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Abstract 
 
This study examines earnings management practices in the wake of natural 
disasters and investigates how earnings management affects credit ratings 
during such events.  
Initially, we provide an extensive literature on earnings management and 
earnings quality, an inverse measure of earnings management, as the 
foundation for our empirical development.  
Beginning with the first set of studies, the primary objective is to assess the 
level of earnings management used by firms around natural disasters. Our main 
analyses are performed across two different disasters, namely the 2004 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 flooding in Thailand, in order to 
investigate whether the different intensity of the disaster matters for firms’ 
earnings management strategies. We employ a differences-in-differences (diff-
in-diff) approach to test how firms engage in earning management when facing 
the disaster. We further examine how the severity of the disaster affects 
managers’ incentives to manage earnings by considering the difference in the 
country-level financial damage caused by the tsunami and the flooding. Our 
findings show that firms manage earnings to misrepresent economic 
performance after going through the disasters and that the levels of earnings 
management hinge upon the severity of the natural disaster. 
For the second set of empirical evidence, the primary objective is to analyze the 
implications of earnings management for credit ratings. That is, we examine 
whether (how) credit rating agencies see through (react to) earnings 
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management used by firms in the event of a natural disaster. Similar to the first 
empirical study, we also investigate whether the effect of earnings management 
on credit ratings are conditional on the disaster intensity. Moreover, we explore 
those effects across the types of credit ratings, i.e. investment and speculative 
grades. Our evidence further suggests that credit rating agencies impose 
penalties for firms that manage earnings during disasters. The higher the 
intensity of the disaster, the more likely the credit rating agencies will adjust 
their credit ratings for earnings management. Lastly, credit rating agencies tend 
to adjust their credit rating in speculative-grade vs. investment-grade firms in 
different ways. 
Overall, this dissertation provides new and novel evidence that firms engage in 
earnings management when managers are incentivized, as in our case, by 
natural disasters. We contribute to the literature on earnings management by 
shedding light on natural disasters as both a determinant of earnings 
management and on its consequences for the relation between earnings 
management and credit ratings.  
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Essays on Earnings Management in Response to 
Natural Disasters 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1 Background and motivation 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the determinants and 
consequences of earnings management. This study is of special interest 
because it considers both the determinants and consequences of earning 
management around natural disasters. It sheds light on how natural disasters 
affect the incentives to engage in earnings management and how it affects the 
relationship between earnings management and credit ratings. 
Environmental risk is the actual or potential economic and social threat of 
adverse effects on living organisms, arising out of a human or an organization's 
activities (i.e. global warming, pollution, oil and toxic material spills) 
(Queensland Government, 2014). Although natural disasters are events that 
result from natural processes such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunami, and hurricanes (Abbott, 1996; and Smith, 1992), science 
seems to converge that human activities may be related to their happening and 
they still bear economic and social adverse effects. For example, with flooding, 
the volume of water in the river becomes greater than the capacity of the stream 
channel, causing negative effects on humans and firms, and in severe cases 
may disrupt both the local and the national economy (Kliesen, 1994). Flooding 
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may be attributed directly to human activities (i.e. increased construction on 
floodplains, poor levee design, and destruction of natural areas that would 
contain the impact of flooding). Furthermore, natural disaster may be attributed 
directly to inappropriate activities by the company’s management (i.e. the 
explosion at the upper big branch mine in Montcoal on April 5, 2010) (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 2018; and Koehler and Hespenheide, 2013). 
Interestingly, Spiegel et al. (2007) identify that the occurrence of one type of 
disaster may enhance the risk of another type of disaster. For example, fires 
can be ignited as a result of earthquakes or floodings can be caused by a 
landslide into a river (Smith, 1992; and Nelson, 2018). Therefore, natural 
disaster and environmental risk are closely linked.  For example, the Union of 
Concerned Scientists (2018) suggests that global warming related floods are 
becoming more frequent because of the shifting in the rainfall patterns. The 
more global temperatures rise, the more water evaporates from the oceans, 
rivers, and lakes, making heavy rain more frequent in many areas of the world 
(The Weather Gamut, 2018). In the end, both natural disasters (floods) and 
environmental risks (global warming) can cause significant negative impacts on 
both human lives and businesses.  
The occurrence of natural disasters may encourage manager to engage in 
upward earning management to convey information about the firm’s ability to 
survive after the disaster as the market incentive hypothesis or engage in 
downward earning management to benefit from the government help as the 
political cost hypothesis. Furthermore, the occurrence of natural disasters 
affects a firm through downgraded credit rating due to a significant loss of firm 
financial performance (Standard and Poor’s, 2015). Credit rating is the analysis 
of credit risk associated with financial statements of a firm by various credit 
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rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Credit rating 
agencies focus on earnings, profitability, interest coverage, liquidity, leverage, 
changing debt burdens, new competition, and regulatory changes in their rating 
analysis (Jorion et al., 2009; Jung et al., 2013; and Carter, 2015). Because 
credit rating is used to determine the firm’s future borrowing costs, to help 
assess the solvency position of the particular firm, and to comply with internal 
by-low restrictions, thus, it is no surprise that firms are likely to affect their credit 
ratings by manipulating earnings to increase the credit rating agencies 
confidence in the survival of the firm after the occurrence of a natural disaster. 
Prior literature (i.e. Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; Schipper, 1989; and 
Turner and Guilding, 2011) defines earnings management as some misdeeds 
by managers to maximize the value of their firms or to achieve their targets (e.g. 
loss avoidance, earnings increase, earnings smoothness, meeting or beating 
analyst earnings forecasts, and preserving a desired credit rating) by using 
discretionary accounting or abnormal real operations.  
Importantly, the number of disasters has been increasing in every continent 
(Down to Earth, 2015). Hence shedding light on how firms manage earnings 
around natural disasters and the implications of such earnings management on 
credit ratings appears to be timely and important. Three facts are driving the 
choice of our research setting. First, Asia has faced more natural disasters than 
any other continents over the years (Figure 1.1). Second, the percentage of 
people killed by earthquakes in Asia has been greater than that in any other 
continent (Figure 1.2) (WordPress, 2010). Third, flooding is considered the most 
common natural disasters (Figure 1.3), it ranks in the top ten natural disasters 
with the highest death toll in the first half of 2017 (World Economic Forum, 
2018a).  
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Figure 1.1: Number of natural disasters reported in different continents 
(1970-2014) 
 
Source: Down to Earth, 2015 
 
Figure 1.2: Percentage of people killed by earthquakes in different 
continents 
 
Source: WordPress, 2010 
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Figure 1.3: Percentage of occurrences of natural disasters by disaster 
type (1995-2015) 
 
 
Source: World Economic Forum, 2016 
 
Natural disasters can cause significant negative impacts on a firm’s tangible 
assets (e.g. inventory, buildings, factories and equipment), and intangible 
assets (e.g. image, creditworthiness on safety and survival, etc.), as well as 
human capital (World Economic Forum, 2015). Firms cannot fully avoid natural 
disasters risk and many organisations (i.e. World Economic Forum, 2015; The 
Global Risks Report, 2018; and World Economic Forum, 2018b) report that 
natural disasters are becoming more frequent and severe. This is also 
consistent with the document of World Economic Forum (2018a) that 
environmental issues are listed as one of the four key global risks and suggests 
that they may lead to serious disruption of business. Hence, firms have set 
plans to reduce disasters risk; however, they may still find it difficult to remain in 
business after the disaster. In this situation, it is very interesting to study 
whether managers have the incentive to engage in earnings management, as 
well as potential consequences of such behaviour.  
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The magnitude and location of the bad event determine whether a bad event 
becomes a disaster (Nelson, 2018). Small earthquakes occur all of the time with 
no adverse effect. Large earthquakes are considered a disaster if they affect 
humans adversely and damage infrastructure (i.e. collapse of buildings, and 
disruption of electrical power and water service). In contrast, a large earthquake 
in an unpopulated area will not result in a disaster if it does not have an effect 
on humans. In conclusion, bad events are considered as disasters when they 
impact large areas where humans live. According to Spiegel et al. (2007), 
during the period 1995-2004 Africa and Asia have experienced the largest-scale 
natural disasters. Therefore, it is interesting to study disasters that hit Asia, such 
as the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 flooding. 
Our empirical studies are based in Asia, which we have discussed is the 
continent most prone to natural disasters.  Specifically, we will focus on two 
different natural disasters: (1) the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, which is 
one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history that killed over 
230,000 people in fourteen countries and rendered millions homeless (Sms 
Tsunami Warning, 2012); and (2) the 2011 flooding in Thailand, which caused 
disruptions to manufacturing supply chains affecting the regional automobile 
production, and also causing a global shortage of hard disk drives which lasted 
throughout 2012 (Centre for research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2012). 
 
2 Research objectives and questions  
Before investigating the formal empirical studies, Chapter 2 provides an 
extensive literature review on earnings quality and earnings management 
studies, with the overarching aim of understanding the conceptual connection 
between earnings management and earnings quality. Moreover, Chapter 2 aims 
19 
 
to systematically explore the motivations for earnings management, the trade-
offs in alternative earnings management strategies (such as accruals earnings 
management (AEM), real earnings management (REM), and classification 
shifting), and to present the research designs which are commonly used in 
accruals and real earnings management studies. We also discuss a different 
categorization of the earnings management literature, namely determinants and 
consequences of earnings management, to lay the groundwork in earnings 
management practices for researchers. 
While most of the prior studies on earnings management focused on market 
expectations, contractual arrangements, debt market and public scrutiny as 
determinants of earnings management, recent literature is concerned with 
exogenous shocks that affect the level of earnings management (Cohen et al., 
2008; Carter, 2015; Aono and Guan, 2008; and Doyle et al., 2007). Our first 
objective in Chapter 3 is to extend the earnings management literature by 
investigating natural disasters and how they affect the incentives to manage 
earnings. On the one hand, natural disasters have a negative effect on the 
financial performance of firms, thus managers may need to re-assure investors 
and analysts about the firm’s survival prospects or even attract more 
prospective investors by managing earnings upwards. On the other hand, 
managers may decide to underreport performance to reserve earnings for the 
future or to benefit from the government’s aid, hence engaging in income-
decreasing earnings management. Both situations are consistent with idea that 
natural disasters encourage managers to engage in opportunistic earnings 
management. The managers can select to engage in either AEM or REM or 
utilize both strategies (AEM and REM) as substitutes by trading-off the costs 
and benefits. The main cost of REM is that it affects both current and future 
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cash flows, whereas, the main cost of AEM are related to auditor and regulatory 
scrutiny, litigation risk, and the fact that accruals reverse in subsequent periods 
(Zang, 2012; Bozzolan et al., 2015; and Cohan et al., 2008). Moreover, if 
managers opt for accruals manipulation and the amount being managed falls 
short of the earnings target in the last quarter, there would be insufficient time to 
use real earnings management (Alhadab et al., 2016). Hence, the main 
objective of the first empirical study (Chapter 3) is to examine whether firms in 
countries that are hit by natural disasters are more willing to engage in accruals 
and real earnings management activities. As a secondary objective, we also 
investigate whether the severity of the natural disaster (measured as the 
country-level financial damage caused by the events) is related to the level of 
earnings management. Following prior literature (Trombetta and Imperatore, 
2014), we expect that the loss of investors’ confidence in the survival of the firm 
shortly after the natural disaster would be more (less) severe in countries with 
high (low) level of intensity of natural disaster and thus it could influence 
managers’ incentives to manage earnings.  
While the first empirical study focuses on how natural disasters are related to 
the use of earnings management strategies, the empirical study in Chapter 4 
study examines the consequences of earnings management on credit ratings 
around natural disasters. As mentioned above, natural disasters negatively 
affect the financial performance of firms and are considered as one of the 
business risks that firms face and cannot always be adequately protected 
against (World Economic Forum, 2018a and 2018b). Indeed, Standard and 
Poor’s (2015) indicates that natural disasters affect firms through credit rating 
downgrades. These situations could encourage managers to manipulate 
earnings to increase the credit rating agencies confidence in the survival of the 
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firm after the occurrence of a disaster. Therefore, it is important to look at the 
reaction of credit rating agencies to such earnings management efforts during 
serious natural disasters. As the firm’s credit rating is a key factor in investment 
decisions, low credit ratings have significant cost implications for firms (i.e. cost 
of future borrowing and valuation of stocks). Therefore, we investigate whether 
firms are likely to affect their credit ratings by managing earnings during natural 
disasters in order to obtain a more favourable credit rating or to avoid a 
downgrade after the disasters.  
On the one hand, credit rating agencies may want to protect their reputation 
when they recognize that firms are managing earnings during a natural disaster. 
In this case, credit rating agencies will penalize firms with managed earnings by 
lowering their credit rating. However, because credit rating agencies are not 
independent from the firms they rate, they might be motivated not to adjust for 
earnings management during disaster periods, resulting in higher than expected 
credit ratings. In other words, the research question is whether managers are 
able to influence credit rating during natural disasters by manipulating earnings. 
We also consider whether the effects of earnings management on the 
deviations from expected credit rating is conditional upon the severity of the 
disaster. Similarly to our arguments above, we expect that the loss of investors’ 
confidence in the survival of the firm shortly after the natural disaster would be 
more (less) severe in countries with high (low) level of intensity of natural 
disaster, thus affecting how earnings management relates to the deviations 
from expected credit rating.  
As a final objective of the second empirical study, we consider whether the 
moderating role of a natural disaster in the relation between earning 
management and deviations from expected credit rating is different between 
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separating speculative grade and investment grade firms. Generally, 
speculative-grade (SG) firms need to manage earnings to have a higher level of 
credit ratings or upgrade from SG firms to investment-grade (IG) firms. This is 
because most investors (e.g. insurance firms, securities firms, banks, mutual 
funds, and private pensions) will not invest in non-IG firms due to self-imposed 
or regulation-based cutoffs. However, SG firms have many constraints (i.e. cash 
flow problems and high level of cumulative accruals management) in earnings 
management. Thus, credit rating agencies tend to detect earnings management 
in SG firms easily and they penalize SG firms for manipulating earnings during 
the disaster by lowering their credit ratings. While IG firms are likely to manage 
earnings to avoid downgrades to SG group, credit rating agencies are reluctant 
to adjust ratings in IG firms because of the low risk profile of IG firms (i.e. low 
bankruptcy risk). This leads to our final objective of investigating how credit 
rating agencies’ response to earning management of SG firms differs from that 
of IG firms during natural disaster. 
 
3 Overview of findings and contributions of the research 
This study provides insights into the determinants and the debt market 
consequences of earnings management during natural disasters through two 
empirical studies presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
In Chapter 3 we provide evidence that firms actively manage earnings after the 
disasters by using both accruals and real earnings management to transmit a 
positive signal or avoid the loss of investors’ confidence in the survival of the 
firms, which is aligned with the market incentive hypothesis. The market 
incentive hypothesis for earnings management suggests that firms whose 
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performance is suffering due to exogenous shocks, such as financial crises or – 
as in our setting - natural disasters, make adjustments to their policies (i.e. 
altering inventory accounting methods, changing estimates of bad debt, revising 
assumptions related to pension assets, changing credit terms and price 
discounts, and changing the product volume) to improve the look of their 
financial statements. We also document that the level of earnings management 
depends on the severity of the disaster.  
Overall Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing useful insights into 
how natural disasters can affect reporting incentives and by providing evidence 
in favour of the market incentive hypothesis. More specifically, we improve on 
prior evidence (Byard et al., 2007) in two ways. First, we consider both accrual 
and real earnings management (hence allowing for the possibility that firms may 
choose one or the other strategy). Second, we employ a more robust 
methodological approach via the use of a differences-in-differences research 
design which assesses differences between the treatment and control groups 
before and after the disasters, hence strengthening causal inference (although 
we are aware that we cannot completely rule out that other potential omitted 
variables are affecting our results).  
Our findings also extend prior literature on similar exogenous shocks, such as 
the financial crisis in Trombetta and Imperatore (2014), and its impact on 
earnings management. As extreme weather conditions are intensifying and 
catastrophic phenomena such as flooding become more common, 
understanding how managers react to natural disasters is of interest not only to 
investors and practitioners, but also to regulators in order to formulate 
appropriate policies.  
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In Chapter 4 we investigate how earnings management during a natural 
disaster is related to deviations from expected credit ratings. We document that 
credit rating agencies seem to be able to detect earnings management activities 
and penalize firms with earnings management by providing a lower credit rating 
during the disaster. This evidence is aligned with a reputation incentive story. 
We also document that the intensity of the disaster positively affects how the 
credit rating agencies adjust their credit ratings for earnings management. 
Finally, the results show that the consequences of earnings management on 
deviations from expected credit ratings affect mainly speculative-grade, rather 
than investment-grade, firms.  
Our analyses in Chapter 4 contribute to the literature in several ways. Building 
on Carter (2015)’s findings on the impacts caused by internal factors 
(governance and internal controls), we examine the joint interaction among 
three important phenomena: earnings management, credit ratings, and natural 
disasters and investigate the impacts of the external factor (natural disasters, 
specifically the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 flooding in 
Thailand) on earnings management towards credit ratings. Natural disasters are 
a very different type of exogenous shocks compared to regulation changes 
(SOX), as presented by Carter (2015). In addition, the analysis extends the 
scope of a previous study by Alissa et al. (2013) on the consequences of 
earnings management on deviations from expected credit rating by considering 
whether natural disasters play a moderating role. We also provide new 
empirical evidence that the difference in the timing of each disaster has affected 
the selection of earnings management techniques by the managers. Because 
the flooding in Thailand occurred at the beginning of the last quarter in 2011, 
firms in the flooding sample have more time to manipulate earnings by using 
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both real and accruals earnings management to affect deviations from the 
expected credit rating. In contrast, the tsunami occurred at the end of the last 
reporting quarter in 2004. Thus, firms in the tsunami sample have limited time to 
manage real activities. Our results may therefore benefit investors, regulators, 
and lenders who rely on credit ratings during events such as natural disasters to 
make decisions on investment, risk assessment, and lending. 
 
4 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of 
earnings quality and earnings management. Chapter 3 presents the first 
empirical chapter which focuses on natural disasters as determinants of 
earnings management. Chapter 4 presents the second empirical chapter which 
focuses on the consequences of earnings management during natural disasters 
on deviations from expected credit rating. Chapter 5 provides the research’s 
conclusions, limitations, and avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
A Review of Earnings Quality and Earnings Management 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this literature review is to understand the theoretical 
underpinning of earnings management and how it relates to earnings quality. In 
addition, the review provides a thorough discussion of the most commonly used 
proxies of earnings management and examines research design choices in the 
earnings management research. Further, we discuss the determinants of 
earnings management as well as its consequences to provide a convenient 
reference tool for readers who are interested in studying earnings management 
practices. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Earnings quality, earnings management, discretionary accruals, and 
abnormal real activities  
27 
 
1 Introduction 
Prior literature has shown that investors fixate in reported earnings numbers for 
valuation and stewardship purposes and tend to ignore or underestimate the 
importance of other information (e.g. Sloan, 1996). This incentivizes managers 
to manipulate earnings and makes the evaluation of earnings quality important 
for both academics and practitioners.  
Managerial engagement in earnings management can be driven by either 
information efficiency or opportunistic reasons. According to the efficient 
information hypothesis, managers apply discretion in estimation and judgment 
in order to represent the fundamental earnings performance in a faithful way 
(Francis et al., 2005; Choi et al., 2011; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; and 
Bowen et al., 2008). However, under the opportunistic behavior hypothesis, 
managers may exploit this flexibility in accounting decisions to manipulate 
reported income according to their own incentives. In other words, they could 
engage in earnings management to misrepresent economic performance 
(Dechow, 1994; Schipper, 1989; Stolowy and Breton, 2004; and Kirschenheiter 
and Melumad, 2002).  
Earnings management and earnings quality are the two sides of the same coin. 
When earnings management is low, the quality of earnings is high and vice 
versa (Dechow et al., 2010). The aim of this chapter is to review and allow a 
better understanding of the literature on the relation between earnings 
management and earnings quality, as well as the research design choices in 
the earnings management research. 
Section 2 is concerned with explaining the notions of earnings quality and 
earnings management. We start by describing why earnings information is 
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critical, recognizing that high reported earnings quality is important in order to 
make accurate earnings forecast and estimate a stock’s return potential as well 
as for stewardship purposes. Next, we present a clear definition of earnings 
quality and we discuss prior literature on this topic, shown the relationship 
between earnings quality and earnings management. 
Section 3 discusses two types of earnings management (accruals and real 
earnings management). The discussion finds the fact that accruals and real 
earnings management have different costs and benefits, and that firms use 
them as substitutes. However, managers can also manage earnings by moving 
items within the income statement to increase core earnings or use special 
items. This strategy of managing earnings is called classification shifting and 
has been mostly overlooked by the literature. 
Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of the models developed to measure 
earnings management which could be applied to improve financial reporting 
quality and to better protect investors in making decisions and verifying the 
reliability of the accounting information in financial reports. We discuss the three 
most common research designs for the study of accruals earnings management 
and the trade-off between the costs and benefits of each methodology. Next, we 
discuss the models developed to measure real earnings management including 
the comparison of costs and benefits of each model. Lastly, we briefly discuss 
other less explored methods (i.e. M-score, F-score, accounting ratio and 
unexplained audit fee model) to measure earnings management.  
Section 5 provides a systematic classification of earnings management 
literature. Namely, we describe the two theoretical underpinnings for earnings 
management: the efficient information and the opportunistic behavior 
hypotheses. In addition, we discuss separately the incentives for earnings 
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management according to each theoretical framework. Better understanding 
managerial incentives for earnings managements is important for practitioners 
and regulators looking to undo the engaged portion of reported earnings when 
valuing the firm. Lastly, we discuss two patterns of earnings management 
(income minimization and income maximization). 
Sections 6 and 7 present a different categorization of the earnings management 
literature, based on the determinants and constraints of earnings management 
(Section 6) or its consequences (Section 7). We classify the determinants and 
constraints on earnings management into two categories, namely, internal and 
external factors, and the consequences of earnings management into four 
categories, which include litigation propensity, market valuations, auditor 
opinions, and credit rating. Section 8 offers some conclusions and avenues for 
future research. 
Firms with earnings management are of concern to various stakeholders. 
However, before looking for a solution, they need to understand the frequency, 
determinants and impact of earnings management, including what factors limit 
earnings management. This is the reason that we start this thesis with the 
review of earnings quality and earnings management literature before turning to 
the formal empirical studies in Chapter 3 and 4.  
Chapter 2 is of interest to researchers studying the likelihood and extent of 
earnings management and/or developing a new model to detect earnings 
management behaviors of the firms. Furthermore, it can be helpful to investors’ 
trying to improve their portfolio returns, auditors concerned about avoiding 
costly litigation, and analysts worried about building a reputation for accuracy. 
Lastly, it can help policy makers to formulate appropriate policies to detect 
earnings management and enhance investor protection. 
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2 Understanding earnings quality and earnings management 
Dichev et al. (2013) report that chief financial officers (CFOs) are primarily 
responsible for the quality of earnings because they make the key decisions 
about how to apply accounting standards within their firms, and whether to use 
(or abuse) discretion in financial reporting. Earnings is an important input when 
evaluating management performance, setting efficient contracts, and making 
valuation/investment decisions about the firm. Thus, managers may decide to 
manage earnings to meet or beat certain performance and contracts thresholds 
or to achieve specific objectives. Prior literature (i.e. Dechow et al., 2010; 
Richardson et al., 2005; and Schipper and Vincent, 2003) suggests that 
earnings quality and earnings management are inversely related. This is 
consistent with the idea that strong earnings management leads to less clear 
earnings and vice versa. 
Section 2 begins by analyzing why earnings are important to provide a basis for 
understanding the relationship between earnings management and earnings 
quality. Next, we present a definition of earnings quality and earnings quality 
components. Finally, we discuss how earnings management affects each of the 
components of earnings quality. 
2.1 Importance of earnings   
There are three reasons why earnings are highly important. First, earnings are 
an essential tool for shareholders to control management effectively as they 
provide a summary measure of a firm’s performance and can be used to 
evaluate future cash flows (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In line with this view, 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) suggest that earnings are considered as the most 
important summary performance indicator and Dewi (2015) documents that 
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profitability describes the firm’s financial performance or management’s 
responsibility with respect to the owner’s interest. Furthermore, Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) indicate that equity investors, board of directors, and creditors 
use earnings benchmarks to reduce information-processing costs when 
evaluating firms' performance; while Dichev et al. (2013) extend the pool of 
interested stakeholders to employees, suppliers, customers, etc.  
Second, earnings and other accounting numbers are often used to set efficient 
contracts (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; and Dichev et al., 2013). For example, 
bonus compensation contracts may dictate that the firm will not pay the bonus 
to the management or other employees if earnings are lower than a certain 
threshold. Debt contracts are another example, where the terms of the contract 
often include earnings-based covenants, such as restrictions to pay dividends to 
shareholders if earnings are lower compared to the prior year.  
Third, earnings numbers contain essential information for making valuation 
decisions (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Ariff et al., 
1997; and Ball and Brown, 1968). Based on Ohlson’s model, market price is 
associated with earnings and other accounting data (Ohlson, 1995). Similarly, 
Ball and Brown (1968) document that accounting information such as earnings 
is useful in estimating the risks of security returns and expected value for 
investors. Thus, it is not surprising that investors mainly focus on earnings to 
predict future cash flows of firms and assess their risk when making an 
investment decision (Watrin and Ullmann, 2012). Callao et al. (2006), who study 
the comparative analysis of the value relevance of reported earnings and their 
components, provide evidence for the value relevance of net earnings numbers. 
Dichev et al. (2013) survey CFOs about earnings quality and find that 94.67% of 
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public firm CFOs think that earnings are important for investors in valuing the 
firm.  
Conclusively, the quality of earnings is important for users of financial 
statements because high earnings quality ensures that earnings reflect current 
operating performance accurately, can be used to determine firm value, and are 
a good indicator of future operating performance (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Dechow et al., 2003; Jansen et al., 2012; Perotti 
and Wagenhofer, 2014; Schipper, 1989; and Dechow et al., 2010). In addition, 
earnings quality is important for regulators, whose role is to ensure that reported 
earnings are informative of the true underlying performance and economics of 
the business and safeguard investors (Dichev et al., 2013). Lastly, earnings 
quality is an area of interest for academics who examine a variety of issues, 
including the development of models to measure the quality of the reported 
earnings.  
2.2 Definition of earnings quality and earnings quality measures 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) define earnings quality as the unbiasedness and 
sustainability of earnings. Dichev et al. (2013) suggest that the quality of 
earnings relates to reported earnings which are sustainable, repeatable, 
recurring, consistent, and reflecting long-term trends. Furthermore, the 
statement of financial accounting concepts No.1 (SFAC No1) documents the 
importance of earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010). It mentions that high 
earnings quality is relevant to particular decisions because it provides 
information about a firm’s financial performance, which is not directly 
observable. In other words, firms with high earnings quality have financial 
statements that reveal their real fundamental value. Dechow et al. (2010) 
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document that financial performance and the accounting system are among the 
factors affecting earnings quality.  
Financial performance is one of the factors affecting quality of earnings because 
firms with weak performance are likely to engage in accounting gimmicks to 
improve their earnings. In other words, firms that are performing poorly have 
stronger incentives to manage earnings and such actions could reduce the 
quality of earnings (Doyle et al., 2007; and Dechow et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, firms with abnormal good performance (i.e. abnormal fast-growing firms) 
are associated with high earnings volatility, and hence they are considered to 
also have a low quality of earnings (Dichev et al., 2013). Not surprisingly, 
several papers select earnings properties (such as earnings smoothness, 
earnings variability, and earnings persistence) as earnings quality proxies 
(Esteban and Garcia, 2014; and Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). We will 
describe earnings properties in more depth in subsection 2.2.1 about earnings 
quality measures. 
The accounting measurement system determines the quality of a firm’s 
earnings as well. Dechow (1994) and Dichev et al. (2013) suggest that 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) play a prime role in improving 
the ability of earnings to signal the firm’s performance. In the same vein, 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) report that standard setters view the quality of 
financial reporting standards as an indirect indicator of the quality of the 
reported earnings. Accounting standards set the flexibility in the choice of 
accounting treatments and managers can use this flexibility either to convey to 
investors their private information about future cash flows in line with the 
efficient information hypothesis or opportunistically to serve their own interest. 
Ewert et al. (2005) investigate whether tighter accounting standards reduce 
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earnings management and provide more relevant information to capital 
markets. They show, by relying on a rational expectations equilibrium model, 
that earnings quality increases with tighter standards in line with the 
opportunistic hypothesis.  Therefore, firms with high quality of both financial 
performance and tighter accounting systems have higher quality of earnings.  
In addition to the above, earnings quality also depends on changes in other 
characteristics of the firm, i.e. the business model of the firm, the environment in 
which the firm operates, its auditors, and other macro-economic conditions that 
we will describe in more depth in Section 6 when discussing the determinants of 
earnings management (Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014; Zeff, 2014; Cormier et 
al., 2013; and Schipper and Vincent, 2003). Dechow et al. (2010) and Esteban 
and Garcia (2014) indicate that macro-economic factors (such as inflation, 
unemployment, a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), public policies, 
environmental policies, and financial crisis) negatively influences earnings 
quality, and are associated with incentives for earnings management. For 
example, the managers may be motivated for earnings management during 
financial crises to show good performance and ensure that the firm can 
continue in the future or to justify laying off employees.  
Prior researchers (i.e. Dechow et al., 2010; Kousenidis et al., 2013; Esteban 
and Garcia, 2014; and Mendes et al., 2012) have categorized earnings quality 
in various ways as shown in table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Classification of earnings quality 
Classify by measures Classify by 
strategies 
Dechow et al. (2010) Kousenidiset et al. (2013); 
and Esteban and Garcia 
(2014) 
Mendes et al. 
(2012) 
1. Properties of earnings 
- Earnings persistence 
- Earnings smoothing 
- Small profits and small 
loss avoidance 
- Timely loss recognition 
(Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002;  Subramanyam and 
Wild, 1996; Dichev et al., 2013; Dechow 
et al., 2010; Esteban and Garcia, 2014; 
Richardson, 2003; Ball et al., 2003; Li, 
2008; Dichev et al., 2013; Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004; Mendes et al., 2012; 
Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; 
Rountree et al., 2008; Milikan and 
Mukkti, 2015; Carter, 2015; Graham et 
al., 2005; Barth et al., 2008; Defond and 
Park, 1997; Bartov, 1993; Defond, 
2010; Ball et al., 2000; Basu, 1997;   
and Price et al., 2011) 
 
1. Accounting-based 
measures 
- Earnings persistence 
- Earnings variability 
- Earnings predictability 
- Earnings smoothing 
- Small profit 
(Subramanyam and Wild, 1996; Bath et 
al., 2008; Schipper and Vincent, 2003; 
Dichev et al., 2013; Dechow et al., 
2010; Li, 2008; Esteban and Garcia, 
2014; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Price 
et al., 2011; Dichev and Tang., 2009; 
Das et al., 1998; and Affleck-Graves et 
al., 2002) 
1. Aggressive 
policy 
 
(Dichev et al., 2010; 
Richardson, 2003; 
Mendes et al., 2012; and 
Dichev et al., 2013) 
2. Investor responsiveness to 
earnings 
- Earnings response 
coefficient (R
2
) 
(Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Dichev et 
al., 2013; Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Liu 
and Thomus, 2000; Teoh and Wong, 
1993; Cahan et al., 2009; Givoly and 
Hayn, 2000; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; 
and Darjezi et al., 2015) 
 
2. Capital market-based 
measures 
- Value relevance 
- Timeliness of loss 
recognition 
(Francis et al., 2004; Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003;  Sloan, 1996; Ball et al., 
2003; Xie, 2001; Cahan et al., 2009; 
Ball et al., 2000; Kormendi and Lipe, 
1987; and Chin, 2015) 
2. Conservative 
policy 
(Penman and Zhang, 
2002; Basu, 1997; 
Dichev et al., 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2010; Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2008; 
Defond, 2010; Ball et al., 
2000; and Dichev et al., 
2013) 
3. Other indicators of 
earnings quality 
- Restatements 
- Internal control 
weaknesses 
- SEC accounting and 
auditing enforcement 
releases 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Dechow et al., 
2010; Tang at el., 2015; Doyle et al., 
2007; Klein, 2002; and Lin et al., 2016) 
 
 3. Earnings 
smoothing 
 
(Barth et al., 2008; 
Milikan and Mukkti, 
2015; Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004; Schipper 
and Vincent, 2003; 
Mendes et al., 2012; 
Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad, 2002; Tucker 
and Zarowin, 2006; and 
Rountree et al., 2008) 
We follow Dechow et al. (2010) and we classify the quality of earnings into three 
groups: properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings, and other 
indicators of earnings equality. 
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2.2.1 Properties of earnings 
The first group of measurements focuses on the characteristics or properties of 
earnings, which includes earnings persistence, earnings smoothing, earnings 
variability, earnings predictability, and timeliness of loss recognition.  
Earnings persistence 
Earnings persistence is correlated with stability and is observable over time. 
Earnings persistence is measured as the slope coefficient in a regression of 
stock returns on the changes in earnings or level of earnings (Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). Subramanyam and Wild (1996) measure earnings persistence 
by using the coefficient from a regression of returns on earnings to study 
whether the relation between earnings and changes in security valuation is 
increasing in the persistence of the earnings. Their result shows an inverse 
relation between an entity’s probability of termination and the informativeness of 
earnings. Dichev et al. (2013) suggest that high-persistence earnings are an 
accurate predictor of future long-run sustainable earnings. In addition, Dechow 
et al. (2010) document that more persistent earnings lead to higher firm and 
equity valuation (higher stock prices and market returns). Therefore, firms 
having higher earnings persistence are viewed as having higher earnings 
quality (Esteban and Garcia, 2014; Richardson, 2003; and Revsine et al., 
1999).  
Further, firms with higher readability of financial disclosures have more earnings 
persistence which allows investors to predict stock prices that more accurately 
reflect the persistence of earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). This is consistent with 
evidence in Li (2008) that annual report readability is positively associated with 
earnings persistence. These findings suggest that the annual reports of firms 
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with more persistent positive earnings are easier to read. In contrast, firms with 
more special items or accruals adjustments have lower persistence of earnings 
because special items may not be helpful for predicting future earnings 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Thus, those firms are considered to have low earnings 
quality.  
Earnings smoothing 
Earnings smoothing is a technique used to decrease the natural earning 
variability over time to produce a steady stream of income and make the firm 
appear less risky (Dichev et al., 2013; Stolowy and Breton, 2004; Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003; and Mendes et al., 2012). Dechow et al. (2010), who study the 
validity and usefulness of the determinants of earnings quality, document that 
earnings smoothing can improve the firm value. Firms with originally smoother 
earnings have less earnings volatility, and thus firm value is priced with a 
premium. This is consistent with the evidence by Tucker and Zarowin (2006) 
who show that changes in the current share price of firms with less earnings 
smoothing contain less information about their future earnings than do changes 
in the share price of firms that smooth earnings more. Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad (2002) point out that the managers wish to smooth earnings because 
reporting small earnings increases the inferred precision of the reported 
earnings. However, Rountree et al. (2008) find that income smoothing is not 
value creating if not supported by smoothed cash flows and is viewed by 
investors as opportunistic accounting manipulation. 
Milikan and Mukkti (2015) suggest that earnings smoothing together with less 
volatility in stock prices will encourage investors to buy shares. Hence, it leads 
to higher market value. Moreover, Carter (2015) finds that smoother earnings 
will lead to less uncertainty about firms’ creditworthiness and, thus, higher credit 
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ratings. Not surprisingly, firms with less volatile earnings will have higher credit 
ratings than other firms. This notion is further supported in a survey by Graham 
et al. (2005), in which approximately 42 percent of the respondents believe that 
smoother earnings enable firms to achieve better credit ratings. In summary, 
smaller variance in earnings implies earnings smoothing and, generally, higher 
earnings quality.  
Barth et al. (2008) suggest three ways to measure earnings smoothness: the 
variability of the change in net income scaled by total assets (low variance 
indicates more income smoothing); the ratio of the variability of the change in 
net income to the variability of the change in operating cash flows (lower ratios 
imply more income smoothing); and the Spearman correlation between accruals 
and cash flows (negative correlations are evidence of income smoothing).  
Schipper and Vincent (2003) argue that the researchers need to assess 
whether income is inherently smooth because of the business model and the 
reporting environment of a firm or, alternatively, if earnings smoothness has 
been caused by a deliberate management’s choice. In the latter case, the 
researcher can use discretionary accruals, a measure described and discussed 
in detail in section 4.2 about discretionary accruals models, to assess artificially 
smoothed earnings. In several accounting studies (e.g. Defond and Park, 1997; 
Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; and Barth et al., 2008), firms with high discretionary 
accruals have been shown to artificially smooth earnings in order to increase 
firm value. As a result, these firms have lower earnings quality. This is 
consistent also with evidence in Jung et al. (2013) that firms near a broad rating 
boundary (plus and minus) have high discretionary accruals. Their findings 
imply that those firms are more likely to smooth earnings to increase the 
likelihood of a credit rating upgrades or decrease the likelihood of a credit rating 
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downgrades from broad ration category. Bartov (1993) provides another 
example of artificially smoothed earnings. His analysis shows that managers 
engage in earnings management by choosing the period during which long-lived 
assets and investments will be sold. In doing so, managers manipulate earnings 
smoothness by taking advantage of the principle of acquisition cost underlying 
the accounting valuation of assets1. 
Earnings variability 
Earnings variability is measured by the standard deviation of earnings over 
time. It is measured as an inverse of earnings smoothing. Milikan and Mukkti 
(2015) suggest that a high degree of earnings variability, which is associated to 
fluctuation in share prices, will discourage investors to buy shares, which, in 
turn, leads to lower share market value. Similarly, Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
and Schipper and Vincent (2003) point out that firms with larger standard 
deviations of earnings have less earnings persistence, less earnings 
predictability and hence lower quality of earnings. Furthermore, Schipper and 
Vincent (2003) document that managers may introduce transitory components 
to decrease time-series variability because they believe investors prefer firms 
with small standard deviation of earnings. This is consistent with findings in 
Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) that firms are likely to reduce earnings volatility 
caused by oil price risk by hedging with derivatives instruments in the first three 
quarters, but then, primarily in the final quarter, managers' trade-off abnormal 
accruals and hedging with derivatives to report smooth earnings. 
                                                          
1
 Acquisition-cost principle implies that changes in the market value of an asset between 
acquisition and sale are reported in the period of the sale. 
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Most studies use the abnormal accruals approach to test for evidence whether 
earnings variability is a faithful representation to the reporting entity’s business 
model and its economic environment. Firms with high abnormal accruals are 
assumed to manage earnings variability. Hence, they are considered to have 
low earnings quality. 
Earnings predictability  
Earnings predictability is an attribute of earnings and refers to the predictive 
ability of earnings. Firms with highly predictable earnings are considered to 
have higher-quality earnings because they increase the accuracy and value 
relevance of earnings forecasts (Esteban and Garcia, 2014; Dichev et al., 2013; 
and Price et al., 2011).  According to Schipper and Vincent (2003), earnings 
predictability and earnings variability are negatively related. This is consistent 
with evidence in Dichev and Tang (2009), who investigate the link between 
earnings volatility and earnings predictability. They find that earnings with little 
reliable predictability have remarkably low persistence and high volatility. In 
other words, firms’ earnings will have high predictive ability if they have low 
variability, and hence higher quality (Dechow et al., 2010). In contrast, Barth et 
al. (2008) argue that forecastable earnings may be not positively correlated with 
accounting quality (e.g. in case of using of accruals to report earnings with an 
artificially reduced variability).  
Interestingly, Das et al. (1998) study whether the predictive accuracy of past 
information and the magnitude of the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
related. They estimate the predictability measure by using the forecast error 
from time-series models. Their results show that analysts will issue less 
optimistic forecasts for high predictability firms than for low predictability firms. It 
can be inferred that high predictability firms have high earnings quality; thus, 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate predictions compared to 
forecasts for low predictability firms. Moreover, the evidence of Affleck-Graves 
et al. (2002) suggests that firms with relatively more predictable earnings have a 
lower cost of equity capital (i.e. lower bid-ask spreads) than comparable firms 
with less predictable earnings streams. In their study they measure earnings 
predictability by using a time series linear regression model. However, 
managers who wish to minimize their cost of equity capital may manage 
artificially earnings predictability, which in turn, signifies low earnings quality. 
Timeliness of loss recognition 
According to timeliness of loss recognition, firms with more timely recognition of 
losses have higher quality earnings because timely loss recognition can 
enhance contracting efficiency (Defond, 2010; and Ball et al., 2000). For 
example, timely loss recognition gives managers more incentives to undertake 
positive net present value (NPV) projects and abandon loss-making 
investments quickly, thereby increasing the efficiency of contracting (Ball et al., 
2003). In addition, Chin (2015) finds that credit ratings of firms with earnings 
that exhibit more timely loss recognition predict default more quickly and 
accurately overall. Consequently, firms with higher accounting quality exhibit 
more timely loss recognition allowing investors and credit agencies to more 
accurately evaluate them.  
Dechow et al. (2010) indicate that the reverse earnings-returns regression from 
Basu (1997) is the most frequently used measure of timely loss recognition and 
that it is based on the assumption of efficient markets. According to Basu 
(1997), the idea of conservative accounting system is that earnings reflects bad 
news more quickly than good news. This means that negative earnings 
changes (when bad news are incurred) will be less persistent and more likely to 
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reverse than positive earnings changes (when good news are incurred). This 
attribute of earnings is also known as accounting conservatism. Similarly, 
Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that earnings measured under a more 
conservative policy, which implies early expense recognition or delay in income 
recognition, are correlated with high earnings quality. This is consistent with the 
evidence provided by Ball and Shivakumar (2008). They find that IPO firms, 
which are required to increase the quality of their accounting quality due to the 
increased market scrutiny, report more conservatively. However, even though 
timely loss recognition is considered evidence of accounting quality, it is 
negatively related to earnings smoothing because large losses may be relatively 
rare in firms with earnings smoothing (Lang et al., 2003).  
2.2.2 Investor responsiveness to earnings  
The second group of measurements of earnings quality is the investor 
responsiveness to earnings, which comprises earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) and value relevance. 
Earnings response coefficient   
Information in earnings and information used by investors in their equity 
valuation decisions are correlated (Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, it should 
not be surprising that some studies use various equity market attributes (e.g. 
volatility changes around earnings announcements, and long-window returns 
and volume) to infer earnings quality (Dichev et al., 2013).  
Liu and Thomus (2000) indicate that the earnings response coefficient 
(coefficient estimate) or the R2 from the returns earnings model can be used as 
a measure of investor responsiveness to earnings. Teoh and Wong (1993) 
examine whether auditor’s reputation is correlated with credibility of the 
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earnings report by comparing how the earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
differs between Big Eight (now Big Four) and non-Big Eight audited firms. Their 
results indicate that the ERCs of non-Big Eight clients are statistically 
significantly lower than for Big Eight clients. This suggests that auditor’s 
reputation is a proxy for auditor quality, where a high-quality audit is defined as 
one who brings about more credible earnings reports, resulting in higher-quality 
earnings. However, Dechow et al. (2010) document that declining ERCs may 
occur from changes in accounting methods. For example, more conservatism in 
accounting standards (e.g. increase in fair value accounting of asset 
impairments, and the recognition of pension liabilities) results in the recognition 
of more transitory losses in earnings as having low earnings quality, which in 
turn, lead to declining ERCs (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; and Lev and Zarowin, 
1999). 
Value relevance  
Earnings quality plays a role for the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Value relevance can be measured by regressing stock prices or stock returns 
on earnings or cash flows metrics (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  
The earnings of firms with high earnings quality have a greater association with 
share prices and stock returns compared to the earnings of firms with low 
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010). In other words, firms with managed 
earnings have a low association between earnings and stock returns/share 
prices (Sloan, 1996; and Xie, 2001). This is consistent with the evidence of 
Chan et al. (2006) which shows that high (low)-quality earnings are associated 
with good (poor) future returns. Similarly, Darjezi et al. (2015), who investigate 
whether earnings quality is linked with stock returns, find that working capital 
accruals of high earnings quality firms can help to predict their future returns. 
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Interestingly, Cahan et al. (2009) document that not only the quality of earnings 
but also the quality of prices affects the value relevance of earnings. Moreover, 
the evidence of Kormendi and Lipe (1987) suggest that earnings quality is 
associated with the ability of earnings to reflect information about future benefits 
accruing to shareholders. 
2.2.3 Other indicators of earnings quality  
The third group of earnings quality measures focuses on the firm external and 
internal environment, and how it affects earnings quality. By external 
environment, we mean reference to accounting regulation and other regulatory 
actions (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)), that can affect earnings 
quality. External indicators of earnings quality have advantages because an 
external party directly identifies earnings quality problems (e.g. the auditor in 
case of internal control weaknesses, and the SEC in case of accounting and 
auditing enforcement releases) (Dechow et al., 1996). Moreover, earnings 
quality is measured by using internal indicators as well (such as the 
management team in case of restatements and internal control weaknesses). At 
the same time the most important disadvantage of using external and internal 
indicators as proxies for earnings quality is that they include both intentional and 
unintentional misstatements.  
Dechow et al. (2010) find that extreme accounting accruals firms tend to be 
subject to SEC enforcement releases and are considered to have lower-quality 
earnings than normal firms. Tang at el. (2015) find that smaller, younger, riskier, 
and financially weaker firms are likely to have material weaknesses in internal 
control, which signal the likelihood of unreliable financial reporting. According to 
regulatory requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), managers and auditors 
provide an assessment regarding the effectiveness of internal control over 
45 
 
financial reporting (e.g. internal control quality). In other words, SOX asks firms 
to have more stringent internal controls. Hence, the firms’ earnings are of higher 
quality after the regulatory requirements of SOX. This is consistent with 
evidence of Doyle et al. (2007) that internal control quality under section 404 of 
the SOX of 2002 and earnings persistence are positively associated. Firms with 
weak internal control (as proxied by disclosure of material weaknesses) have 
also lower earnings persistence, hence lower-quality earnings. In another study, 
Aono and Guan (2008) investigate the mitigating effect of SOX on cosmetic 
earnings management and find evidence of earnings management in the two-
year period prior to the SOX, which however decrease in the period after the 
SOX. This finding means that SOX has a deterring impact on earnings 
management behavior. 
Klein (2002), who investigates whether audit committee and board 
characteristics are related to earnings quality, indicates that boards structured 
to be more independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the firm 
financial accounting process, resulting in earnings of higher-quality. Moreover, 
Lin et al. (2016) find that better corporate governance has a positive impact on 
the possibility of earnings management to improving the transparency of 
financial reporting and informativeness of reported earnings. 
2.2.4 Alternative classifications of earnings quality measures 
Earnings quality measures may also be classified according to their reliance on 
accounting-based and market-based measures (Kousenidis et al., 2013; and 
Esteban and Garcia, 2014). Recent empirical research measures earnings 
quality based on accounting information by considering various earnings 
attributes, namely, earnings persistence, earnings variability, earnings 
predictability, earnings smoothing, and small profit, while, proxies for market-
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based constructs are based on the relation between market data and 
accounting data (Francis et al., 2004). Capital market-based measures take 
prices or returns into consideration, by focusing on value relevance and 
timeliness of loss recognition.  
Mendes et al. (2012) employ a different approach and classify earnings quality 
strategies into three groups, which are (1) aggressive policy, (2) conservative 
policy, and (3) earnings smoothing. The first two strategies serve the opposite 
purpose. Aggressive accounting strategies are used to boost income; whereas 
conservative accounting strategies aim to reduce income. Earnings measured 
under an aggressive policy recognize early revenues and/or delay expense 
recognition. Consequently, earnings for the current period would most likely be 
upward biased, in contrast to cash flow from operations. Operating cash flow 
that is less than net income or decreasing over time may indicate low quality 
earnings because firms that cannot generate enough cash have increased 
incentives to mask their poor performance. Thus, an aggressive policy is 
associated with lower quality of earnings (Dechow et al., 2010; and Richardson, 
2003). On the other hand, earnings under a more conservative policy are 
associated with higher quality because this policy is often associated with a 
more timely loss recognition as discussed earlier.  
As an example, suppose firm A and firm B have about the same level and type 
of cash flows and similar strategies regarding the use of property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE). However, firm B assumes that the useful life of its assets is 
15 years while firm A assumes a useful life of 10 years. Firm B is using a longer 
useful life, which results in increased earnings as the depreciation expense is 
lower than in firm A. The underlying performance of both firms is the same, yet 
firm B’s earnings will appear higher. Firm B is said to employ a more aggressive 
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accounting strategy and similarly firm A is said to employ a more conservative 
accounting strategy. Based on prior literature, Firm A is considered to have 
higher earnings quality than firm B (Dechow et al., 2010; and Dichev et al., 
2013).  
Finally, income smoothing strategies aim to reduce long-term income volatility 
and, as such, they are associated with higher earnings quality. Hence, firms 
having higher earnings smoothing are viewed as having higher earnings quality 
because of enhanced market value and accuracy of analyst forecasts (Milikan 
and Mukkti, 2015; and Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). 
2.3 Relation between earnings quality and earnings management 
Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the relation between earnings management and 
earnings quality (Barth et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013; 
and Richardson et al., 2005). 
Figure 2.1: The interrelation of earnings management and earnings quality  
 
The quality of accounting accruals is one of the most commonly used measures 
of earnings management (Dichev et al., 2013). Dechow et al. (2010) divide 
accruals into two types, namely normal and abnormal accruals. Normal 
accruals, also known as non-discretionary accruals (NDAs), capture 
adjustments that reflect fundamental performance, whereas abnormal accruals 
or discretionary accruals (DAs) capture distortions induced by (the abuse of) 
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discretion in accounting choices. In other words, earnings components can be 
split into an innate portion that is beyond the control of the management, and a 
discretionary portion that can be influenced by management decisions (Dichev 
et al., 2013). Discretionary accruals contain intentional error and unintentional 
error that ultimately must reverse (Dechow et al., 2010). NDAs reflect the real 
economic fundamentals of a firm, while, DAs represent the managerial choices 
(i.e. accounting choices, implementation decisions, and managerial errors) 
(Mendes et al., 2012). Therefore, firms with high absolute discretionary accruals 
tend to have a high degree of earnings management which, in turn, implies low 
quality of earnings (Kousenidis et al., 2013).  
Dechow et al. (2010) explain that firms reporting high accrual accounts tend to 
have high DAs. Hence, extreme accruals firms are considered to have low 
quality of earnings. Similarly, Schipper and Vincent (2003) and Francis et al. 
(2005) document that DAs and earnings quality have an inverse association. In 
other words, quality of reporting is positively influenced by quality of accruals. In 
addition, high-quality accrual accounting reduces the variance of earnings (Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2006) and results in better quality accounting information, with 
higher precision and less variation. This in turn, reduces the assessed variance 
of the firm’s assets value, thus, the cost of capital (Lambert at al., 2007). 
However, managers can manage earnings not only via accounting estimates 
and methods, but also through operational decisions, such as the delaying or 
cutting of research and development expenses (R&D), alterations in shipment 
schedules, and the expansion of credit terms (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et 
al., 2008; and Bozzolan et al., 2015). Roychowdhury (2006) was the first to 
empirically study real activities manipulation, finding that firms manipulate 
earnings by changing their real decision by, for example, cutting R&D 
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expenses, changing price discounts, and overproducing to beat or meet 
benchmarks. In turns, these operational decisions have an effect on abnormal 
cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and 
overproduction/ underproduction. 
In conclusion, firms having higher degree of earnings management tend to have 
less persistent earnings, more restatement or misstatement, lower investor 
responsiveness to earnings, more special or non-recurring items, they appear to 
beat or meet benchmarks more often, and hence they are considered to have 
lower earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2011; and Dichev et al., 2013).  
3 Types of earnings management 
In general, the manipulation of the profit figures typically implies the 
manipulation of the accruals because management can exercise discretion in 
the reported accruals in line with current accounting standards (Watrin and 
Ullmann, 2012; and Leuz et al., 2003).  
Previous studies find that accruals and cash flows are negatively correlated and 
that accrual accounting provides smoother earnings and a better measure of 
performance than cash flows (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Dechow and Dichev, 
2002; and Dechow, 1994). On the other hand, the accrual component of 
earnings contains more uncertain information than the cash flow component 
because accruals are the product of estimates, judgment, and allocations (such 
as depreciation methods, allowance for doubtful debt, and etc.). For instance, 
managers must estimate uncollectible accounts receivables or write down 
inventories. Firms can also change depreciation method for PPE (Ghosh and 
Olsen, 2009), however, as Sloan (1996) points out managers can manage 
current accruals more easily than non-current ones. Adjusting assumptions or 
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estimates lead to a decline in earnings quality. In other words, abnormal 
accruals or DAs represent a distortion to earnings quality (Kousenidis et al., 
2013; and Dechow et al., 2010). In line with this argument, Burgstahler and 
Eames (2006) find that firms that meet certain earnings benchmarks have 
greater DAs than firms that miss the benchmarks.  
However, managing accounting accruals is not the only method that managers 
can use to manipulate earnings. Earning can be managed also by changing the 
operating environment and business model of the firm, e.g. by extending a line 
of business or changing credit policies (Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 
2006; and Bozzolan et al., 2015).  
Lastly, a third type of earnings management, classification shifting, is also used 
by managers despite prior literature heavily ignoring this option. Unlike accruals 
and real earnings management, classification shifting does not affect bottom 
line earnings as managers manage earnings by simply moving items within the 
income statement and thus altering the location between core earnings and 
special earnings items. 
Table 2.2, below, summarizes the characteristics of the three different types of 
earnings management; while the following subsections discuss each type in 
more detail. 
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Table 2.2: Types of earnings management 
 AEM REM Classification 
shifting 
Nature Relates to changes in 
estimates and accounting 
policies. Accruals depend 
on the judgement of the 
management team within 
the constraints of GAAP 
Directly affects the real 
operating cash flow and 
activities of the firm. 
Managers can manage 
earnings by: 
1. Premature revenue 
recognition by offering 
prices discounts, 
expanding credit terms, 
and sale of profitable 
assets  
2. Cutting expenses (i.e. 
R&D and advertising 
expenses) 
3. Overproducing/ 
Underproducing 
Managers can 
manage earnings 
by moving items 
within the income 
statement to 
increase core 
earnings 
Timing for 
managing 
earnings 
After the end of the 
accounting period but within 
the confines of the 
accounting system 
 
During the fiscal year Fiscal year-end 
reporting 
Benefits Easy to do 
Does not affect cash flows 
 
 
 
 
Not a GAAP violation 
Harder to detect 
Net income 
remains 
unchanged 
Constraints Scrutiny by auditors and 
regulators and risk of 
litigation. 
The sum of the accruals 
must be zero over the life of 
the firm 
More costly for firms 
Affects cash flows 
 
 
 
 
Misstatement 
Potential 
Models 
Jones model (1991) 
Modified Jones model 
(1995) 
Dechow and Dichev model 
(2002) 
Modified Dechow and 
Dichev model (2002) 
Modified Jones with ROA 
model (2005) 
Performance-matched 
Jones model (2005) 
Cash flow from operations 
model (2006) 
Discretionary expenses 
model (2006) 
Production cost model 
(2006)  
- 
Seminal 
papers 
Healy (1985); Jones (1991); 
Dechow et al. (1995); Lo 
(2008); Bozzolan et al. 
(2015); Irani and Oesch 
(2016); Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010); Cohen et al. (2008); 
Healy and Wahlen (1999); 
Beyer et al. (2014); Sloan 
(1996); Teoh et al. (1998); 
Byard et al. (2007); Gul et 
al. (2003); and Haw et al. 
(2005) 
Roychowdhury (2006); 
Cohen et al. (2008); Zang 
(2012); McVay (2006); 
Irani and Oesch (2016); 
Alissa et al. (2013); 
Alhadab et al. (2016); 
Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010); Bozzolan et al. 
(2015); Cohen et al. 
(2008); and Trombetta and 
Imperatore (2014) 
Abernathy et al. 
(2014); McVay 
(2006); Riedl and 
Srinivasan (2010); 
Dechowet et al. 
(2010); Dichev et 
al. (2013); and 
Walker (2013) 
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3.1    Accruals earnings management 
Accruals earnings management (AEM) relates to changes in estimates and 
accounting policies (Lo, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 2015; and Irani and Oesch, 
2016). Accruals depend on the judgement of managers within the constraints of 
GAAP. Managerial judgement involves estimating figures for future economic 
events, such as the expected life and salvage values of long-term assets, 
deferred tax valuation allowance, loss from bad debts and asset impairments, 
obligations for pension benefits and other post-employment benefits. In 
addition, managers must make decisions about inventory valuation methods 
and an accounts receivable policy, which affects cost allocation and net 
revenues.  
Accounts receivable, inventory, PPE and intangible assets, in particular, are 
captured with relatively low reliability (Ghosh and Olsen, 2009). Dechow et al. 
(2011) suggest that management may be optimistic about the value of credit 
sales, inventories, PPE and other assets. For example, accounts receivable 
involves the estimation of uncollectible accounts and managers are likely to 
manipulate earnings by premature revenue recognition and trade-loading. 
Inventories involve the allocation of costs (e.g. FIFO, LIFO, and weighted 
average) and writing-down decisions based on estimates of fair value. PPE and 
intangible assets involve choosing a depreciation/ an amortization schedule and 
writing-down decisions based on impairment. Therefore, managers may take 
advantage of how accounting standard can be applied in order to achieve 
specific targets.  
Although, AEM is done easily, it can also be detected easily and the primary 
cost of AEM is its potential detection by auditors and regulators, reputation and 
the litigation risk (Bozzolan et al., 2015). Nonetheless, discretionary accruals do 
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not directly affect cash flows and should not have a negative impact on firm 
value (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; and Irani and Oesch, 2016). 
The motive for AEM can be either increased or decreased earnings according 
to the target at that time. However, note that accruals reverse over time 
affecting future earnings in the opposite direction (Lo, 2008; and Cohen et al., 
2008). Dechow et al. (1995) point out that managing abnormal accruals is more 
complex than measuring abnormal stock returns because the sum of the 
accruals must be zero over the life of the firm. Consequently, if firms manage 
discretionary accruals, they will need to make additional assumptions about the 
timing of the accrual reversals. (Beyer et al., 2014). Consistent with this 
argument, Sloan (1996) provides evidence that the earnings of firms that have 
large accruals tend to decline over the subsequent three years, a finding he 
attributes to the reversal of the accounting accruals. Similarly, Gill et al. (2013) 
suggest that the more intense the practice of earnings manipulation, the greater 
the adverse effect on the ROA in subsequent periods. Moreover, the evidence 
of DuCharme et al. (2001) suggest that abnormal accruals in the preceding IPO 
year are significantly negatively related to subsequent performance. Because 
firms with AEM need to revise accruals in the following year, it is not surprising 
that those firms offer lower subsequent returns to investors.  
Although, AEM has several constrains as mentioned earlier, many previous 
researchers find that managers are likely to engaged in AEM by using 
discretionary accruals for several reasons. For example, Teoh et al. (1998) find 
that seasoned equity issuers tend to manage income upward by altering 
discretionary accounting accruals, while Gul et al. (2003) indicate that 
managers of firms with high accounting-based compensation tend to use 
discretionary accruals to improve their compensation. Moreover, Haw et al. 
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(2005) find that managers use income-increasing accounting accruals to meet 
regulatory return on equity targets for stock rights offerings under the 1996-98 
security regulations in China.  
3.2    Real earnings management 
Real earnings management (REM) directly affects the real operating cash flow 
and activities of the firm. However, it does not violate the GAAP as long as firms 
correctly account for the transaction. For instance, managers can change the 
operating environment by extending a line of business or a geographic region; 
moreover, they can change the business model by decreasing or increasing the 
accounts receivable turnover, offering greater price discounts, and decreasing 
or increasing the production volume (Alhadab et al., 2016; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2008; and Roychowdhury, 2006).  
According to previous research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Trombetta and 
Imperatore, 2014; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012; and Alissa et al., 2013), 
there are three types of real earnings management, namely, (1) abnormal cash 
flow from operations such as accelerating sales by offering price discounts, 
extending credit terms, selling profitable assets or repurchasing stock; (2) 
abnormal discretionary expenses such as cutting R&D expenses, cutting 
advertising and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses (including 
employee training, maintenance, travel, and  etc.); and (3) abnormal production 
cost such by either overproducing or underproducing. Firms engaging in 
downward earnings management tend to have above-normal cash flow from 
operations, above-normal discretionary expenses, and below-normal production 
costs (Roychowdhury, 2006). Both manufacturing firms and non-manufacturing 
firms can extend their credit terms and offer price discounts to accelerate sales 
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or cut R&D to reduce expenses. However, production costs can be used to 
manage earnings mainly in manufacturing firms. 
These actions are harder for auditors or investors to detect as such decisions 
are in the discretion of managers and boards of directors (Irani and Oesch, 
2016). Consequently, there is no benchmark to use when evaluating such 
actions as cutting (increasing) R&D, reducing (increasing) advertising 
expenditure to manage earnings upward (downward), provide price discounts to 
temporarily increase income or increase the product volume more than 
necessary (build-ups in inventories) in order to lower the reported cost of goods 
sold and report higher income (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
However, manipulating real activities affects both current and future cash flows. 
AEM does not affect cash flows, while real earnings management activities 
have a direct effect on the cash flow and operating performance of firm (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010). Trombetta and Imperatore (2014) point out that cutting 
R&D expenses and increasing income by offering price discounts or extended 
credit terms can be easier and faster than overproducing during a financial 
crisis; at the same time, it is also likely to be more costly for firms (McVay, 2006; 
and Zang, 2012). For example, accelerating the sales by increasing price 
discounts or further extending credit terms will obviously result in lower cash 
flows in the current period and may lead customers to expect such discounts in 
the future (Irani and Oesch, 2016). Further, reducing advertising expenditure 
can manage earnings upwards in current period but may result in the loss of 
future income due to a loss in the value of the brand. This supports the 
argument by Chen et al. (2015) that a firm’s real earnings management 
activities increase the firm’s future cash flow uncertainty. This is also consistent 
56 
 
with the result by Tabassum et al. (2015) that firms manipulating real earnings 
management activities have worse financial performance in the future.  
As mentioned above, REM has several constrains, but, many prior studies find 
that managers are likely to manipulate REM to report higher earnings, meet/ 
beat the expectations of analysts’ forecasts, and achieve earnings goals. For 
example, Gunny (2010) reports that firms meeting earnings benchmarks are 
more likely to have engaged in REM by reducing R&D to increase income, 
reducing SG&A to increase income, and overproducing to decrease COGS 
expense. However, their results indicate that firms that engage in REM to meet 
earnings benchmarks have higher subsequent firm performance than firms that 
do not engage in REM and miss the earnings benchmarks. Similarly, Kim et al. 
(2013) find that managers are likely to engage in REM rather than accruals-
based earnings management to affect the upcoming rating changes because of 
frequent discussion and communication with credit rating agencies and 
relatively less scrutiny and litigation risk on REM. 
Costs and benefits of accruals and real earnings management 
Inconsistent reporting choices tend to be signals of earnings management 
(Dichev et al., 2013). For example, firms with changes in business policy (such 
as extending credit terms, offering price discounts, cutting R&D, and increasing 
the product volume) are likely to manipulate earnings by using real earnings 
management, whereas, firms with changes in estimates and accounting policies 
(such as changing from FIFO to weighted-average inventory valuation methods, 
changing from accelerator to straight-line depreciation methods, and changing 
estimates of bad debt) are likely to engage in accruals earnings management. 
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As mentioned earlier, accruals and real earnings management have costs and 
benefits. The costs of REM are mainly related to the economic consequences of 
deviating from the optimal operations, whereas, the main costs of AEM are 
related to auditor and regulator’ scrutiny and litigation risk (Zang, 2012). 
Investigating the behavior of younger executives who are faced with substantial 
incentives to engage in earnings management, Demers and Wang (2010) find 
that younger executives tend to choose the lesser potentially value-destroying 
action to meet the earnings threshold by managing accruals rather than 
undertaking real earnings management. The reason is that younger CEOs are 
more likely to be concerned with their career and reputation, relative to older 
CEOs.  
However, previous empirical evidence shows that often managers prefer to 
engage in earnings management by making real economic decisions rather 
than accounting accruals, despite the fact that manipulating real activities may 
reduce the value of the firm (Defond, 2010). There are at least two reasons for 
this, the first of which is that AEM tends to draw more attention from the auditor 
or regulator than REM (Graham et al., 2005). Carter (2015) finds that managers 
prefer to use real earnings management rather than discretionary accruals to 
enhance or smooth earnings because of a lower degree of scrutiny, leading to 
receiving favorable credit ratings. Moreover, strong regulation (e.g. SOX) may 
trigger firms to switch from exercise discretionary accruals to real earnings-
management techniques. This is consistent with evidence of Cohen et al. 
(2008) that earnings management using real activities increases following SOX, 
while, firms are less likely to manage earnings using accruals when compare to 
similar firms before SOX. This suggests that SOX is negatively associated with 
accruals earnings management, but it is positively associated with real earnings 
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management. Thus, the overall effect of SOX on the earnings management is 
ambiguous. 
Secondly, managers are unlikely to rely on AEM alone because AEM cannot be 
done during the reporting period but only in the end. If managers decide to 
engage in AEM alone, in which the amount being managed fell short of the 
desired threshold, there would be insufficient time to manipulate real operations 
to meet or beat the earnings target (Alhadab et al., 2016). 
Defond (2010) observes that few researchers have investigated both accruals 
and real based-on earnings management, which Zang (2012) found was an 
interesting place to start her study of the decision of managers to manage 
earnings sequentially. The REM decision is made during the fiscal year to meet 
certain earnings targets; on the other hand, the choice of AEM is made at the 
year-end or after the fiscal year end when managers have gathered sufficient 
information about the actual earnings performance and the expectations of the 
market. Moreover, she points out that, although a shock in REM can affect 
AEM, there is no feedback from AEM to REM because a shock to AEM occurs 
after the fiscal year end. This is consistent with evidence in Burgstahler and 
Eames (2006) that managers can manage earnings to achieve their target by 
using both real operating action, which is reflected in the cash flow from 
operations, and actions of a bookkeeping nature, which are reflected in 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) discover that firms 
use both AEM and REM around seasoned equity offering (SEO) and they rotate 
the two methods. They find that, after a SEO period, the effect of real earnings 
management activities on the subsequent operating performance is likely to be 
more severe than the effect of accruals earnings management. Lin and Shen 
(2015) document that firms may engage in accrual-based and real earnings 
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management to obtain more favorable credit ratings, to acquire funds with lower 
capital cost and to attract investment. This is consistent with the evidence of 
Alissa et al. (2013) that firms have an incentive to manage earnings upward 
(downward) by using accrual and real earnings management to affect 
deviations from their expected credit rating. 
Interestingly, Irani and Oesch (2016) suggest that managers are likely to utilize 
both strategies (AEM and REM) as substitutes by trading-off the costs and 
benefits. Further, they illustrate that, when firms feel less scrutinized by financial 
analysts, managers make greater use of accruals-based earnings management 
and engage in less real operations manipulation. This implies that AEM is 
negatively correlated with analyst-level experience of following the companies. 
Alhadab et al. (2016) indicate that the regulatory environment further affects 
levels of real and accruals earnings management. More stringent regulation 
mitigates AEM but leads to a greater use of REM. 
Classification shifting 
According to Abernathy et al. (2014) and Walker (2013), managers can also 
manage earnings by moving items within the income statement to boost core 
earnings; however, in that case the net income remains unchanged. This 
strategy of managing earnings is called classification shifting.  
One example of classification shifting is when managers present the 
classification of ordinary operating expenses as non-recurring to increase the 
core earnings. Another example is that managers may use special items to 
manage earnings. Special items are unusual or infrequent transactions, such as 
damage caused by natural disasters, gain from the sale of assets, and so on. 
Managers can use special items as an earnings management tool by the 
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deliberate misclassification of items in the profit and loss statement (McVay, 
2006). Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) find that managers’ presentation of special 
items within the financial statements reflects opportunistic motivations to bias 
perceptions of the firm’s performance. Extraordinary items are accrual 
adjustments and are related to cash sales of a discontinued operation that 
reduce the persistence and sustainability of earnings. Thus, earnings free from 
special items or extraordinary items are considered to be of high quality and to 
have a low degree of earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010; and Dichev 
et al., 2013). 
Prior studies identify that managers are likely to use special items to manipulate 
earnings upward or downward. For example, Fairfield et al. (2009) document 
that high-core profitable firms are more likely to use special items for earnings 
management under pressure to maintain high profitability by managing 
expenses down or revenue up. Similarly, managers can also decrease the total 
debt leverage through the accounting treatment of operation leases or special 
items to keep debt off its balance sheet and help firm appear less risky, which in 
turn, leads to higher credit ratings (Jorion et al., 2009). On the other hand, 
managers can use special items to manage their core earnings figures 
downward during bad news by showing excessive loss from crisis to be able to 
report higher earnings easier in the subsequent period. Dichev et al. (2013) 
document that extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and other 
comprehensive income (OCI) items are like red flags that point to potential 
earnings manipulation and lead to low-quality earnings. In contrast, high-quality 
earnings reflect consistent reporting choices over time followed by avoidance of 
transient items as much as possible. 
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This earnings management tool does not change GAAP net earnings; therefore, 
neither future accounting earnings for future cash flows are affected. 
Accordingly, managers might use classification shifting more than AEM in fiscal 
year-end reporting because AEM is more constrained by the year-end audit and 
has to reverse the earnings in the future period (Abernathy et al., 2014). At the 
same time, classification shifting could be one of the last earnings management 
strategies available to achieve earnings targets because REM must occur 
during the fiscal year and AEM occurs after the end of the accounting period but 
within the confines of a generally accepted accounting system, while 
classification shifting represents a flexible earnings management strategy, 
because it is used more in the fourth quarter and can be done outside the 
accounting system (McVay, 2006). Hence, firms constrained from using REM 
by poor financial conditions, higher scrutiny from institutional shareholders, 
lower industry market share and high net operating assets, and firms 
constrained from using AEM by the presence of a cash flow forecast tend to 
change their core reported earnings by using classification shifting (Walker, 
2013). Lin et al. (2006) show that firms use different types of earnings 
management and downwards forecast guidance, to increase the probability of 
meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and that classification shifting 
is the earnings management method which leads to the greatest increases in 
this probability. In addition, they find that the likelihood of classification shifting 
is negatively associated with an unexpected amount of AEM. Therefore, if 
managers make the decision to use accruals manipulation, they will be less 
likely to use classification shifting.  
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4 Models developed to measure earnings management 
This section presents the research designs which are most commonly used in 
accruals earnings management studies. We start by discussing the various 
models developed to measure accruals and real earnings management. Next, 
we compare the pros and cons of each model. Finally, we present briefly other 
methods (e.g. M-score, F-score, accounting ratios, and unexplained audit fee 
model) to measure earnings management. 
4.1 Research designs for accruals earnings management studies 
The research designs commonly used in accruals earnings management can 
be divided into three categories, namely, (1) aggregated discretionary accruals 
or total discretionary accruals; (2) specific discretionary accruals; and (3) the 
distribution of earnings after management. Note, however, that the third 
category can be used in real earnings management studies as well.  
Most empirical researchers attempt to find incidents of DAs based on the 
relationship between the total accruals and hypothesized explanatory factors 
because this method can measure the magnitude of earnings management. 
Although, McNichols (2000) argues that the results of aggregated accruals 
models may present a misleading picture of earnings management behavior 
because it is unable to consider the growth of long-term earnings, many studies 
control for expected earnings growth by using the return on assets (ROA) as a 
control variable to solve disadvantage of aggregated accruals. Moreover, the 
aggregated discretionary accruals method uses changes in cash sales 
(revenues deduce the accounts receivable) and gross property, plant and 
equipment to control for non-discretionary accruals of current assets, current 
liabilities, and component of the depreciation expense, respectively. We will 
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describe aggregated discretionary accruals method in more depth in section 4.2 
on discretionary accruals models. 
As for the specific accruals, studies focus on a particular industry or 
homogeneous firms (i.e. banking, insurance, and property) and also require the 
knowledge of institutional arrangements to identify the DAs and NDAs behavior 
of accruals, such as loan loss provisions in the banking industry, loss of 
reserves of property and casualty insurers, tax expense, allowance for deferred 
tax assets, and allowance for bad debt. For example, commercial banks report 
larger deferred tax assets due to higher allowances for loan losses compared to 
other industries (e.g. manufacturing, trading, and services industry). 
It is not surprising that several papers (e.g. McNichols, 2000; Marquardt and 
Wiedman, 2004; and Ahmed et al., 1999) apply specific accruals instead of 
aggregated accruals as this method makes strong predictions about the 
behavior of earnings in a closely targeted earnings number. On the other hand, 
as discussed in McNichols (2000) and Dechow et al. (2010) the main 
disadvantage of modeling specific accruals is that they can only be used within 
specialized industries which comes at the expense of generalizability.  
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) examine three earnings-management contexts 
- equity offerings, management buyouts, and firm avoiding earnings decreases - 
by considering the use of specific accruals and support the usefulness of 
examining individual accruals in specific contexts. They develop performance-
matched measures to measure earnings management for specific accruals and 
to capture the unexpected component of accounts (such as account receivable, 
inventory, accounts payable, accrued liabilities, depreciation expense, and 
special items). Their results show that firms issuing equity are likely to manage 
earnings upward by accelerating revenue recognition. Moreover, they find that 
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unexpected account receivable for firms issuing equity are high, while, accounts 
receivable for the management buyouts are negative. For firms trying to avoid 
reporting earnings decreases, their results show that managers are more likely 
to use more transitory or special items. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (1999) use 
specific accruals to measure earnings management effects on bank loan loss 
provisions; they do not find evidence of earnings management via bank loan 
loss provisions. 
Finally, with regards to the distribution of earnings after management, studies 
employ statistical properties of earnings to identify specified thresholds (e.g. 
zero earnings, preceding period’s earnings, and analysts’ earnings forecasts) 
and incidents where the reported amounts are just above or below these 
thresholds. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine discontinuities around zero 
earnings to detect earnings management. Their result shows that managers 
engage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses as evidenced by 
unexpectedly low frequencies of small losses and unexpectedly high 
frequencies of small positive earnings. Further, Kerstein and Rai (2007) extend 
this approach by examining changes to the earnings distribution. They model 
shifts in the cumulative earnings distribution during the last quarter instead of 
the distribution of annual earnings examined in previous studies (i.e. 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Beaver et al., 2003; and Plummer and Mest, 
2001). Because the last quarter provides a manager’s last opportunity during 
the year to manipulate annual earnings, analyzing changes in the earnings 
distributions between the third and the last quarters can yield insights into how 
managers use this opportunity. Their results identify that a high proportion of 
firms with small cumulative profits or losses at the beginning of the last quarter 
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report small annual profits rather than small annual losses. Conclusively, firms 
tend to manage earnings upward to avoid reporting losses.  
The distribution of earnings approach has two benefits, the first of which is that 
it avoids several econometric problems in the estimation of discretionary 
accruals such as measurement error in expected accruals, omitted variables, 
and model misspecification. Secondly, it is able to identify specific benchmarks 
such as loss avoidance, earnings increases, and meet or beat earnings target 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, the distribution of earnings approach has 
a disadvantage in that it does not measure the magnitude of the earnings 
management (McNichols, 2000).  
Table 2.3 below provides an analysis of the pros and cons of each of the 
research designs of AEM (aggregated accruals, specific accruals, and the 
distribution of earnings after management).  
Table 2.3: Benefits and costs for each research designs of AEM 
Research 
designs 
Benefits Costs Seminal papers 
1. Aggregated 
accruals 
- Can measure 
the magnitude 
of earnings 
management 
- Unable to 
consider the 
growth of 
long-term 
earnings in 
models 
Healy (1985);  Dechow 
(1994); Jones (1991); 
Dechow et al. (1995); 
McNichols (2002); Dechow 
and Dichev (2002); Kothari 
et al. (2005); Daniel et al. 
(2008); Alhadab et al. 
(2016); Cohen et al. (2008); 
Byard et al. (2007); Choi et 
al. (2011); Healy and 
Wahlen (1999); and Cahan 
(1992) 
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Research 
designs 
Benefits Costs Seminal papers 
2. Specific 
accruals 
- Strong 
predictions 
about the 
behavior of 
earnings in 
closely 
targeted 
management 
- Cannot be 
applied to 
firms outside 
specific 
industries 
McNichols (2000); 
Dechow et al. (2010); 
Ahmed et al. (1999); 
Marquardt and Wiedman 
(2004); and Ahmed et al. 
(1999) 
3. Distribution 
of earnings 
after 
management 
- Avoids 
econometric 
problems 
- Identifies 
specific 
benchmarks 
- Does not 
measure the 
magnitude of 
earnings 
management 
Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997); Beaver et al. 
(2003); Plummer and Mest 
(2001); Kerstein and Rai 
(2007); and Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) 
4.2 Discretionary accruals models 
As discussed previously in subsection (4.1), aggregated accruals or total 
accruals is the most popular research design in top journals. Although this 
method does not consider the growth of long-term earnings in the original 
models, researchers these days control for growth by using ROA as a control 
variable. Numerous researchers have found that DAs are a good measure of 
AEM and that earnings are mainly misstated via the accrual component of 
earnings (Healy, 1985). In other words, DAs provide managers often with the 
opportunities to manage earnings, due to the flexibility of accounting regulations 
(Dechow, 1994; and Kousenidis et al., 2013).  
Discretionary accruals are used to measure AEM in a large number of studies 
(e.g. Alhadab et al., 2016; Cohen et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2007; Choi et al., 
2011; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Cahan, 1992; Shuto, 2007, and Patten and 
Trompeter, 2003). For instance, Trombetta and Imperatore (2014) examine the 
relationship between financial crises and earnings management using 
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discretionary accruals. More interestingly, they study separately positive and 
negative accruals as a proxy for income-increasing and income-decreasing 
earnings management, respectively. Their results show that the relationship 
between earnings management and financial crises is non-monotonic, meaning 
that earnings management increases when the crisis is acute, whereas it 
decreases when the crisis is weak. 
Examples of early studies on measuring DAs include Healy (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986) (Stolowy and Breton, 2004). Healy (1985) assumes that the 
NDAs for the period are zero; thus, any non-zero value of total accruals is 
attributable to accounting discretion. DeAngelo (1986) assumes that NDAs 
follow a random walk, which means that the NDAs in the current period are 
assumed to be equal the NDAs in the prior period. Hence, any difference in the 
value of the total accruals between period t and t-1 is attributable to managerial 
discretion. In the ‘90s, many researchers, such as Jones (1991) and Dechow et 
al. (1995), have developed more elaborate models to estimate non-
discretionary accruals (NDAs) which they then subtract from total accruals to 
get discretionary accruals (DAs), their measure for earnings management. 
Direct estimation of abnormal accruals (DAs) by using accounting 
fundamentals 
Jones (1991), as shown in equation (1), employs a linear regression-based 
expectation model and also includes the level of gross fixed assets and 
changes in revenue to control for variations in NDAs without assuming that the 
level of NDAs is constant, as Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) do.  
∆WC = b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1∆Sale + b2GrossPPE + e   (1) 
Changes in working capital (∆WC) are calculated as follows: 
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∆WC = (∆CA - ∆CL - ∆Cash + ∆STD - Dep)/ TAt-1 
Subscripts from firm (i) and year (t) are omitted from all models for simplicity. 
Appendix 2.1 provides the definitions for the variables used throughout this 
study. 
The Jones (1991) model uses changes in sales to control for NDAs of current 
assets and liabilities (∆CA, ∆CL, ∆Cash, and ∆STD) and uses gross property, 
plant and equipment to control for NDAs component of the depreciation 
expense (Dep). In direct estimation approaches, DAs are estimated as the 
residuals from regression in equation (1). Therefore, as the magnitude of the 
absolute value of the residuals increases, so does the level of earnings 
management. Furthermore, some papers (e.g. Trombetta and Imperatore 
(2014)) separate earnings management (EM) into positive EM and negative EM 
to predict a specific direction for EM. Hence, as the magnitude of the residuals 
for the positive EM (negative EM) increases, so does income-increasing 
(income-decreasing) earnings management. 
Dechow et al. (1995) questions the assumption in the Jones’s model that 
revenues are NDAs and suggests that the model should deduce the accounts 
receivable from the revenue because firms may use the credit policy to boost 
revenues. Therefore, a Modified Jones model was developed in 1995 to avoid 
measurement error in the case discretion is exercised through account 
receivables. The adjusted model is described in equation (2).  
∆WC = b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1(∆Sale - ∆AR) + b2GrossPPE + e   (2) 
Again, the residual in equation (2) represents the DAs measure of earnings 
management. Once again, higher earning management is captured by greater 
amounts of the absolute value of the residuals.  
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Dechow et al. (1995) compare the ability of alternative accrual-based models to 
detect earnings management and confirm that the Modified Jones’s model is 
the most powerful test for earnings management as it generates the fewest type 
II errors, although power of the tests for earnings management of economically 
plausible magnitudes remain quite modest. 
Direct estimation of accruals-to-cash relations 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a new model (DD model hereafter) by 
providing a direct link between cash flows and current accruals as shown in 
equation (3). 
∆WC = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt +b3CFOt+1 + e   (3) 
This model measures the magnitude of measurement errors in accruals as one 
of the primary indications of the quality of earnings based on the relationship 
between the working capital accruals in the current period and the operating 
cash flows in the prior, current and future periods. While the original DD model 
measures earnings management as the standard deviation of the residuals for 
each company using rolling windows, more recently Dechow et al. (2011) use 
directly the residual from the cross-sectional estimation instead. Thus, as the 
magnitude of the absolute value of errors in the accruals increases, earning 
management increases and the quality of earnings decreases.  
This model is widely used in long-horizon studies (i.e. cost of equity capital and 
investment efficiency) to assess the quality of historical earnings. Further, 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) document that the DD model avoids many of the 
problems associated with the accounting fundamentals approach. For example, 
the Jones and Modified Jones models need to posit accounting fundamentals 
(e.g. revenues/ revenues adjusted for account receivables and gross PPE) and 
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require sufficient cross-sectional data to estimate DAs. Moreover, they require 
assumptions about unmanaged accounting fundamentals. In contrast, the DD 
model provides a direct link between current accruals and cash flows that 
captures aspects of the cash-to-income relation and does not assume that the 
accounting fundamentals are not themselves manipulated. However, the DD 
model is limited to estimating the quality of future earnings in the current period 
(CFOt+1). In addition, this model is not appropriate for studying that using short-
horizon variables, such as the prediction of stock returns. Furthermore, the DD 
model does not separately consider abnormal accruals (DAs) and normal 
accruals (NDAs). Thus, it may too suffer from misspecification when used to 
estimate discretionary accruals (McNichols, 2002). 
Combining models 
McNichols (2002) points out the limitations of both the Jones model and the DD 
model. For example, the DD model does not separately consider DAs and 
NDAs, whereas, the Jones model separates DAs from NDAs. In contrast, the 
Jones model assumes that accruals react to the current change in revenue; 
however, future growth in revenue is not considered. This implies that growth 
may be a correlated omitted variable. Therefore, McNichols (2002) developed a 
new model (Modified DD model), shown in equation (4) by combining both 
models (the Jones and DD models). Including cash flows in the Jones models 
may reduce the extent to which the model omits variables and including the 
growth in revenue and PPE in the DD model may provide a useful specification 
check on the magnitude of the estimated errors in cash flows. Her finding 
suggests that the implications of both the DD and Jones models should be 
considered by the researchers to develop more powerful approaches to the 
estimation of earnings management. She proposes the following model: 
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  ∆WC = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt +b3CFOt+1 + b4∆Sale + b5GrossPPE + e  (4) 
Consistent with the Jones and DD models, McNichols (2002) uses the residuals 
from the cross-sectional estimation as the proxy for AEM.  
Kothari et al. (2005) also develop a new discretionary accruals model by 
introducing an additional independent variable, which is ROA, into the Jones or 
Modified Jones models to control for firm’s performance. In other words, a new 
discretionary accruals model is developed to solve a major limitation of the 
Jones and Modified Jones models; that is that firm-years with extreme financial 
performance can bias those measures.  The resulting models are called Jones 
with ROA and Modified Jones with ROA, respectively. In addition, Kothari et al. 
(2005) introduce a performance-matched discretionary accruals measure by 
matching the DAs estimate of the firms in the treatment group with the DAs of 
firms in the control group with the closest ROA2 within the same industry and 
year. In other words, discretionary accruals for a given treated firm are adjusted 
by discretionary accruals of the control firm that has the nearest ROA. Their 
results suggest that matching based on ROA and using the Jones model results 
in a well specified and powerful model as it yields the lowest mean and median 
values among all other measures.  
Kothari et al. (2005) estimate the performance-matched Jones model DA as the 
Jones model DA3 for a firm-year minus the matched firm’s Jones-model DA4 for 
                                                          
2
 Return of assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
3
 The Jones model DA is the residuals from annual cross-sectional industry regression model in 
equation (5) 
4
 The matched firm’s Jones-model DA is matching residual of each firm-year observation with 
residual of another firm from the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest ROA in the 
current year.   
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same year and industry both calculated as shown in equation (5). Specifically, 
they include a constant term (b0) in the estimation to better address the power 
of the test issues and use net PPE instead of gross PPE, as Jones (1991) and 
Dechow et al. (1995) do. 
∆WC = b0 + b1(1/TA t-1) + b2(∆Sale) + b3NetPPE + e   (5) 
(Match residual of each firm-year observation with residual of another firm from the 
same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest return on assets in the current year) 
Daniel et al. (2008) report that this method is a more reliable measurement of 
earnings management when using non-random samples of firms, as, for 
example, in the case of firms restating earnings, changing auditors, and issuing 
IPO/ SEO, whereas, the original Jones or Modified Jones models only 
examined random samples. Moreover, Stubben (2010) agrees that this model 
has the least misspecification among the accrual models.   
Stubben (2010) goes on to create a very simple model to examine the ability of 
revenue and accruals models to capture a combination of revenue and expense 
manipulation. Moreover, she documents that conditioning on annual revenues is 
a limitation of the models; therefore, she splits revenues in the first three 
quarters and revenues in the fourth quarter because revenues in the last 
quarter are less likely to be collected in cash by the end the year. In addition, 
managers are more likely to manage the revenue via accounts receivable in the 
last quarter. As a result, she suggests the following model presented in 
equation (6) 
∆AR = b0 + b1∆AR1-3 + b2∆AR4 + e    (6) 
The revenue model analyzes the relationship between revenue and accounts 
receivable based on the recognition of premature revenue (e.g. relaxed credit 
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requirement, sales discounts, and sales recognized before cash is collected). 
The evidence indicates that the revenue model is not only useful as a proxy for 
earnings management, but also for detecting discretion in revenue for growth 
firms. 
Shi and Zhou (2013) suggest an alternative approach to resolve the limitations 
of the DD models (2002) in which it is difficult to capture the quality of future 
earnings in the current period (CFOt+1 in DD model). They developed the 
Modified Dechow and Dichew model with cash flow forecasts (CFF) by 
replacing realized next-period cash flows with forecasted future cash flows from 
financial analysts at year t for year t+1 (CFFt
t+1). There model is described by 
the following equation (7). 
∆WC = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFFt
t+1 + e   (7) 
Table 2.4 summarizes the pros and cons of each of the discretionary accruals 
models discussed above. Overall, no measure of AEM is superior for all 
decision models because each of the models has benefits and limitations as 
shown in table 2.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
Table 2.4: Comparison of discretionary accruals models 
Model Benefits Limitations Seminal 
papers 
Jones (1991) 
 
∆WC = b0(1/ TAt-1) + 
b1∆Sale + 
b2GrossPPE + 
e  
 
- Separately 
considers 
abnormal and 
normal accruals 
- Does not consider 
credit revenue 
(accounts 
receivable including 
revenue) 
- Not well specified 
for growth firms 
because it does not 
consider future 
changes in revenue 
(growth firms)  
- Cannot examine 
non-random 
samples 
Jones (1991) 
 
Modified Jones (1995) 
∆WC = b0(1/ TAt-1) + 
b1(∆Sale - ∆AR) + 
b2GrossPPE + e 
- Separately 
considers 
abnormal and 
normal accruals 
- Considers credit 
revenue 
(accounts 
receivable 
including 
revenue) 
- Not well specified 
for growth firms 
because it does not 
consider future 
changes in revenue 
(growth firms) 
- Cannot examine 
non-random 
samples 
Dechow et al. 
(1995) 
Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) 
∆WC = b0 + b1CFOt-1 
+ b2CFOt 
+b3CFOt+1 + e 
- Assesses the 
quality of 
historical 
earnings  
- Appropriate for 
studying that 
using long-
horizon 
variables such 
as the cost of 
equity capital 
and investment 
efficiency  
Suitable for 
estimating the 
quality of 
earnings  
- Does not 
separately consider 
abnormal and 
normal accruals 
- Difficult to estimate 
the quality of future 
earnings in the 
current period 
- Difficult to study 
that using short-
horizon variables 
such as predicting 
stock returns 
Greater 
misspecification 
when used to 
estimate 
discretionary 
accruals 
 
Dechow and 
Dichev 
(2002) 
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Model Benefits Limitations Seminal 
papers 
Modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) 
 
∆WC = b0 + b1CFOt-1 
+ b2CFOt + 
b3CFOt+1 + 
b4∆Sale + 
b5GrossPPE + 
e 
- Separately 
considers 
abnormal and 
normal accruals 
- Assesses the 
quality of 
historical 
earnings  
- Appropriate for 
studying that 
using long-
horizon 
variables such 
as the cost of 
equity capital 
and investment 
efficiency 
 
- Difficult to estimate 
the quality of future 
earnings in the 
current period 
 
McNichols 
(2002)  
Performance-matched 
Jones (2005) 
 
∆WC = b0 + b1(1/TAt-
1) + b2(∆sale) 
+ b3NetPPE + 
e  
 
less the same estimate 
for the firm from the 
same industry and year 
with the closest ROA 
- Can examine 
non-random 
samples 
- Can apply in a 
sample with 
firm-years 
experiencing 
extreme 
financial 
performance 
- Considers changes 
in total revenue 
rather than 
changes in cash 
revenue 
Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
Revenue and accrual 
model (2010) 
 
∆AR = b0 + b1∆AR1-3 
+ b2∆AR4 + e 
- Well-specified 
tests of 
manipulation for 
growth firms 
- Splits last 
quarter revenue 
from first three 
quarters 
- Not suitable to 
measure 
discretionary 
expenditure 
 
Stubben 
(2010) 
Modified Dechow and 
Dichew with cash flow 
forecast (2013) 
 
∆WC = b0 + b1CFOt-1 
+ b2CFOt + 
b3CFFt
t+1 
+ e 
 
- Estimates the 
quality of future 
earnings in the 
current period 
(CFFt
t+1) 
 
- Does not 
separately consider 
abnormal and 
normal accruals 
 
Shi and Zhou 
(2013) 
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Balance sheet versus Income statement and cash flow approach for 
estimating NDAs 
Non-discretionary accruals (NDAs) can be estimated using two approaches: 
balance sheet approach, and income statement and statement of cash flow 
approach.  
As presented above, according to the balance sheet approach, total accruals 
are equal to the changes in working capital (∆WC) and calculated as follows: 
∆WC = (∆CA - ∆CL - ∆Cash + ∆STD - Dep)/ TAt-1 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) document that using the balance sheet approach 
for firms transitioning from private to public status or firms entering IPO 
proceeds induce systematic biases in estimating accruals because managers 
tend to engage in acquisitions and divestitures transactions in IPO years and 
those transactions are affecting reported accruals in balance-sheet. Further, 
Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest that the error in the balance sheet approach 
of estimating accruals is related to firms’ economic characteristics. Lo (2008) 
indicates that estimating accruals from cash flow statements compared with 
balance sheets are significantly different. Thus, some researchers estimate 
accruals (ACCR) measures based on the income statement and the statement 
of cash flow approach as follows: 
  ACCR = (net income before extraordinary items (EBXI) – cash flow from operations)/ TAt-1 
It is hardly surprising that more and more researchers nowadays simply use the 
income statement and the statement of cash flow approach to estimate accruals 
as this approach can lead to a lower magnitude and frequency of measurement 
error (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Daniel et al., 2008; Irani and Oesch, 2016; 
Alhadab et al., 2016; and Jung et al., 2013). 
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4.3 Real earnings management models 
Roychowdhury (2006) is the first to develop a statistical model to detect real 
earnings management by running the following cross-sectional regression (8) 
for every industry and year. He expected that a normal cash flow from 
operations (CFO) is a linear function of sales and change in sales as described 
in equation (8) below: 
CFO =   b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1Salet + b2∆Salet + e    (8) 
Abnormal CFO is estimated as the residuals from regression in equation (8) and 
is a proxy for real earnings management.  
Roychowdhury (2006) also developed a measure of abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Discretionary expenses can be both recurring or non-recurring costs 
that is not essential for the operation of a business such as R&D expenses, 
employee training, entertainment cost and maintenance. He started by 
assuming that normal discretionary expenses (Disc) are a function of lagged 
sales and estimated the normal level of discretionary expense as follows: 
Disc =   b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1Salet-1 + e      (9) 
The residual in equation (9) represents abnormal discretionary expenses.  
Finally, production costs are defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and the change in inventory during the year.  A normal COGS is 
expected to be a linear function of contemporaneous sales, as follows: 
COGS = b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1Salet   + e      (10)  
Inventory growth is expected to be a change in inventory (INV) and is 
expressed as a linear function of lagged change in sales and current change in 
sales, as follows: 
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∆INV =   b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1∆Salet + b2∆Salest-1 + e   (11) 
The normal level of production cost (Prod) is estimated using equation (10) and 
(11) as follows: 
Prod =   b0(1/ TAt-1) + b1Salet + b2∆Salet + b3∆Salet-1 + e    (12) 
The residual from the cross-sectional estimation of equation (12) is the proxy for 
abnormal production costs. As in other DA models, the residuals in each 
regression is indicative of the magnitude of earnings management. 
Real earnings management (REM) proxy can be computed in several ways. 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), abnormal cash flow from operations5, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal level of production cost were 
estimated as the residuals from the regressions described by equations (8), (9), 
and (12), respectively. These are to this day the three most commonly used 
proxies for REM. Some studies compute REM proxy as a single aggregated 
measure of real earnings management activities. For example, Cohen et al. 
(2008) compute REM as the sum of the standardized variables of an abnormal 
cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal 
production costs. Alternatively, Zang (2012) computes single aggregated 
measure of REM by combining the level of abnormal cash flow from operations 
and the level of abnormal discretionary expenses. Bozzolan et al. (2015) 
                                                          
5
 Several papers (such as Bozzolan et al., 2015; Alhadab et al., 2016; and Irani and Oesch, 
2016) suggest that abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses 
should be multiplied by minus one to allow coefficients in regressions of real and accruals 
earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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calculate REM by combining the abnormal discretionary expenses and 
abnormal production costs. In contrast, Irani and Oesch (2016) consider two 
aggregated measures of REM that are (1) the sum of abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses, and (2) the sum of abnormal 
level of production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Roychowdhury (2006) in addition to the aforementioned measures he also 
replicates his results using the performance-matching technique advocated by 
Kothari et al. (2005). Every firm-year is matched to the firm-year in its industry 
that has the closest ROA in the last year as mentioned above. Performance-
matched REM models (CFO, Disc, and Prod models) for a firm-year are the 
abnormal real activities (abnormal CFO, abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
abnormal production costs) of that firm-year in excess of the abnormal real 
activities for the matching firm-year stated as follows: 
Performance-matched REM models = Abnormal real activities for REM models - 
Abnormal real activities for the matching firm 
Finally, he uses the performance-matched cash flow from operations, 
discretionary expenses, and production costs to detect real earnings 
management. The results using the performance-matching technique are 
broadly similar to the unmatched ones. 
4.4 Other methods to measure earnings management 
There are other, less commonly used, methods to assess the quality of the 
firm’s reported number such as M-score, F-score, and unexplained audit fee 
model (Richard et al., 2011).  
Benish (1999) creates a mathematical model (M-score) to detect earnings 
manipulation behaviors of the firms that can distinguish manipulated from non-
80 
 
manipulated reporting using a probit model. M-score model is based on the 
interrelations between the balance sheet, income statement and statement of 
cash flow as this model examines the relationship between earnings 
manipulation and eight financial ratios (i.e. the ratio of account receivables to 
sales, gross margin ratio, the ratio of assets quality in year t compared to year t-
1, the ratio of sales growth, the ratio of depreciation in year t compared to year 
t-1, the ratio of sales, general and administrative expenses in year t compared 
to year t-1, leverage ratio, and the ratio of total accruals to total assets) as 
shown in equation (13). 
M-score =   -4.84 + (0.920xDSRI) + (0.528xGMI) + (0.404xAQI) + (0.892xSGI) + 
(0.115xDEPI) + (0.172xSGAI) + (0.327xLVG) + (4.679xTATA)       (13) 
This model uses a benchmark of 2.22 to categorize firms. Specifically, an M-
score less than 2.22 implies no sign of earnings manipulation; whereas, firms 
with M-score higher than the threshold (2.22) have a high probability of earnings 
management.  
There are many prior studies (e.g. Beneish, 1999; Mahama, 2015; and Anh and 
Linh, 2016) that examine earnings management detection by using the M-score 
model. However, not that the M-score might be inappropriate for predicting or 
detecting earnings management in the banking industry because Benish, who 
created M-score model, excludes the banking industry from the sample used to 
test and develop M-score model. 
Another scaled probability that can be used as a measure of the likelihood of 
misstatements is F-score, which is developed by Dechow et al. (2011). Dechow 
et al. (2011) built three models that can be used as a red flag to detecting 
earnings manipulation. Model 1 includes variables that are obtained from the 
primary financial statements (i.e. accruals quality, and firm performance), while, 
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model 2 adds off-balance-sheet (i.e. operating leases and expected return 
assumption on plan assets for defined benefit pension plans) and nonfinancial 
variables (i.e. abnormal reductions in the number of employees). Finally, model 
3 adds a set of variables that relate to equity and debt market incentives for 
earnings management (e.g. market-adjusted stock return, and stock issuances). 
The output of F-score is a scaled logistic probability for each firm-year that 
represents the level of probability of earnings management; the higher the F-
score the higher the probability of earnings management. However, Dechow et 
al. (2011) stresses a limitation of the F-score model, that the misstatements 
sample for the test and development of the F-score model were actually 
identified by the SEC. Although, the sample is unbiased, researchers should 
investigate the characteristics of high-F-score companies that are not identified 
by the SEC in future studies.  
An alternative measured that has been used in the literature of earnings 
management is the unexplained audit fee model. This model assumes that 
external auditor’s fee can provide information about the risk a firm faces, and 
suggests that a higher value of unexplained audit fee is an indication of 
earnings management (Gupta et al., 2012).  
Lastly Jansen et al. (2012) use popular accounting ratios, ROA and profit 
margin, to diagnose earnings management. Their results show that abnormal 
change in firms’ profit margin and asset turnover indicate greater likelihood of 
managing earnings.  Dechow et al. (2011), as mentioned above, use 
nonfinancial measures (e.g. abnormal decline in the number of employees) for 
detecting misstatement. This is consistent with the wide-spread view that 
employee lay-offs are unlikely to correspond to a significant increase in 
earnings (Brazel et al., 2009). However, a decline in the number of employees 
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leads to a reduction in payroll costs. Therefore, managers may use this method 
to solve financial troubles of firms or to manage earnings upward in the short-
term. 
In summary, although there are many models and methods to measure 
earnings management, there is no universal agreement about which single 
measure of earnings management is the best.  
5 Theoretical underpinning for earnings management  
This section discusses the efficient information vs. opportunistic behavior 
hypotheses of earnings management. Then, we discuss the various incentives 
for earnings management and classify them by theoretical frameworks (Francis 
et al., 2003; Zang, 2012; Aerts and Zhang, 2014; Cohen et al., 2008; Healy and 
Wahlem, 1999; Mendes et al., 2012; Zamri et al., 2013; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Leuz et al., 2003; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; and Cahan, 1992). Finally, we 
discuss two patterns of earnings management, namely, income minimization 
and income maximization. 
5.1 Efficient information hypothesis vs. Opportunistic behavior hypothesis 
As mentioned in the previous section, GAAP permit several accounting choices 
and require several estimations to better report the underlying performance of 
the firm and communicate the its future prospects to the market, to 
communicate managers’ inside information to investors, or to improve 
contracting efficiency. These objectives are important for firms for increasing 
their value (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Sun and Rath, 2008; Choi et al., 
2011; and Bowen et al., 2008). In line with this, Francis et al. (2005) support the 
efficient information hypothesis according to which managers may use their 
discretionary accruals to reduce information uncertainty and improve earnings 
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as a signal of the firm’s performance. This is consistent with evidence in Sun 
and Rath (2008) that managing earnings to create a smooth and growing 
earnings string over time is a signaling mechanism to convey inside information 
about firms’ prospects to the investors and enhance investors’ ability in 
predicting firm’s performance as well. Similarly, the evidence in Ahmed et al. 
(1999) indicate that bank managers have incentives to use loan loss provisions 
to signal private information about future earnings for capital managing but not 
to manage earnings. In summary, these studies find the efficient perspective of 
earnings management, which occurs for the purpose of signaling. 
In contrast to the efficient information hypothesis, the discretion allowed by 
GAAP may provide an opportunity for managers to take advantage of how 
accounting standards can be applied to meet their own targets or appear to 
meet the expectations of the capital market which is seen as being negative. As 
such, earnings can be opportunistically manipulated (Stolowy and Breton, 2004; 
Dechow, 1994; and Healy and Krishna, 1993). Several choices allowed by 
accounting standards threaten the quality of financial reporting, such as cookie 
jar reserves, write-offs of purchases in the process of R&D, big bath 
restructuring charges, and premature revenue recognition (Stolowy and Breton, 
2004).  
According to the opportunistic behavior hypothesis, managers use discretionary 
accounting or abnormal real operations to influence financial statements or to 
report operating results that are not consistent with the economic performance 
of the firm. Schipper (1989, 92) defined earnings management as “a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gain.” Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) describe 
earnings management as some misdeeds by management in order to maximize 
84 
 
the value of their firm by using their reporting discretion within the confines of 
acceptable accounting and legal requirements (e.g. changing accounting 
methods, changing estimates, manipulating accruals, liquidating LIFO 
inventories, selling assets, and retiring debt). Turner and Guilding (2011) state 
that earnings management is a process that occurs when management teams 
use judgment in financial reporting in order to achieve their target by either: (1) 
changing the structure of revenue and/ or expenditure (e.g. cut-off R&D 
expenses, cut-off employee training, and reduce credit terms); (2) changing 
accounting procedures (e.g. straight-line depreciation,  declining balance 
method, and sum-of-the-years'-digits method); or (3) manipulating accruals (e.g. 
estimating depreciation lifecycles, estimating uncollectible accounts, and 
providing for bad debt expense and warranty costs). Interestingly, Healy (1985) 
finds evidence that managers are likely to manage earnings by making changes 
to accruals policies in response to incentives provided by their bonus contracts, 
while they tend to change accounting procedures during adoption or 
modification of their bonus plan. Further, evidence by Gul et al. (2003) suggest 
that managers of firms with high management ownership tend to use 
discretionary accruals to communicate value-relevant information; whereas, 
managers of firms with high non-equity compensation tend to use discretionary 
accruals opportunistically to manipulate earnings. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates that according to the accounting standards which leave 
discretion for many primary purposes, managers can select particular 
accounting choices which can be made "efficiently", to maximize the value of 
the firm, or "opportunistically", to give the manager better benefits than other 
contracting party (Christie and Zimmennan, 1994). For example, Gounopoulos 
and Pham (2017), who investigate the impact of having a credit rating on 
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earnings management, find that managers in unrated firms are likely to exercise 
their accounting and operating discretion to mislead investors, whereas 
managers in rated firms generally manipulate earnings to increase their 
informativeness. 
Figure 2.2: Overview of theoretical underpinning for earnings management  
 
However, if firms have sufficient control over managers' accounting discretion 
(e.g. monitoring by the board of directors, audit committee, good control over 
financial report, and transparency of disclosures), then the managers will 
choose accounting choices to maximize the value of the firm. Consistent with 
this argument, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (1999) shows 
that the effectiveness of internal controls can reduce operating risk and lead to 
an increase in quality of earnings.  
5.2 Incentives for earnings management according to theoretical frameworks  
According to Stolowy and Breton (2004), earnings management is mainly 
motivated by the desire to influence the possibility of transferring wealth (1) 
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between the firm and society (political costs), (2) between the firm and funds 
providers (cost of capital) 6, or (3) between the firm and managers 
(compensation plans) according to positive accounting theory. In the first two 
cases, companies benefit from the wealth transfer, but in the third case, 
managers are acting against the firm. Expanding the three motives identified in 
Stolowy and Breton (2004) this review classifies the incentive for earnings 
management into four groups, which are market expectations, contractual 
arrangement, debt market, and public scrutiny/pressure, by theoretical 
frameworks. 
5.2.1 Market expectations 
Earnings can be managed to avoid negative market reactions and satisfy 
market expectations about earnings. In general, managers are likely to avoid 
disproportionate adverse reactions. The results of market expectations studies 
suggest that managers tend to smooth earnings or engage in upward earnings 
management in response to capital market pressures. Firms may manage 
earnings upward to meet/beat the expectations of analysts’ forecasts, achieve 
some essential threshold, and preserve a desired credit rating. Zang (2012) 
shows that firms failing to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts are more 
penalized than firms that meet the goal. Thus, it is not surprising that managers 
have strong incentives for earnings management to report positive earnings 
surprises relative to analysts’ expectations, and to manipulate earnings at these 
thresholds (such as reporting a profit, reporting an increase in earnings, 
meeting analysts’ forecasts, and achieving expected credit rating). In other 
words, managers are likely to manipulate earnings to obtain market rewards or 
                                                          
6
 For example, earnings management is practiced to encourage investors to buy a firm’s stock 
or increase its market value. 
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avoid negative market reactions (Francis et al., 2003; Zang, 2012; Aerts and 
Zhang, 2014; Cohen et al., 2008; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et 
al., 1999; Herrmann et al., 2011; and Young, 1999).  
Dichev et al. (2013) indicate that the importance of stock prices and outside 
pressure to hit earnings benchmarks affect earnings management around 
specific financing events such as season equity offering (SEO) and stock 
buybacks, while, Dechow et al. (2010) point out a positive relation between 
capital raising activities (e.g. a firm’s initial public offering and SEOs) and 
earnings management. This is consistent also with finding in Teoh et al. (1998) 
and Erickson and Wang (1999) who find that managers are likely to manage 
earnings upward in SEO and merger periods to increase their stock prices as 
per the market incentive hypothesis.  
Satisfying market expectations or Avoiding a negative market reaction 
(Loss avoidance, earnings increase, earnings smoothness, meeting or 
beating analyst earnings forecasts, and preserving a desired credit rating) 
Previous research (i.e. Degeorge et al., 1999; and Dechow and Skinner, 2000) 
indicates that there is a hierarchy among earnings thresholds. Firstly, managers 
manage earnings upward to avoid losses in a year of poor performance. This is 
consistent with the document of Rezaee (2005) that managers can manipulate 
accounting practices under the existing rules-based accounting standards to 
hide the economic substance of their performance. For example, managers are 
likely to manage earnings through AEM by changing from the sum-of-the-years’ 
digit depreciation method for PPE to the straight-line method, resulting in 
reduced depreciation expenses in the initial years, which in turn leads to an 
increase in earnings. Managers might decide to do this in order to attract 
security brokers and investment trusts (Zamri et al., 2013). Interestingly, 
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Dechow et al. (2010) document that managers are likely to avoid loss by 
managing earnings just enough to report a small profit. Small profits have been 
identified as an indication of earnings management and low-quality earnings in 
several other papers (Dechow et al., 2010; and Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
Dechow et al. (2003) empirically test this assumption by comparing 
discretionary accruals of firms reporting a small profit to those of firms reporting 
a small loss. Their results suggest that discretionary accruals of the small profit 
group are the same as those of the small loss group. This implies that small 
profits cannot unconditionally be used as an indication of earnings 
management. 
Next, for companies with positive profitability, the incentive is to report an 
increase in annual earnings which represents good news and leads to 
increases in the firm value. For that reason, managers tend to smooth earnings 
in order to maintain steady earnings growth. This is consistent with the evidence 
in Beaver et al. (2003) that public and mutual firms in the insurance industry 
manipulate loss reserves to smooth earnings or to avoid reporting losses in the 
future. Interestingly, Barth et al. (1999) document that consistent increases in 
earnings is important because firms with string of earnings increases relative to 
prior year or relative to the same quarter of the previous year receive a price 
premium or have higher valuations than firms which report an increase in 
earnings for the first time.  
Finally, firms may manage earnings to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
continuous growth. According to the market expectation hypothesis, firms 
meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts have a higher return than 
companies that fail to meet the analysts target (Bartov et al., 2002; Brown and 
Caylor, 2005; and Zang, 2012). Similarly, when earnings level meets the 
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financial analysts or investors’ expectation, the association of earnings with 
stock returns is greater (Ortega et al., 2003). In other words, meeting or beating 
analysts’ earnings forecasts positively affects firm stock prices. Thus, managers 
have a strong motive to achieve analysts’ forecast and avoid a negative market 
reaction by choosing an accounting method or changing real activities to 
manipulate earnings. This is consistent with evidence of Payne and Robb 
(2000) that managers have incentives to manage earnings to align with market 
expectations established by analysts’ forecasts. Additionally, their results report 
that when the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is low, managers have greater 
incentives to increase income and vice versa. Interestingly, Burgstahler and 
Eames (2006) point out that managers have two ways to meet or slightly 
exceed analysts’ forecasts and avoid a negative earnings surprise7: manage 
earnings upwards and forecasts downward. Similarly, Cotter at el. (2006) 
suggest that management guidance plays a significant role in leading analysts 
toward achievable earnings benchmarks. 
Jiang (2008) shows that firms that beat (miss) earnings benchmarks are 
associated with a lower (higher) cost of debt (e.g. smaller (larger) yield spread) 
and tend to have better (worse) credit ratings. This is consistent with capital 
market effects that investors reward firms that meet or beat earnings targets, 
however, they penalize firms failing to meet such target (Barth et al., 1999; 
Francis et al., 2003; and An et al., 2014). Graham et al. (2005), Zhao (2002), 
Carter (2015), and Jung et al. (2013) identify that one of the main reasons for 
earnings manipulation is gaining a desirable rating. Specifically, managers have 
been shown to manipulate credit-rating through (1) income-increasing earnings 
management activities, (2) artificial smoothing of earnings, and (3) lower 
                                                          
7
 Negative earnings surprise is determined as realized earnings minus the earnings forecast.  
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reported leverage. This is consistent with findings of Hovakimian et al. (2009) 
that firms with above-target ratings are likely to make choices that increase their 
debt in order to meet or beat the target ratings in the future, whereas firms with 
below-target ratings are likely to make financing, pay out, and acquisition 
choices that decrease their debt to meet the target ratings in the current period. 
On the other hand, Eastman et al. (2017) find that firms with actual rating below 
their target rating have incentives to reach a target rating by using income-
increasing earnings management, but, there is no evidence that firms with 
actual rating above their target rating engage in earnings management. 
Issuing capital and acquiring firms 
Dechow et al. (1996) state that a primary motivation for earnings manipulation is 
to encourage investors to buy an interest in a firm’s stock as owners or in bonds 
as creditors, or to lower the cost of raising additional external financing. Dechow 
et al. (2011) suggest that managers are happy when stock prices are high 
because this reduces the cost of raising new equity. Evidence by Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) show that managers manage earnings upward in anticipation of 
season equity offerings (SEO) to show good performance, and then, managers 
reverse earnings and show poor stock performance in a subsequent period. 
Similarly, Yoon and Miller (2002), who investigate earnings management of 
SEO in Korea, find that SEO firms are more likely to increase report earnings in 
the year immediately preceding and the year of SEOs if their relative 
performance is poor. 
Prior studies (i.e. Louis, 2004; Dichev et al., 2013; and Erickson and Wang, 
1999) identify that acquiring firms are likely to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management, which in turn, increase their stock prices prior to a stock 
merger to reduce the cost of buying the target. Moreover, Erickson and Wang 
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(1999) find that the relative size of the merge is positively related to the degree 
of income-increasing earnings management. 
5.2.2 Contractual arrangement 
The second incentive for earnings management is related to the management’s 
compensation contracts. Earnings play a significant role in executives’ 
employment status and compensation benefits (such as salary plus bonus, 
long-term incentive payouts, and restricted stock). Not surprisingly, the results 
of studies on compensation contracts and earnings management indicate that 
managers are likely to manage earnings upward to benefit from increased 
compensation (Healy and Wahlem, 1999; Mendes et al., 2012; Dechow et al., 
2010; and Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009). This is consistent with the 
suggestion of Cohen et al. (2008) that managers with higher equity or bonus-
based compensation are more sensitive to using their discretion to manipulate 
earning upwards. 
Compensation contracts (Bonuses and share compensation)  
According to the contractual arrangement incentive, managers are likely to 
manage earnings upward to increase their own compensation via higher 
bonuses and/ or share options (Healy and Wahlem, 1999; Healy, 1985; Cohen 
et al., 2008; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Turner and Guilding, 2011; Zhang et al., 2008; and Shuto, 2007). Smith and 
Watts (1992) indicate that firms in high growth industries tend to employ stock-
based rather than earnings-based compensation. Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that managers attempt to increase stock prices to maximize bonus 
compensation. This is consistent with evidence by Cheng and Warfield (2005) 
that managers with high equity incentives are likely to sell shares in the future, 
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thus, they are motivated towards upward earnings management to increase the 
value of shares to be sold. Interestingly, Jiang et al. (2010), who investigate the 
association between (1) chief financial officer (CFO) equity incentives and 
earnings manipulation; and (2) chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives 
and earnings manipulation, find that the magnitude of accruals and the 
likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity 
incentives than to those of the CEO because CFOs’ primary responsibility is 
financial reporting. Thus, it is not surprising that CFO can manage earnings 
easier than CEO to increase their compensation. 
Bonus schemes create incentives for managers to choose accounting 
procedures or change accounting policy to maximize the value of their bonuses 
(Healy, 1985; Guidry et al., 1999; and Holthausen et al., 1995). Interestingly, 
Ghosh and Olsen (2009) find that the management team may smooth earnings 
in order to remain between the lower and upper bonus compensation 
boundaries and to maximize their benefits over time. In contrast, Burns and 
Kedia (2006) find that salary and bonus insignificantly affect the adoption of 
aggressive accounting practices, while, stock options are positively associated 
with stronger incentives to misreport. Similarly, Efendi et al. (2007) indicate that 
CEOs with a large amount of in-the-money stock options are more inclined to 
manipulate earnings. Another example of compensation driven earnings 
management is discussed in Turner and Guilding (2011) who show that unlike 
hotel owners, hotel operators tend to capitalize asset related expenditure in 
order to increase their management fee. 
5.2.3 Debt market 
The debt covenant hypothesis refers to the relationship between creditors and 
shareholders. Roychowdhury (2006) indicates that the level of leverage is 
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positively associated with the likelihood of management managing earnings to 
avoid violating a debt covenant, as stated by the financial distress theory. In 
other words, if firms present poor cash flows, managers attempt to loosen debt 
covenant restrictions by engaging in earnings management (Sweeney, 1994; 
and Leuz et al., 2003). This is consistent with argument in Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1994), who examine the impact of leverage on accrual manipulation, 
that leverage is an incentive for earnings management. On the other hand, 
other papers find that debt covenant may reduce earnings management (e.g. 
Zamri et al., 2013; and Ardison et al., 2012). 
Covenant violations 
As mentioned above, the empirical evidence on debt covenant hypothesis is 
mixed. On the one hand, the results of debt covenant studies find that 
managers may manage earnings upward to raise new debt on more favorable 
terms or satisfy financial covenants in existing debt contracts (Zamri et al., 
2013; Roychowdhury, 2006; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; and Leuz et al., 2003). This is consistent with 
evidence by Sweeney (1994), who examines the relation between debt-
covenant violations and accounting changes. He finds that determinants of 
managers’ accounting responses are the accounting flexibility available to 
managers and the default costs imposed by lenders. Moreover, he finds that 
managers of firms with high debt-covenant violations are likely to manage 
earnings by making income-increasing accounting changes. Francis et al. 
(2005) find that credit ratings have a significant impact on cost of debt and 
financial performance. This is in line with findings by Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001) and Alissa et al. (2013) that credit rating downgrades lead to negative 
excess returns and violation of debt covenants. Hence, it is hardly surprising 
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that managers are motivated towards upward earnings management to reduce 
the effect of debt-covenant violations. 
On the other hand, the evidence of Zamri et al. (2013), who analyze the relation 
between leverage and real earnings management, and Ardison et al. (2012), 
who examine the association between leverage ratio and accruals earnings 
management, support the view that the high monitoring of creditors may restrict 
managers’ ability to manage earnings. In other words, leverage is negatively 
associated with earnings management. However, some papers, including Healy 
and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1994) find no evidence of an effect of 
debt constraints on earnings management.   
5.2.4 Public scrutiny/ Pressure 
The final incentive for earnings management concentrates on public 
scrutiny/pressure and it is labeled political-cost hypothesis. The political-cost 
hypothesis refers to the relationship between the company and the public 
authorities. According to the political-cost hypothesis, the incentives to manage 
earnings downward relate to some specific government policy or intervention. 
For example, if firms are investigated for monopoly-related violations, managers 
may try to apply several methods in order to report lower earnings (Cahan, 
1992). Further, managers may attempt manipulate earnings downward to 
benefit from governmental help during the crisis (Jones, 1991; Byard et al., 
2007; Hall, 1993; and Han and Wang, 1998).  
Political sensitivity period 
There are several studies that show how managers attempt to drive earnings 
downward during political sensitivity periods in order to increase the amount of 
relief granted and/ or increase the likelihood of obtaining such protection 
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(Cahan, 1992; Jones, 1991; and Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). For example, 
evidence supplied by Han and Wang (1998) indicate that oil refining firms 
reported more special items (e.g. write down the value of aging or added 
reserves for cleaning up oil fields) to reduce their quarterly reported earnings 
and delayed the announcement of a growth in earnings during the Gulf crisis in 
1990 in order to restrain stock price increases, and, thus, political pressure. This 
is consistent with the argument that firms react to a regulatory threat. In 
addition, they find that LIFO firms manage inventory levels to report lower 
profits in the third and fourth quarters of 1990 by purchasing additional 
inventory. In contrast, no firms are observed to report negative special items (as 
noted above) for crude oil and natural gas in the same period.  
Similarly, Byard et al. (2007) find that large petroleum refining firms attempt to 
report lower earnings in the immediate aftermath of the hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, when oil prices increased rapidly, as a political-cost strategy when under 
investigation by a regulator that is concerned with price control. In the same 
vein, Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) find that managers have an incentive to 
report lower earnings by using discretionary non-working capital accruals during 
periods in which they face potentially large damage awards. Moreover, Jones 
(1991) find that firms seeking import relief use income-decreasing earnings 
management activities during the import-relief investigations. Cahan’s (1992) 
results show that firms under investigation for monopoly-related violations 
exercised income-decreasing discretionary accruals in investigation years. 
Lastly, Konigsgruber and Windisch (2014) indicate that firms manage earnings 
downward when under investigation by a competition authority, while, Cho and 
Sachs (2012) find that firms in motor carriers’ industry record significant 
abnormal income-decreasing accruals in order to lessen perception of 
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excessive profits and avoid deregulation. In summary, incentives for earnings 
management can be classified by theoretical frameworks as shown in table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Incentives to manage earnings  
Incentives 
for earnings 
management 
Market expectations Contractual 
arrangement 
 
Debt market 
 
Public scrutiny/ 
pressure 
 
Stakeholders Analysts and Investors Management 
 
Debtholders 
 
Government 
Pattern of 
earnings and 
hypothesis 
Income maximization and 
Income minimization 
(only earnings smoothing) 
based on market 
expectation hypothesis 
Income 
maximization 
based on 
management 
compensation 
hypothesis 
Income 
maximization 
and Income 
minimization 
based on debt 
covenant 
hypothesis 
Income minimization 
based on political 
cost hypothesis, and 
Income 
maximization based 
on market incentive 
hypothesis 
Events - Satisfying market 
expectations (loss 
avoidance, earnings 
increases, earnings 
smoothness, preserving 
a desired credit rating) 
(Francis et al., 2003; 
Young, 1999; Beaver et 
al., 2003; Carter, 2015; 
Barth et al., 1999; and 
Graham et al., 2005) 
- Avoiding a negative 
market reaction 
(meeting or beating 
analyst earnings 
forecasts) 
(Burgstahler and Eames, 
2006; Amy, 2005; Zang, 
2012; Brown and Pinello, 
2007; Jiang, 2008; and 
Alissa et al., 2013) 
- Issuing capital and 
acquiring firms 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Rangan, 1998; 
Teoh et al., 1998; 
Erickson and Wang, 
1999; and Louis, 2004) 
- Compensation 
contracts 
(bonuses/ 
share 
compensation) 
(Healy and 
Wahlem, 1999; 
Healy, 1985; 
Zang, 2012; 
Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000; 
Cohen et al., 
2008; Turner and 
Guilding, 2011; 
Mendes et al., 
2012; Zhang et 
al., 2008; Cheng 
and Warfield, 
2005; Ghosh and 
Olsen, 2009; 
Burns and Kedia, 
2006; Efendi et 
al., 2007; and 
Charoenwong 
and Jiraporn, 
2009) 
- Covenant 
violations  
(Zamri et al., 
2013; 
Roychowdhury, 
2006; Defond 
and Jiambalvo, 
1994; 
Sweeney, 
1994; Dichev 
and Piotroski, 
2001; Zamri et 
al., 2013; 
Ardison et al., 
2012; 
DeAngelo et 
al., 1994; and 
Leuz et al., 
2003) 
 
 
- Political sensitivity 
period 
(Cahan, 1992; 
Jones, 1991; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 
1978; Han and 
Wang, 1998; Byard 
et al., 2007; Chen et 
al., 2011; key, 1997; 
Cho and Sachs, 
2012; Konigsgruber 
and Windisch, 2014; 
and Hall and 
Stammerjohan, 
1997) 
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5.3 Patterns of earnings management 
The discussion above about the theoretical underpinning for earnings 
management suggests that managers may manipulate earnings upward or 
downward depending on their specific incentives. Then, this sub-section 
presents separately the incentives for these two patterns: income minimization 
and income maximization in more depth.  
There are two patterns of earnings management, namely, income minimization 
and income maximization. According to Irani and Oesch (2016), managers may 
be motivated to accelerate sales by using positive discretionary accruals. In 
contrast, managers may also use negative discretionary accruals to engage in 
earnings smoothing or make future earnings thresholds easier. Moreover, 
Roychowdhury (2006) indicates that managers can result to real earnings 
management such as cutting (increasing) R&D, employee training, 
maintenance, and marketing expenditures, extending (reducing) credit terms, 
offering (cutting) price discounts, and increasing (decreasing) product volume.  
Healy (1985) provides a good example of the two patterns of earnings 
management that influence income-decreasing and income-increasing 
accounting policies. He focuses on the firm’s accrual choice based on a bonus-
plan hypothesis and discovers that managers not only consider the current 
performance but also the future performance of the firm. The evidence shows 
that managers choose income-decreasing accruals when either cash from 
operations is above the upper boundary or income is below the lower boundary 
of the top executives’ bonus plans in order to make the future target easier to 
achieve; however, they select income-increasing accruals when these 
boundaries are not binding. 
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5.3.1 Income minimization & smoothing 
Managers may opt for income minimization during periods of high profitability in 
order to avoid being scrutinized by politicians, during restructuring to clear the 
deck, or even during low performance in order to be able to report higher 
earnings easier in the future (Leuz et al., 2003; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 
2002; and Stolowy and Breton, 2004). More specifically, Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad (2002) demonstrate that, when firms encounter bad news, managers 
prefer to take a “Big Bath”, depending on the degree of available discretion or 
the ability, to under-report earnings by the maximum amount possible in the 
current period and report higher earnings in the future. In contrast, if the news is 
good, managers prefer to engage in earnings smoothing and the amount of 
smoothing depend on the level of cash flow and available discretion. 
Generally, managers like to reserve income in periods of good performance 
which allows them to manage earnings upwards in periods of poor performance 
(Leuz et al., 2003). This is in line with the study of Turner and Guilding (2011), 
who indicate that if earnings before special items and income tax exceed a 
certain threshold, managers will have an incentive to reduce the profits in the 
current period to increase the reported earnings in subsequent accounting 
periods. Managers can achieve this by the accelerating recognition of 
expenditure or delaying recognition of future income. In addition, managers can 
manipulate real actions to reduce earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). For 
example, managers can manage earnings downwards by increasing R&D and 
marketing expenditures, cutting price discounts, and decreasing product 
volume. 
In some cases, however, firms that perform poorly may also be motivated to 
take a “Big Bath” in order to report higher earnings easier in the subsequent 
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periods. Stolowy and Breton (2004) note that Moore (1973) was the first to 
propose the “Big Bath” accounting hypothesis when he found that firms tend to 
manage earnings downward after a change in top management. Income-
decreasing discretionary accounting decisions benefit new management 
because of the reduction in historical bases for future comparison. This is 
consistent with evidence of Pourciau (1993) that earnings are likely to be 
managed downward after non-routine executive changes. Similarly, Kousenidis 
et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to take a “Big Bath” during a 
crisis by making huge provisions for advertising and R&D expenditure, showing 
excessive losses, or rapidly writing off capital assets and intangibles assets to 
report higher earnings in the next period. Walsh et al. (1991) finds a relationship 
between the size of growth in income-decreasing earnings and the amount of 
extraordinary items adjustment. Hence, it can be concluded that the greater the 
extraordinary items adjustment, the more the intensity of earnings management 
via Big Bath. 
Summing up, income minimizing earnings management tends to be used in 
periods when pre-managed earnings are lower than expected, while the 
smoothing of earnings tends to happen in periods when pre-managed earnings 
are higher than expected. Both of them are associated with income 
minimization. 
5.3.2 Income maximization 
Managers may opt for income maximization to window-dress financial 
statements prior to offering public securities, or to avoid the loss of investors’ 
confidence in the survival of the firm after a crisis/ period of poor performance 
(market incentives hypothesis) (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Rangan, 1998; and 
Teoh et al., 1998). In addition, managers might also manipulate earnings 
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upward for their own benefit in order to increase their compensation and job 
security (stewardship hypothesis) (Healy and Wahlem, 1999; and Charoenwong 
and Jiraporn, 2009). Furthermore, many papers show that debt contracts are an 
incentive to manage earnings upward to boost financial performance both to 
satisfy financial covenants in existing debt contracts and to raise new debt on 
more favorable terms (debt covenant hypothesis) (Dechow et al., 2011; Leuz et 
al., 2003; and Roychowdhury, 2006). Interestingly, Daniel et al. (2008) show 
that prior dividend policy and the tightness of debt-related dividend constraints 
have a significant influence on upwards earnings management to meet a 
dividend threshold and avoid a cut in dividends.  
Prior studies (e.g. Dechow et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013; Roychowdhury, 
2006; and Cohen et al., 2008) document that managers can use discretionary 
accruals and real actions to boost earnings.  For instance, the sales department 
could predict that the sales volume would drop in the future; managers could 
boost the sales volume by offering price discounts and extending credit terms. 
Alternatively, managers can manage earnings upwards by delaying the 
reporting of current costs such as bad debt expenditure or inventory write-offs, 
or delaying repaying long term liabilities, increasing estimates of live salvage 
value for fixed assets within an acceptable range, and reducing advertisement 
and R&D expenses. Interestingly, Jansen et al. (2012) study a new diagnostic 
for earnings manipulation upwards based on directional change in firms’ profit 
margin and asset turnover ratio and find that firms with an increase in profit 
margin and a decrease in assets turnover tend to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts, have extreme earnings surprises, subsequently restate earnings 
downward, and experience lower year-ahead firm performance. For example, if 
managers manipulate earnings upward by understating bad debt expenses, 
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both net income relative to sales and the net realizable value of accounts 
receivable relative to sales will be overstated. Therefore, the increase in net 
income relative to sales will lead to an increase in profit margin (calculated by 
the ratio of net income to sales); whereas, the increase in net accounts 
receivable relative to sales will lead to a decrease in assets turnover (calculated 
by the ratio of sales to net operating assets). 
In summary, there are three different methods to increase earnings by using 
accruals and real earnings management as mention above: namely, (1) 
expense manipulation by the delayed recognition of expenditure; (2) revenue 
manipulation by the accelerated recognition of future income; (3) margin 
manipulation by stabilizing the recognition of revenue (Dechow et al., 1995).  
6 Other determinants and constraints of earnings management 
After exploring the types, concept, and patterns of earnings management, we 
next turn to the investigation of other underlying determinants and constraints of 
earnings management. Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) suggest that the 
main reasons for earnings management are an internal demand related to 
optimal contracting and an external demand to boost the firm’s stock price. 
Similarly, Dichev et al. (2013) indicate that outside and inside pressures in an 
attempt to influence stock price and avoid adverse compensation are primarily 
key for earnings misrepresentation. Therefore, this paper classifies factors on 
earnings management into two main categories, namely, internal factors and 
external factors as many prior literatures suggest (e.g. Latridis and Dimitras, 
2013; Leuz and Schrand, 2009; and Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). 
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6.1 Internal factors 
Internal factors and constraints on earnings management include business 
model, human factor, firms’ characteristics, governance and internal controls, 
and managerial compensation. However, we have discussed managerial 
compensation as an incentive based on management compensation hypothesis 
in detail before. Hence, this section will not cover the topic on managerial 
compensation. 
Business model 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) document that the business model is an important 
determinant of earnings management. Mazumder (2016), who studies the 
impact of ownership structure on earnings predictability, identifies that firms with 
incremental domestic institutional ownership are related to higher earnings 
predictability, while, firms with higher foreign institutional ownership are related 
to lower earnings predictability. In other words, firms with higher domestic 
institutional ownership are considered to have high earnings of quality. 
Matsumoto (2002) observes that firms with higher transient institutional 
ownership, greater reliance on implicit claims with their stockholders, high long-
term growth, high risk of shareholder lawsuits, and higher value-relevant 
earnings, are more likely to manage earnings upward and/or guide forecasts 
downward in order to meet or beat expectations of the earnings announcement. 
Human factor 
The character of the manager, her credibility, attitude and work experience 
affect the likelihood of earnings management and can raise red flags about 
potential misrepresentation (Dichev et al., 2013). For example, Pham (2016) 
examines the relationship between CEOs’ financial experience and earnings 
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management around IPOs. His findings identify that IPO firms with financial 
expert CEOs tend to manipulate earnings less through accruals earnings 
management than IPO firms with managerial expert CEOs. He attributes this 
finding to financial expert CEOs being more likely to be informative in financial 
reporting and able to use accounting to allow investors to properly gauge the 
fair value of the firm. Moreover, his findings suggest that CEOs’ expertise (i.e. 
financial or managerial expert) impacts on the ability of IPO firms to remain 
viable for a longer period of time. 
Firms characteristics 
Dechow et al. (2010) document that performance, growth, risk, and size are four 
specific firm characteristics related to earnings management. According to 
Trombetta and Imperatore (2014), a company’s return on assets (ROA), which 
is used to assess performance, represents potential determinants of earnings 
management. Firms with weak performance have stronger incentives to 
manage earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). Dichev et al. (2013) document that 
fast-growing firms and firms with a higher exposure to lawsuits show a greater 
dollar magnitude of earnings management. Thus, such action reduces the 
earnings quality.  Further, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) find a positive 
relationship between size and earnings management, while, Dechow et al. 
(2010) suggest that firm size is inversely related to commonly used proxies for 
quality of earnings. This is similar to Byard et al. (2007), whose evidence 
suggests that large firms manage earnings in the immediate aftermath of 
disasters in line with the political cost hypothesis. In contrast, Kousenidis et al. 
(2013) argue that the financial reporting quality of big firms is higher than small 
firms because big firms need to disclose more information according to the 
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regulation of stock markets. Thus, big firms are less likely to be incentivized to 
manage earnings than small firms. 
Governance and internal controls 
Dichev et al. (2013) indicate that internal control procedures and the role of the 
board of directors (BODs) drive earnings quality. Internal control procedures are 
used as mechanisms to constrain a manager’s opportunity or ability to 
manipulate earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). Firms with good internal controls 
can protect earnings quality and reduce earnings management (Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). In other words, strong internal decisions would be associated 
with higher quality earnings. Hail and Leuz (2006) suggest that public firms 
engage in less earnings management than private firms because of stronger 
internal controls and the arm’s length relationship with stakeholders. In addition, 
Prawitt et al. (2009) find that internal audit quality is associated with reduced 
level of earnings manipulation by using absolute abnormal accruals from the 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model and propensity to barely meet or 
beat versus barely miss analysts’ earnings forecasts. In particular, the lower the 
internal audit quality, the higher the absolute abnormal accruals measure, and 
the less likely the firm is to barely miss analysts’ earnings forecasts. This 
implies that better internal control procedures lead to a reduction in earnings 
management. 
Dechow et al. (1996) document that weaknesses in firms’ internal governance 
structures (e.g. CEO duality, board composed largely of insiders, and firms 
without an audit committee) are factors increasing the likelihood of earnings 
management. In contrast, Dechow et al. (2010) indicate that managerial 
turnover and more independent board are associated with less earnings 
management. This is consistent with evidence of Karamanou and Vafeas 
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(2005) that firms with more effective corporate governance are associated with 
higher earnings forecast accuracy and financial disclosure quality. Lastly, 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) report that firms with more outside directors and greater 
institutional ownership tend to be more specific and accurate. Hence, these 
firms are considered to have higher-quality earnings and manage earnings less. 
6.2 External factors 
External factors affecting earnings management include financial reporting 
practices, auditors, capital market incentives, regulation and potential regulatory 
scrutiny, and crises and the environment. However, we have discussed capital 
market incentives and regulation and potential regulatory scrutiny as an 
incentive based on the market expectation hypothesis and political cost 
hypothesis, respectively in detail before. Therefore, we will discuss only three 
external factors on earnings management remaining in this sub-section. 
Financial reporting practices 
According to Schipper and Vincent (2003), accounting recognition rules, which 
preclude the recoding of many economic assets and liabilities, and difficulties in 
reliably measuring assets and liabilities at their economic values affect reported 
earnings. For example, managers must report the recognition of impairment 
losses on fixed assets and purchased goodwill based on estimates. In addition, 
they indicate that the quality of earnings increases with the decreasing 
incidence of estimation used by managers. This is consistent with interview 
evidence reported in Dichev et al. (2013) that the quality of earnings is positively 
correlated with the quality of assumptions underlying the estimates on the 
balance sheet. If the quality of assumptions is high, then earnings are of high 
quality, while, the degree of earnings management is low. Dichev et al. (2013) 
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argue that accounting for merger and acquisition can help managers engage in 
income-increasing earnings management through a goodwill account whereby 
they can boost up future earnings. Similarly, Louis (2004) suggests that 
acquiring firms are likely to manipulate earnings upwards before the merger 
announcements to reduce the cost of acquiring target firms. Interestingly, 
Bartov (1993) finds that managers take advantage of the acquisition-cost 
principle to manage earnings through the timing of income recognition from 
disposal of long-lived assets and investments, as changes in the market value 
of an asset between acquisition and sale are recognized in the period of the 
sale. Dechow et al. (2011) indicate that managers can perform financial 
statement window-dressing by using off-balance-sheet activities such as 
pension obligations and related plan assets for defined benefit plans, and 
operating leases. For example, managers can adjust the expected return on 
plan assets and so reduce/increase future reported pension expense. In 
addition, managers may use the accounting for operating leases to record lower 
expenses early on in the life of the lease and so increase income in the current 
period. These can provide important signals about the likelihood of managers 
intentionally manipulating earnings. This is consistent with argument in Dechow 
et al. (2010) that accounting method choices on the average lead to lower-
quality earnings because managers are likely to make opportunistic choices 
rather than efficient choices. 
According to Dechow et al. (2010), financial statement classification and interim 
reporting are likely to result in higher incentives to manage earnings. McVay 
(2006) indicates that financial statement classification is another strategy for 
managing earnings because managers opportunistically use discretion over 
classifications in the profit and loss statement to meet targets. This is consistent 
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with the suggestion of Matsumoto (2002) that the accruals at fiscal year-end 
may differ from those at interim quarters because auditors may increase their 
scrutiny. Accordingly, managers are more likely to report extraordinary items or 
use classification shifting technique in the fourth quarter to meet analyst 
forecasts or avoid negative earnings surprises. Similarly, Brown and Pinello 
(2007) find that managers are likely to reduce the likelihood of income-
increasing earnings management but increase the magnitude of downward 
expectations management in annual reporting when compare to similar firms in 
interim reporting. While, Zang (2012) indicates that managers tend to 
manipulate transactions more in the last quarter of the fiscal year because, by 
then, they have sufficient information about the level of earnings management 
needed. 
Auditors 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) document that earnings quality depends on the 
quality of the auditors. Auditors are important actors in detecting and mitigating 
level of accruals earnings management; however, it may lead firms to engage in 
a higher level of real-based earning management (Alhadab et al., 2016). Bonner 
et al. (1998) show that Big 6 firms (now Big 4) are of higher quality than firms 
with non-Big 6 auditors by considering the litigation rate which reflects quality 
differences between the two types of auditor. In other words, Big 4 firms are 
less likely to be litigation targets than other audit firms, thus, they are of higher 
quality. Similarly, Dechow et al. (2010) and Pornupatham (2007) find that firms 
that use Big 4 auditors have significantly lower discretionary accruals than firms 
that use other accounting firms.  
Auditor industry expertise and hours spent auditing are proxies for auditor 
effectiveness, which are positively correlated with earnings quality, but, are 
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negatively correlated with earnings management. Further, Dechow et al. (1996) 
point out that independence and quality of the outside auditor affect earnings 
management. Therefore, several empirical studies select audit quality as the 
control variable to measure earnings management (i.e. Alhadab et al., 2016; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Lennox and Pittman, 2011; and 
Lang and Maffett, 2011).  
Interestingly, Dechow et al. (2010) argue that the relation between audit fees 
and earnings quality is mixed. The evidence of Frankel et al. (2002) suggest 
that audit fees are negatively related to earnings management indicators 
because audit fees are predicted to be positively associated with audit 
expertise, and hence with detection earnings management ability. On the other 
hand, audit fees are also predicted to be negatively associated with auditor 
independence, and hence the audit quality could be impaired (Dechow et al., 
2010).  
Firms with changes in auditor tend to manage earnings more easily and are 
associated with lower-quality financial reports because new auditors need some 
time to understand the nature of their businesses (Johnson et al., 2002; Stanley 
and DeZoort, 2007; and Okolie, 2014). This is consistent with evidence of Davis 
et al. (2009) that firms with short (2-3 years) auditor tenure tend to report higher 
levels of discretionary accruals to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts due 
to a lack of client-specific knowledge. While, firms with long (13-15 years) 
auditor tenure are likely to report higher levels of discretionary accruals due to 
impairment of auditor’s independence (over-familiarity). On the other hand, 
Johnson et al. (2002) finds no evidence of reduced earnings quality for long 
(nine or more years) auditor tenure. 
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Crises and the environment 
Many researchers (i.e. Kousenidis et al., 2013; Trombetta and Imperatore, 
2014; and Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013) have examined the impact of economic 
downturn (like financial crisis or economic crisis) on earnings management. On 
the one hand, the crisis has negative effects on earnings quality of firms. For 
example, Trombetta and Imperatore (2014) point out that financial distress, 
economic downturn and other crises are determinants of accounting discretion 
decisions. Their results indicate that the accounting quality during periods of 
financial distress is affected by accounting choices and earnings management. 
In addition, they also find a U-shaped relationship between earnings 
management and macro-economic factors. This means that a highly intense 
crisis level greatly affects earnings management activities, while a low-crisis 
level affects earnings management activities less. In other words, earnings 
management activities may be non-monotonic and may vary according to the 
intensity of the crisis. Moreover, Cohen et al. (2008) find that firms have high 
levels of discretionary accruals in a period surrounding the corporate accounting 
scandals of Enron and WorldCom. Similarly, Esteban and Garcia (2014) finds 
that financial crisis influences accounting choices to manage earnings. In other 
words, a crisis negatively influences earnings quality or earnings quality 
deteriorated due to the crisis. In the same vein, Choi et al. (2011) suggest that 
the crisis may have negative effects on firms’ earnings quality because it leads 
to a significant decline in the information value of discretionary earnings. 
Interestingly, Byard et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between weather 
catastrophes and managers’ accounting choices. Their results indicate that 
managers of large petroleum refining firms choose income-decreasing accruals 
in the aftermath of hurricanes hit as suggested by the political cost hypothesis. 
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On the other hand, some papers find that earnings manipulation has decreased 
significantly during crises. For example, Filip and Raffournier (2014), who 
examine the impact of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 on earnings 
management, find that earnings management has decreased significantly in the 
financial crisis years compared with the prior years. This is consistent with 
evidence reported by Kousenidis et al. (2013), who study the effect of the 
European debt crisis on earnings quality in five countries (Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal). They find that the quality of earnings in the crisis 
period is better than in the pre-crisis period. They attribute this finding to the 
increased need of firms for external financing to resolve their liquidity problems.  
7 The consequences of earnings management 
McNichols and Stubben (2008) document that firms under SEC investigation for 
accounting irregularities, are sued by their shareholders for improper 
accounting, and restate their financial statements as a consequence of earnings 
management. Rezaee (2005) indicates that penalties for even unsuccessful 
earnings management are very severe. For example, four top executives of 
HBO & Company managed earnings from 1997 through March 1999 by 
backdating contracts that gave the customers an option to back out in order to 
exceed analysts’ quarterly earnings expectations. However, the firm’s auditor 
discovered the fraud when a customer canceled a purchase but the money 
stayed on the books as revenues. When auditors revealed the managers’ 
actions, the share prices fell by almost 50% in one day.  
In this section, we classify the consequences of earnings management into four 
categories, which include litigation propensity, market valuations, auditor 
opinions, and credit rating. 
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7.1 Litigation propensity 
Dechow et al. (2010) document that restatements increase the likelihood of 
litigation. Moreover, they show that litigation risk is higher for firms with low 
quality of earnings or firms with high incentives for earnings management (i.e. 
firms applying aggressive revenue recognition policy and aggressive expense 
deferral policy, firms avoiding reporting losses or refraining from earnings 
decrease, firms using subsidiary disposal, and negative special items). This is 
consistent with the findings of DuCharme et al. (2004), who study the 
relationship between earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder 
lawsuits, and document that firms manipulating earnings upward around stock 
offers render themselves vulnerable to litigation. 
Gong et al. (2008) indicate that DAs tend to represent misstatements outside 
the boundaries of GAAP and find a positive relation between consequences of 
misstatement (such as restated financial reporting and misunderstanding about 
the financial statements by users) and litigation propensity. In addition, Dechow 
et al. (2011) indicate that misstating firms have a significant negative effect 
immediately, in the correction year. For example, firms may experience a 
decline in investors’ confidence and be sued by their shareholders after 
misstatements are detected. 
Interestingly, Lennox and Li (2014) examine whether the litigation experiences 
of audit firms in the recent past affect subsequent financial reporting quality by 
assuming a rational learning framework. They find a positive association 
between an auditor’s experience of litigation and future financial reporting 
quality, while, auditor’s experience of litigation is negatively associated with 
future misstatement.  
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Summarizing, litigation of the firm and/or the firm’s auditors can be an important 
consequence of earnings management; and litigation of the auditor is further 
positively related to future financial reporting quality. 
7.2 Market valuations 
Dechow et al. (1996) argue that managers manage earnings to enjoy lower 
costs of external financing, however, firms are penalized with significant 
increase in their costs of capital once the earnings management is revealed (i.e. 
a significant decline in the median number of analysts following, low sales, a 
decline in share prices, and bankruptcy). Similarly, Dechow et al. (2010) 
document that once firms with extreme earnings management are discovered, 
they incur substantial losses in market value because of reputational penalties 
or credibility decline, which subsequently lead to low sales, negative stock 
returns, and high contracting and financing costs. 
Earnings manipulation is associated with an increase in the cost of capital when 
the earnings management is detected because investors revise downward their 
estimates of firm value and their beliefs about both the firms’ future economic 
prospects and the credibility of the firms’ financial disclosures. Thus, this causes 
the price of a stock to decline and leads to an increase in the bid-ask spread to 
protect against information asymmetry problems. This informational risk arises 
from the possibility of trading with someone better informed about the true stock 
prices than investors themselves. In other words, the investors earn a bid-ask 
spread to compensate for the increased risk of losing to informed traders 
(Dechow et al., 1996). This is consistent with evidence by Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) that an increase in overall earnings opacity, which includes earnings 
aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and artificially earnings smoothing, is related 
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to an economically significant increase in the cost of equity and an economically 
significant decrease in trading in the stock market. 
Evidence of Gill et al. (2013) suggests that earnings management has an effect 
on a firms’ performance and the value of the firm. Chan et al. (2006) find a 
negative association between AEM and future stock returns, while, Cupertino et 
al. (2016) examine consequence for future returns of REM and find that REM 
has a negative impact on future ROA. Interestingly, Kim et al. (2011) suggest 
that the consequence of income-decreasing manipulation for the purpose of tax 
evasion is directly related to the risk of a collapse of the shares’ price of the firm 
because the hoarding and accumulation of bad news for extended periods lead 
to lack of investors’ confidence after the discovery of the earnings 
manipulation.   
7.3 Audit opinions 
Unqualified audit opinion means that the financial statements are free of 
misstatement; whereas, qualified audit opinions infer a low financial reporting 
quality. Research shows that audit opinions depend on the severity of earnings 
misstatements (Dechow et al. 2010). Similarly, Pornupatham (2007) suggests 
that firms with differing types of auditors’ opinions have differing levels of 
earnings management. This is consistent with evidence in Koumanakos (2008) 
that audit reports with remarkable qualified opinions contain substantially 
manipulated published earnings, which in turn is associated with higher 
probabilities of bankruptcy for these firms. This means that auditors do report 
detected earnings management to the public via auditors’ opinions. Dechow et 
al. (2010) further find that the resignation of an auditor is another indicator of 
poor earning quality.  
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Chen et al. (2013) examine the effect of qualified audit opinions on private debt 
contracts and find that decreases in loan size and increases in the requirement 
of collateral from the borrower are associated with qualified audit opinions. This 
suggests that the lenders consider financial covenants following a qualified 
audit opinion of the borrower’s financial report. In other words, firms with 
qualified audit opinions are likely to have more covenant violations in debt 
contracts than firms with unqualified audit opinions. Francis and Krishnan 
(1999) identify that high-accrual firms have a higher tendency to get modified 
audit opinions than low-accrual firms. 
Interestingly, Omid (2015), who investigates the relationship between AEM, 
REM and qualified audit opinion, finds that discretionary accruals is positively 
related to auditor’s decision to issue a qualified opinion. This evidence is 
consistent also with the findings of Francis and Krishnan (1999), Bartov et al. 
(2001); Abolverdi and Kheradmand (2017); Herbohn and Ragunathan (2008); 
and Butler et al. (2004). In contrast, the result Omid (2015) suggests that there 
is no significant relation between auditor’s decision to issue a qualified opinion 
and abnormal production costs. This is consistent with our earlier discussion 
that costs of AEM are associated with auditor and regulator’ scrutiny, while, 
REM are harder for auditors to detect because managers use business 
judgment to make the decision. Not surprisingly, qualified opinions are 
associated with AEM but are not associated with REM. 
7.4 Credit rating 
Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that firms with higher quality accruals have a 
lower ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing outstanding debt and, hence a 
higher S&P issuer credit rating than firms with lower quality accruals. This is 
consistent with evidence in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) that credit ratings are 
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positively related to accruals quality. In other words, a firm’s accruals quality is a 
significant factor for the level of credit rating. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find 
that credit rating and transparency of firms’ financial reporting are positively 
related. They measure the transparency of firms’ financial reporting using the 
quality of firms’ working capital accruals based on the work of Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and find that it positively affects a firm’s credit rating. Odders-
White and Ready (2006) indicate that low credit ratings are associated with 
lower market liquidity in equity markets, while, firms with a high credit rating 
have high liquidity, which typically increases firm value (Lennox and Pittman, 
2011). This is consistent with the evidence of Fang et al. (2009) that firms with 
better liquidity have typically a good performance as measured by the firm 
market-to-book ratio. In summary, credit rating agencies take into account 
earnings quality and earnings management in their rating decisions. 
8 Conclusions and avenues for future research 
Earnings management and earnings quality are inversely related. Managers 
make particular accounting choices "efficiently", to maximize the value of the 
firm, or "opportunistically”, to ensure that the manager meets his/her objective 
and not those of the other contracting parties. Managers make changes in 
estimates and accounting policies to engage in accruals earnings management 
or make changes in business policies to manipulate earnings using real 
activities. Moreover, managers can also manage earnings by moving items to 
different categories within the income statement to increase core earnings. In 
addition, managers can opt for income maximization or income minimization 
when firms encounter bad or good news depending on their specific incentives. 
Academic researchers develop various models for detecting accruals and real 
earnings management. However, there is no universal conclusion about a 
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single best measure of earnings management. Therefore, developing a better 
model to measure earnings management activity is a topic that will keep 
attracting academician’s attention in the future. Prior research work has also 
tested predictions for numerous factors and consequences of earnings 
management. Still, there are opportunities for expanding this stream of literature 
by examining more rare exogenous shocks, such as natural disasters. 
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Appendix 2.1: Abbreviations and variables used in the chapter 
AEM Accruals earnings management 
REM Real earnings management 
EM Earnings management 
DAs Abnormal accruals or Discretionary accruals 
NDAs Normal accruals or Non-discretionary accruals 
∆WC Changes in working capital = (∆CA - ∆CL - ∆Cash + ∆STD - 
Dep)/ TAt-1 
∆CA Changes in current assets 
∆CL Changes in current liabilities 
∆Cash Changes in cash equivalents 
∆STD Changes in debt included in current liabilities 
Dep Depreciation and amortization expenses 
TA Total assets 
∆Sales Changes in revenues scaled by total assets at t-1 
GrossPPE Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t scaled by total 
assets at t-1 
NetPPE Net property, plant, and equipment in year t scaled by total 
assets at t-1 
∆AR Changes in account receivables scaled by total assets at t-1 
COGS Cost of goods sold scaled by total assets at t-1 
∆INV Changes in inventory scaled by total assets at t-1 
ΔAR1-3 Change in accounts receivable in the first three quarters 
ΔAR4 Change in accounts receivable in the fourth quarter 
DD Dechow and Dichev model following Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) 
Modified DD Modified Dechow and Dichev model following McNichols 
(2002) 
Performance 
match 
Performance-matched Jones model following Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
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CFO Cash flow from operations model following Roychowdhury 
(2006)  
Disc Discretionary expenses model following Roychowdhury 
(2006) 
Prod Production costs model following Roychowdhury (2006) 
ACCR ACCR = net income before extraordinary items (EBXI) - cash 
flow from operation/TAt-1 
ROA A company’s return on assets 
DSRI Account receivables to sales 
GMI Gross margin ratio 
AQI The ratio of assets quality in year t compared to year t-1  
SGI The ratio of sales growth 
DEPI The ratio of depreciation in year t compared to year t-1 
SGAI The ratio of sales, general and administrative expenses in 
year t compared to year t-1 
LVG Leverage ratio 
TATA The ratio of total accruals to total assets 
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Chapter 3 
Natural Disasters as Determinants of Earnings Management 
 
Abstract 
The goal of this study is to examine the level of earnings management occurring 
in a country hit by a natural disaster. In particular, we explore whether and how 
real and accruals-based earnings management strategies change around 
disaster events. Additionally, we test whether the severity of the disaster is 
related to the level of earnings management by comparing two different 
disasters, the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 flood in Thailand. 
We base our study on a final sample of 4,006 firm-year observations over the 
period 2001-2006 to test the effect of a tsunami and 5,786 firm-year 
observations over the period 2008-2013 to test the effect of a flooding. We use 
a differences-in-differences (diff-in-diff) approach to assess differences between 
our treatment group and a control group of geographically and institutionally 
similar firms that were not affected by either the tsunami or the flooding. 
Collectively, our results support the view that (1) firms actively manage earnings 
after the disaster by using accruals and real earnings management; and (2) the 
level of earnings management is conditional on the severity of the disaster. 
 
 
Keywords: Accrual earnings management, real earnings management, and 
natural disasters  
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine the level of earnings management occurring 
in a country hit by a natural disaster and to explore whether and how real and 
accruals-based earnings management strategies change around disaster 
events. There are at least two reasons why natural disasters could affect firms’ 
levels of earnings management. First, according to Hall and Stammerjohan 
(1997), regulatory concerns could encourage managers to manage earnings 
downwards. Firms suffering significant losses due to natural disasters may 
manage earnings during these periods of heightened pressure to benefit from 
the government’s help or lower the political costs of the firm. Second, because 
of a significant loss of investor confidence in the survival of the firm after the 
disaster, managers may also have a strong incentive to manage earnings 
upwards by taking advantage of certain accounting choices (i.e. manipulating 
accruals, changing accounting methods, and changing estimate) or by 
manipulating real activities (i.e. changing research and development (R&D) 
expense, changing product volume, changing credit term or trade discount, and 
selling assets). In this case firms would respond to heightened level of market 
pressure by engaging in earnings management to convey information about 
firm’s ability to survive and future earnings prospects. Hence, both theoretical 
arguments suggest that the occurrence of natural disasters may be associated 
with earnings management, but they each predict a different direction for this 
association. 
In this chapter, we study the effect of two different disasters on earnings 
management: the 2004 Indian Ocean disaster and the 2011 flood in Thailand. 
We use a differences-in-differences approach to assess differences between 
two groups (treated, i.e. firms affected by the disaster and controlled, i.e. a 
121 
 
group of geographically and institutionally similar firms) before and after the 
disasters.  
Consistent with the market incentives hypothesis, we find an increase in 
accruals earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM) 
after the disasters, although results are conditional on the model used to 
measure earnings management. Our evidence suggests that firms are likely to 
manipulate accounting numbers to attract prospective investors or re-assure 
investors and analysts about the firm’s survival prospects.  
In additional tests, we consider the trend in earnings management separately 
for the years following the disaster to examine how fast firms manage earnings. 
We show that firms start to engage in both accrual and real earnings 
management in the first year after the disasters occurs (+1y). However, there is 
no evidence that firms manage earnings by using accrual and real-based 
earnings management during the period hit by natural disasters (y0) (tsunami 
and flooding occur in 2004 and 2011, respectively). Furthermore, we run an 
additional analysis by separating the sample into two groups, (high vs. low 
leverage), to examine whether firms having more leverage are more inclined to 
re-assure investors and analysts about the firm’s survival prospects. The results 
show that firms with high leverage are likely to manage earnings during 
disasters to attract prospective investors or re-assure investors and analysts 
about the firm’s survival prospects as suggested by the market incentive 
hypothesis, whereas, there is no evidence that firms with low leverage 
manipulate earnings over the tsunami and flooding periods.  
Lastly, we compare the two different disasters to provide new evidence into 
whether the level of earnings management is conditional on the intensity of the 
disaster. We measure the intensity of the disasters by comparing the costs of 
122 
 
the tsunami and flooding, therefore assuming that the damages and losses from 
a natural disaster is proportionate to the intensity of that disaster. According to 
Economist (2011) and The World Bank (2011), the actual financial damage from 
tsunami 2004 was relatively smaller than the financial damage from the 2011 
flooding. Consistent with this observation, we find that the magnitude of the 
coefficients of interest for the tsunami sample is statistically different from the 
magnitude of the coefficients of interest in the flooding group, both for accruals 
and real earnings management. In particular, firms exposed to the tsunami 
show smaller earnings management than firms exposed to the flooding. Thus, 
the evidence indicates that the level of earnings management is conditional on 
the intensity of the disaster. 
This research contributes to the earnings management literature by looking into 
an additional incentive for firm to manage earnings, i.e. natural disasters, and 
thus complements prior studies (Healy, 1985; Francis et al., 2003; Young, 1999; 
Daniel et al., 2008; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Chen 
et al., 2011; and Hall and Stammerjohan, 1997) that have instead focused on 
market expectations (loss avoidance, earnings increase, and meeting or beating 
analyst earnings forecasts), contractual arrangement (bonus, share 
compensation, dividend thresholds, and debt market), and public scrutiny. In 
this way, our research contributes to the literature by providing useful insight 
into how natural disasters can affect reporting incentives. 
Further, our analysis expands prior literature on the effect of other exogenous 
shocks of a similar type (e.g. financial crisis as in Trombetta and Imperatore, 
2014) on earnings management, as well as a prior study by Byard et al. (2007) 
on the impact of natural disasters on earnings management by incorporating 
real earnings management as an alternative manipulation activity. In addition, 
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our study offers a more robust methodological approach than Byard et al. 
(2007) by using the diff-in-diff design to assess differences between our 
treatment and control groups before and after the disasters.  Conclusively, our 
findings give a more reliable picture of whether and how natural disasters affect 
both accrual-based and real earnings management.  
Our results also have implications for investors and practitioners to verify the 
reliability of the accounting information during disasters for stewardship and 
valuation purposes (such as to predict future cash flows, stock prices, and to 
assess risk of firms for more accuracy). Further, regulators may benefit from a 
better understanding of how natural disasters shape reporting incentives to 
formulate appropriate policies to safeguard investors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relate 
literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
setting, data, and empirical methodology. Section 4 provides an overview of the 
empirical evidence and sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes the study.  
2 Prior literature and hypotheses development 
While there are plenty of studies investigating the incentives that management 
has to manipulate earnings, little research has investigated how earnings are 
managed around external shocks such as natural disasters. One notable 
exception is the paper by Byard et al. (2007), who look at the impact of 
hurricanes on earnings management. The evidence in their study shows that oil 
firms reduce their earnings as a political-cost strategy when oil prices increase 
rapidly after hurricanes hit.  
In the occurrence of a natural disaster (like a flood, earthquake, or tsunami), 
firms may suffer from the loss of their inventory or factories, or their employees 
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may be unable to reach the workplace. These situations have a negative effect 
on the financial performance of firms. This study argues that natural disasters 
encourage managers to engage in opportunistic earnings management. The 
underlying argument is that during a disaster firms are more likely to experience 
a significant decrease in earnings performance. In addition, almost all firms 
during a disaster experience not only a significant decline in their stock price 
performance but also a significant loss of investor confidence in the survival of 
the firm. During these exceptional events, managers need to re-assure 
investors and analysts about the firm’s survival prospects or to attract more 
prospective investors. The market incentive hypothesis for earnings 
management suggests that firms whose performance is suffering due to 
exogenous shocks, such as financial crises or natural disasters, will make 
adjustments to their policies (i.e. altering inventory accounting methods, 
changing estimates of bad debt, revising assumptions related to pension 
assets, changing credit terms and price discounts, and changing the product 
volume) to improve the look of their financial statements. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Graham et al. (2005) provide evidence that when the overall 
economy is down, CEOs are likely to boost earnings and delay the reversal of 
these actions until the economy recovers.  
On the other hand, it is possible that managers tend to underreport performance 
to reserve earnings for the future or avoid political scrutiny. This is known as the 
political cost hypothesis. The political cost hypothesis predicts that firms 
suffering from a natural disaster will engage in (income-decreasing) earnings 
management to benefit from the government’s help or to be subject to lower 
taxation. Kousenidis et al. (2013) document that firms may engage in “big bath” 
practices to boost losses during a period of crisis while “putting away” income 
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for future reporting periods. Repair lost property expense and devaluation of 
inventory due to the disaster are some of the special items known as transitory 
expenses that managers can use to show excessive loss from a natural disaster 
or make huge provisions associated with the big bath scenario. Hence, firms 
may manage their earnings figures downward during natural disaster periods 
and upward in subsequent periods. In the same vein, Choi et al. (2011) 
investigate the effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 on the value 
relevance of discretionary accruals (DA). As mentioned in the Chapter 2, 
earnings quality plays a role for the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Low earnings management usually has a greater association with share prices 
and stock returns than high earnings management. The evidence in Choi et al. 
(2011) study suggests that during the Asian financial crisis, while the value 
relevance of DA had significantly decreased, the value relevance of non-
discretionary accruals did not significantly change. Moreover, they find that the 
value relevance of DA reverted back to a pre-crisis level in the post-crisis 
period. Overall, their results suggest that managers engaged in income-
decreasing earnings management during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. Similarly, Byard et al. (2007) find that large petroleum refining firms 
respond to periods of heightened political cost sensitivity because of unusual 
product price increases by recording significant abnormal income-decreasing 
accruals immediately after hurricanes hit. 
Within the discretion allowed by the accounting standards, earnings 
management occurs when the management uses judgment in financial 
reporting in order to achieve their target, such as avoiding loss, increasing 
earnings, smoothing earnings and meeting or beating analysts’ forecast 
(Francis et al., 2003; Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2008; Ghosh and Olsen, 2009; 
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Aerts and Zhang, 2014; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; 
Alissa et al., 2013; and Chand et al., 2013). Moreover, managers can also make 
real changes to their business models, for example by changing the credit 
policy for the accounts receivables and offering price discounts to boost 
revenues (Zang, 2012; Roychowdhury, 2006; and Cohen et al., 2008). In other 
words, companies can manage earnings mainly in two ways: (1) by 
manipulating their accounting accruals; and (2) by changing their real 
decisions/expenses. According to the accounting literature (Alhadab et al., 
2016; Trombetta and Imperatore, 2014; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Roychowdhury, 
2006; and Cohen et al., 2008), both real and accruals-based earnings 
management have costs and benefits.  
Real earnings management is more costly to shareholders than accruals 
earnings management because it has a direct effect on the cash flow and 
operating performance of firms. However, it is harder to detect for auditors or 
investors than accruals manipulation. For example, managers may engage in 
real earnings management activities after the natural disaster by eliminating or 
postponing positive NPV projects to save cash and keep liquidity levels high. 
While it is difficult for outsiders to assess and identify real earnings 
management, it still undermines the firm’s ability to earn income in the future.  
Accruals earnings management does not directly affect cash flow, but it can be 
detected more easily by auditors and investors, increasing litigation and 
reputation risk. In addition, if managers select accruals manipulation and the 
amount being managed falls short of the earnings target in the last quarter, 
there would be insufficient time to use real earnings management. Lastly, all 
accruals reverse in subsequent periods.  
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Various studies (Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2008; and Irani and Oesch, 2016) 
document that there is a trade-off between accruals and real earnings 
management due to the different sets of costs and benefits associated with 
these two strategies, in other words, they are substitute (Bozzolan et al., 2015). 
The main objective of this research is to empirically investigate the hypothesis 
that firms in countries that are hit by natural disasters are more willing to 
undertake both earnings manipulation activities. This leads to the first set of 
hypotheses8:  
H1a: Firms exhibit evidence of accruals earnings management after 
a natural disaster. 
H1b: Firms exhibit evidence of real earnings management after a 
natural disaster. 
While the first set of hypotheses focuses on earnings management after the 
disaster, our second hypothesis is concerned with whether the increase in the 
level of earnings management, if any, is higher for firms that were more 
seriously affected by a disaster. More specifically, we expect that the loss of 
investors’ confidence in the survival of the firm shortly after the disaster would 
be more (less) severe in countries with high (low) level of intensity of disaster 
and thus it could influence managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings. 
Consistent with this argument, Trombetta and Imperatore (2014) document that 
the intensity of the crisis plays a role for the level of earnings management. 
Specifically, in their study, earnings management increases when the intensity 
of the financial crisis is severe, but it decreases when the financial crisis is low. 
Building upon the preceding arguments, we formulate the second hypothesis as 
follows: 
                                                          
8
 As we have discussed above, whether natural disasters result in income-increasing or income-
decreasing earnings management remains an empirical issue. 
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H2: The level of earnings management is conditional on the severity 
of the disaster.  
3 Research design and methodology 
3.1 Empirical setting 
We employ two different disasters, the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and 
the 2011 flood in Thailand, to test our hypotheses.  
On Boxing Day 2004, an unusually strong earthquake resulted in a disastrous 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, with repercussion in both Indonesia and Thailand. 
Banda Aceh in Indonesia was the most seriously affected area because it was 
near the epicentre, buildings were physically destroyed, and the infrastructure 
was badly damaged. In contrast, the south of Thailand was hit by a series of 
tsunamis, and although the magnitude of the severest tsunami was smaller than 
in Indonesia, the damage and losses were much worse (The Guardian, 2014; 
and The Guardian, 2009).  
The second disaster refers to the flooding that occurred in Thailand in the last 
quarter of 2011. The floods started in September and spread through the 
provinces of northern, north eastern, and central Thailand. By mid-October, the 
capital of Thailand, Bangkok, was inundated. Flood disaster zones included 
sixty-five of Thailand's seventy-seven provinces and the flood affected more 
than 13.4 million people. The manufacturing industry was badly damaged. The 
flooding caused disruptions to manufacturing supply chains affecting the 
regional automobile production, and also causing a global shortage of hard disk 
drives which lasted throughout 2012 (Centre for research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters, 2012). 
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There are mainly three differences between the tsunami in 2004 and the 
flooding in 2011: the length of each disaster period, the timing of each disaster, 
and the level of the damages and losses.  First of all, a tsunami consists of a 
series of waves happening between 10 minutes to 2 hours, while the floods 
lasted for a period of 2-3 months. Generally, floods have more long-lasting 
effects than a tsunami. Second, the tsunami occurred at the end of the last 
reporting quarter for most firms, but the flooding occurred at the beginning of 
the last quarter. Thus, firms in the flooding sample have more time to manage 
earnings in the immediate aftermath of the disaster compared to firms in the 
tsunami sample. Lastly, the Economist (2011) documents that the Indian Ocean 
tsunami resulted in losses of about 14 billion dollars, more than 70% of which 
represent damages and losses incurred by the private sector. On the other 
hand, the total economic losses from the flooding in Thailand were estimated by 
The World Bank (2011) to be around 45 billion dollars. We exploit these two 
different events to investigate the effect of natural disasters on the level of 
earnings management. 
3.2 Sample and data 
Our overall dataset includes listed firms from four countries, namely, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Korea and Philippines.  
We make use of two treatment samples: (1) firms in Indonesia and Thailand 
over the period 2001-2006, as the countries hit by the 2004 tsunami; and (2) 
firms in Thailand over the period 2008-20139, hit by the 2011 flooding. We 
further divide the two samples into sub-periods. The first sub-period covers the 
                                                          
9
 We also use year 2000 and 2007 in cases where the estimated model uses a lagged variable and use year 
2007 and 2014 in cases where the estimated model uses a future variable. 
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three years before the disasters occurred (2001-2003 and 2008-2010) while the 
second sub-period cover the three years after the disasters occurred (2004-
2006 and 2011-2013). The year (0) is defined as the fiscal year during which 
each disaster occurred. 
It is worth to note that we include firms suffering direct and indirect damages 
from the disaster because of inter-industry relationships or production chains. 
Hence, we take into account the system-wide impact of flow losses incurred 
through supply chains. For example, the tourism industry in Thailand was 
directly affected by the tsunami because touristic destinations were the mostly 
affected areas (ThaiWebsites.com, 2005). Example of industries that were 
affected indirectly are food and petroleum industries. To test the effect of the 
tsunami on earnings management, we classify as treated all firms in Indonesia 
and Thailand. To test the effect of the flooding we classify as treated all firms in 
Thailand. Control firms are chosen from countries which were not hit by natural 
disasters but are in East Asia and belong to the same cluster identified by Leuz 
et al. (2003)10 of treated countries. We select Korea and Philippines as control 
group for the tsunami disaster, whereas, three countries, Indonesia, Korea and 
Philippines, are chosen as control group for the flooding disaster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Leuz et al. (2003) classified 31 countries base on aggregate earnings management score. 
Indonesia, Thailand, Korea and Philippines are in the third cluster which indicates the low 
quality of legal enforcement. 
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Table 3.1: Sample selection and distribution 
Panel A: Distribution of observations 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulated 
percent 
2001 527 13.16 13.16 
2002 628 15.68 28.83 
2003 673 16.80 45.63 
2004 699 17.45 63.08 
2005 734 18.32 81.40 
2006 745 18.60 100.00 
Total (Tsunami) 4,006 100.00  
2008 783 13.53 13.53 
2009 874 15.11 28.64 
2010 919 15.88 44.52 
2011 986 17.04 61.56 
2012 1,055 18.23 79.80 
2013 1,169 20.20 100.00 
Total (Flooding) 5,786 100.00  
 
Panel B: Breakdown of observations by country and year 
 Country  
 Treated group Control group 
Year Indonesia  Thailand  Philippines Korea Total 
2001 159  151  54 163 527 
2002 173  200  59 196 628 
2003 168  229  60 216 673 
2004 171  240  58 230 699 
2005 178  249  58 249 734 
2006 188  246  58 253 745 
Total (Tsunami) 1,037  1,315  347 1,307 4,006 
        
 Treated 
group 
 Control group  
Year Thailand  Indonesia  Philippines Korea Total 
2008 231  204  62 286 783 
2009 249  237  73 315 874 
2010 259  267  74 319 919 
2011 287  284  76 339 986 
2012 310  301  86 358 1,055 
2013 326  304  94 445 1,169 
Total (Flooding) 1,662  1,597  465 2,062 5,786 
 
All financial firms are excluded from the sample due to differences in their 
financial reporting. We restrict the sample to all non-financial firms with all 
132 
 
required data available on Bloomberg. Moreover, we consider only firms with 
fiscal year end in December11 in our analysis.  
The final samples have 4,006 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2006 
and 5,786 firm-year observations over the period 2008-2013. Table 3.1 
illustrates the distribution of the observations over the period (Panel A) and the 
breakdown by country and year (Panel B). As shown in Table 3.1 (Panel B), 
Philippines has a small sample size when compared with the other countries 
(Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea). However, the set of control samples is 
identified by selecting firms located in East Asian countries that were not hit by 
natural disaster, and under the same institutional cluster as the treated group as 
classified by Leuz et al. (2003). During the tsunami and flooding periods, 
Philippines, located in East Asia, was not hit by either natural disaster and is in 
the same third cluster, which includes countries with low quality of legal 
enforcement, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea. 
3.3 Research models 
This study uses a differences-in-differences approach to assess differences 
between the two groups (i.e. treated and controlled) before and after the 
disasters. The treatment group is identified by a dummy variable (treated) that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm is from a country affected by the natural disaster 
and zero otherwise. We also include in our models another dummy variable 
(disaster) which takes the value of 1 for all fiscal year ends after each disaster, 
and zero otherwise. The disaster takes the value of 1 in 2004-2006 for the 
tsunami tests, while, disaster takes the value of 1 in 2011-2013 for the flooding 
                                                          
11
 Tsunami and flooding occurred in the last quarter. So, we consider only firms with fiscal year 
end in December to convenient for compare two events. 
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tests. Finally, we interact the treated and disaster dummies to assess the 
effects of each disaster on earnings management.  
To test hypothesis H1a and H1b on whether natural disaster affects the 
accruals earnings management and real earnings management, respectively, 
we run regressions with robust standard errors clustered at industry level12 and 
year fixed effects, as follows: 
EM i,t= f i,t (b0 + b1treated + b2disaster + b3treated*disaster + b4control variables + e)  (1) 
A detailed description of our earnings management and control variables is 
provided in section 3.4. Appendix 3.1 also provides the definitions for the 
variables used throughout this study. b3 is our coefficient of interest as it 
assesses the difference between treatment and control firms before and after 
the disaster. If significant, it would indicate that managers of treated firms are 
more or less likely to manage earnings after the disasters than the managers of 
control firms. If the coefficient b3 is negative, it indicates that firms face greater 
political pressure to manage their earnings downward in the period immediately 
after the impact of tsunami or flooding in support of the political cost hypothesis. 
However, if the coefficient b3 is positive, it indicates that firms face greater 
market pressure to manage their earnings upward in the aftermath of disaster 
as per the market incentives hypothesis. 
For our second hypothesis, H2, we want to test whether the level of earnings 
management is conditional on the severity of the disaster. To do this, we 
consider the absolute value of EM as the proxy for earnings management over 
the disaster period and test whether the interaction coefficients are statistically 
different from each other. In particular, if our expectation that the severity of the 
                                                          
12
 We also cluster standard errors at the firm level. The results (not tabulated) remain 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3.7. 
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disaster affects positively earning managements holds true, then we expect that 
the coefficient of interest in the tsunami group to be statistically smaller than the 
coefficient in the flooding group.  
3.4 Variables measurement 
3.4.1 Earnings management variables 
We estimate AEM and REM using four models and we scale all variables by 
lagged total assets (TAt-1) to mitigate the effect of heteroskedasticity as 
suggested by Daniel et al. (2008). For the tsunami disaster, we consider 
Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Korea during the period 2001-2006. For 
the flooding, we consider the sample located in the same four countries, but 
during the period 2008-2013. We employ industry and year fixed effects to run 
the earnings management models. All the models are summarized in Table 3.2. 
Subscripts for firm (i) and year (t) are omitted from all models for simplicity.  
Table 3.2: Accruals and real earnings management models 
AEM model REM model 
Modified Dechow and Dichev model 
ACCR = b0 + b1CFOt-1+ b2CFOt + 
b3CFOt+1 + b4∆sale + 
b5GrossPPE + e 
Cash flow from operations model 
CFO = b0+ b1(1/TA t-1) + b2Sales + 
b3∆Sales + e   
 
Performance-matched Jones model 
ACCR = b0 + b1(1/TA t-1) + 
b2(∆sale) + b3NetPPE + e 
 
match residual of each firm-year 
observation with residual of another firm 
from the same two-digit SIC code and 
year with the closest return on assets13in 
the current year 
 
Discretionary expenses model 
Disc = b0 + b1(1/TA t-1) + b2Salest-1 + e            
 
Table 3.2 provides accruals and real earnings management models. This study estimates 
earnings management using residuals and the absolute value of the residual from the annual 
cross-sectional industry regression of AEM (column 1) and REM (column 2) models. Industry-
year with less than 10 observations are eliminated from the sample. 
                                                          
13
 Return of assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
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We measure AEM using the modified Dechow and Dichev model, and the 
performance-matched Jones model, following McNichols (2002) and Kothari et 
al. (2005), respectively. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the modified Dechow and 
Dichev model reduces our exposure to omitted correlated variables problems 
and provides a useful specification check on the magnitude of the estimated 
errors, while the performance-matched Jones model can examine non-random 
samples of firms. 
We estimate total accrual (ACCR) based on the income statement and the 
statement of cash flow approach as suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002) 
who show that the error in a balance sheet approach of estimating accruals is 
related to firm’s economic characteristics. At the same time, Alhadab et al. 
(2016) suggest that the income statement and the statement of cash flow 
approach can lead to a lower magnitude and frequency of measurement error.  
ACCR = [net income before extraordinary items (EBXI) - cash flow from operation]/ TAt-1 
We measure REM following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), 
using the cash flow from operations and discretionary expenses models. We 
have not included production cost model in our analysis because 
overproduction or underproduction can only be applied to manufacturing firms.  
We use residuals and the absolute value of the residuals from annual cross-
sectional industry regressions based on each of the models presented in Table 
3.2 as earnings management proxies to study potential change in the direction 
and in the magnitude of earnings management, respectively. We follow 
previous research (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; and Alhadab et 
al., 2016) in excluding firms in 2-digit SIC code industry-year groups with less 
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than 10 observations14. This approach controls for changes in economic 
conditions that influence total accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, 
and abnormal discretionary expenses across different industry groups. 
However, we note that we examine two types of earnings management (AEM 
for H1a and REM for H1b) and use two variants for each: (1) signed earnings 
management variables to look at the direction (upwards or downwards), and (2) 
the absolute earnings management to study potential changes in the magnitude 
of earnings management (high or low). While real earnings management should 
be considered in terms of its signed values, we use the absolute value of REM 
for consistency purposes to show “evidence” of earnings management. 
However, absolute real earnings management is hard to interpret the coefficient 
of absolute REM. As highlighted in Zang (2012) and Roychowdhury (2006), real 
earnings management impacts abnormal cash flows in different directions. 
Thus, to address this issue we also use the absolute value of abnormal 
discretionary expenses and abnormal cash flows from operations, to investigate 
whether there is evidence of real earnings management as stated in H1b. 
3.4.2 Controls variables 
Following Dechow et al. (2010) we consider several firm specific characteristics 
that relate to earnings management. First, in order to control for firm 
performance, we follow Trombetta and Imperatore (2014) and include a 
company’s return on assets (ROA). Second, we follow Burgstahler et al. (2006) 
who use firm growth (Growth) to control for growth opportunities. Trombetta and 
Imperatore (2014) document that crisis tends to be correlated to sales growth. 
Thus, we computed firm growth as the percentage of yearly growth in sales. 
                                                          
14
 The SIC code industry category is obtained from Thomson Reuters. 
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Next, following previous studies (Cohen et al., 2008), we control for risk by 
using leverage (Lev) measured as the percentage of long-term liabilities to total 
assets. Following Watts and Zimmerman (1978) we also use firm size to 
account for political costs, as Byard et al. (2007) find that large firms manage 
earnings downwards in the immediate aftermath of disasters. We control for the 
possible impact of a size (Size) by including the natural logarithm of the firm's 
total assets in the model. Finally, we control for audit quality (Big4), captured by 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of the big 4 audit firms 
(i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young, 
and KPMG) and zero otherwise. Alhadab et al. (2016) demonstrate that higher 
quality auditors are important in detecting and mitigating level of accruals 
earnings management and may lead firms to engage in a higher level of real-
based earning management. All of these variables are based on information 
obtained from Bloomberg. All continuous non-log transformed variables are 
winsorized at 1%.  
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
We begin with descriptive statistics for the two main time periods, 2001-2006 
and 2008-2013 in the various earnings management metrics. Table 3.3 
presents sample descriptive statistics for accruals earnings management (Panel 
A), real earnings management (Panel B), and other variables (Panel C). 
Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are 
multiplied by minus one to allow real and accruals earnings management 
proxies to have the same interpretation. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics      
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for accruals earnings management 
 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006) 
Actual total accruals (ACCR) 4,006 -0.032 0.120 -0.037 -0.432 0.486 -0.086 0.014 
Accruals earnings management 
AEM_Modified DD 4,006 0.000 0.131 0.006 -0.575 0.535 -0.050 0.060 
AEM_Performance Match 4,006 -0.002 0.202 0.000 -0.977 0.927 -0.081 0.079 
Absolute accruals earnings management 
      AbsAEM _Modified DD  4,006 0.089 0.116 0.055 0.001 0.907 0.026 0.104 
AbsAEM _Performance Match 4,006 0.131 0.187 0.079 0.001 1.496 0.035 0.153 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)         
Actual total accruals (ACCR) 5,786 -0.021 0.119 -0.024 -0.432 0.486 -0.075 0.022 
Accruals earnings management       
AEM _Modified DD 5,786 0.002 0.124 0.002 -0.550 0.579 -0.036 0.042 
AEM _Performance Match 5,786 -0.002 0.228 0.000 -0.977 0.927 -0.083 0.081 
Absolute accruals earnings management        
AbsAEM _Modified DD  5,786 0.093 0.136 0.054 0.001 0.907 0.024 0.102 
AbsAEM _Performance Match 5,786 0.148 0.225 0.082 0.001 1.496 0.035 0.167 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for real earnings management   
  
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006)        
Real earnings management 
  REM_CFO 4,006 -0.041 0.153 0.036 -0.642 0.607 -0.025 0.107 
REM_Disc 4,006 -0.071 0.160 0.043 -0.427 0.748 -0.007 0.121 
Absolute real earnings management 
     AbsREM_CFO 4,006 0.111 0.135 0.070 0.001 1.008 0.031 0.140 
AbsREM _Disc 4,006 0.118 0.147 0.067 0.001 0.930 0.029 0.149 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)        
Real earnings management       
REM_CFO 5,786 -0.033 0.166 0.030 -0.642 0.607 -0.038 0.107 
REM_Disc 5,786 -0.087 0.165 0.053 -0.427 0.748 0.008 0.138 
Absolute real earnings management       
AbsREM _CFO 5,786 0.121 0.153 0.077 0.001 1.008 0.033 0.150 
AbsREM _Disc 5,786 0.127 0.161 0.070 0.001 0.930 0.031 0.156 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics for other variables 
 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006)       
ROA 4,006 0.068 0.105 0.061 -0.279 0.505 0.014 0.113 
Growth (%) 4,006 0.138 0.332 0.076 -0.786 1.794 -0.008 0.216 
Lev (%) 4,006 12.602 16.197 6.223 0.000 76.459 0.043 19.499 
Size 4,006 4.766 1.858 4.640 0.464 9.841 3.448 5.898 
Big-4 4,006 0.371 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)       
ROA 5,786 0.047 0.111 0.040 -0.406 0.474 0.005 0.091 
Growth (%) 5,786 0.099 0.345 0.056 -0.786 1.794 -0.042 0.201 
Lev (%) 5,786 9.639 13.065 4.231 0.000 76.459 0.024 14.850 
Size 5,786 5.394 1.868 5.269 0.464 9.841 4.114 6.579 
Big-4 5,786 0.373 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 
This table shows sample descriptive statistics for AEM (Panel A), REM (Panel B), and other 
variables (Panel C). We use the first period (2001-2006), which is the period to test the effect of 
the tsunami in 2004 on earnings management, and the second period (2008-2013), which is the 
period to test the effects of the 2011 flooding on earnings management. The final sample is 
4,006 and 5,786 frim-year observations over the period 2001-2006 and 2008-2013, respectively. 
To avoid the influence of outliers all continuous financial data are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All 
variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 3.1.  
 
As can be seen in Table 3.3 Panel A, the mean accruals earnings management 
are close to zero (between -0.002 to 0.002). Interestingly, mean discretionary 
accruals in the modified Dechow and Dichev model (Modified DD) are positive 
(between 0.000 to 0.002), whereas, mean discretionary accruals in 
performance-matched Jones model (Performance Match) are approximately -
0.002. In Panel B, for both tsunami and flooding samples, the mean real 
earnings management in all models (CFO and Disc) is negative value between -
0.033 to -0.087. This means that, at the descriptive level, firms appear to 
manage earnings both upward and downward by using discretionary accruals 
and changing real decision. 
The other main variable of interest is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (AbsAEM), the absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operations 
and the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expense (AbsREM). We use 
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the absolute value to study potential changes in the magnitude of earnings 
management. We find that the mean absolute of discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management in all models for the flooding sample have greater 
magnitude than for the tsunami sample. For example, the mean of absolute 
Performance Match and CFO for the flooding sample are 0.148 and 0.121, 
respectively, whereas, the mean of absolute Performance Match and CFO for 
the tsunami sample are 0.131 and 0.111, respectively.  
Panel C presents descriptive statistics for our control variables. The tsunami 
sample firms have a ROA of 0.07, a 13.80% annual growth in sales, 12.60% of 
long-term liabilities to total assets, a size of 4.77, and a Big-4 of 0.37. The 
respective numbers for the flooding sample are 0.05, 9.90%, 9.64%, 5.39, and 
0.37.  
In Table 3.4, we present the estimates for earnings management by country 
over the period 2001-2006 and 2008-2013 to test the effects of the tsunami in 
2004 and flooding in 2011 on earnings management, respectively. Columns (4-
5) show the country-means for our AEM variables, while, columns (6-7) show 
the means for the REM variables.  
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Table 3.4: Estimates for earnings management by country 
   AEM  REM  
Country Freq Percent 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006)     
Indonesia (treated) 1,037 25.89% -0.007 -0.005 -0.033 -0.077 
Korea (control) 1,307 32.63% 0.002 0.000 -0.039 -0.068 
Philippines (control) 347 8.66% -0.037 0.011 -0.033 -0.112 
Thailand (treated) 1,315 32.83% 0.014 -0.003 -0.051 -0.058 
All Countries 4,006 100.00% 0.000 -0.002 -0.041 -0.071 
       
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)     
Indonesia (control) 1,597 27.60% 0.007 -0.005 -0.030 -0.092 
Korea (control) 2,062 35.64% -0.003 0.003 -0.020 -0.090 
Philippines (control) 465 8.04% 0.001 -0.005 -0.055 -0.111 
Thailand (treated) 1,662 28.72% 0.002 -0.006 -0.045 -0.073 
All Countries 5,786 100.00% 0.002 -0.002 -0.033 -0.087 
              
Table 3.4 reports the estimates for earnings management by using residuals from the annual 
cross-sectional industry regression of each model shown in Table 3.2. Industry-year with less 
than 10 observations are eliminated from the sample. CFO and Disc variables are multiplied by 
minus one to allow real and accruals earnings management proxies to have the same 
interpretation. Columns (4-5) show means of AEM, while, columns (6-7) show means of REM. 
We use the first period (2001-2006) and the second period (2008-2013), which are the period to 
test the effect of the tsunami in 2004 and the flooding in 2011 on earnings management, 
respectively.  The final sample is 4,006 and 5,786 frim-year observations over the period 2001-
2006 and 2008-2013, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.1 reports in graphs, separately for the treated and control groups, the 
yearly evolution of our earnings management measures (Modified DD, 
Performance Match, CFO and Disc) from two years before until two years after 
the disasters occurred. Panel A provides time-series plots of AEM for firm-years 
in the treatment and control groups, whereas, panel B shows time-series plots 
of REM for firm-years in treatment group and control group.  
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Figure 3.1: Comparing trends between treatment and control groups 
Panel A: Accruals earnings management 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006) 
Modified DD 
 
Performance Match 
 
 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013) 
Modified DD 
 
Performance Match 
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Panel B: Real earnings management 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006) 
CFO 
 
Disc 
 
 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013) 
CFO 
 
Disc 
 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the graphs of yearly mean Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, and 
Disc variables for the event years, two years before and two years after the disaster occurred 
for each group (treated and controlled groups) in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Year0 (i.e. 
the fiscal year during which each disaster occurred) is respectively 2004 for the tsunami and 
2011 for the flooding.  
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The graphs above illustrate that all variables (except Disc) for the treatment 
group (green dot) after the tsunami occurred show a sharp decrease in 2004 
(y0) which is subsequently reversed. For the flooding sample, AEM in the 
treatment group (green dot) increase in 2011 (y0), while, REM only increase in 
the first year after flooding occurred (+1y) or in 2012.  
Next, we compare the means between treatment group and control group 
before and after two disasters (tsunami and flooding) for both AEM (Panel A) 
and REM (Panel B), as shown in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.5: Comparing differences between the two groups (treated and 
controlled) before and after the disasters 
Panel A: Comparing differences of accruals earnings management 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
Group Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference  Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference 
Modified DD     
Treated 0.000 0.008 0.008  -0.005 0.008 0.013** 
Controlled -0.009 -0.004 0.005  0.001 0.002 0.001 
Difference -0.009 0.012** 0.003***  0.006 0.006 0.012* 
        
Performance Match     
 Treated 0.001 -0.009 -0.010  -0.007 -0.005 0.002 
Controlled 0.005 0.000 -0.005  0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
Difference -0.004 -0.009 -0.005  -0.008 -0.003 0.005 
 
Panel B: Comparing differences of real earnings management 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
Group Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference  Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference 
CFO     
Treated -0.044   -0.043 0.001  -0.042 -0.048 -0.006 
Controlled -0.027   -0.046 -0.019***  -0.034 -0.023 0.011** 
Difference -0.017*** 0.003 0.020**  -0.008 -0.025*** -0.017 
        
Disc     
 Treated -0.069  -0.063  0.006  -0.072 -0.074 -0.002 
Controlled -0.076  -0.078 -0.002  -0.096 -0.091  0.005 
Difference 0.007 0.015** 0.008***  0.024*** 0.017*** -0.007 
Table 3.5 presents comparing univariate differences between the two groups (treated and 
controlled) before and after two disasters (tsunami and flooding) by AEM (Panel A) and REM 
(Panel B).  
The “Difference” in the last column is the mean of residual earnings management after disasters 
minus the corresponding mean before the disasters; whereas, “Difference” in the last row is the 
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mean of residual earnings management in treated group minus that of the control group. The 
main coefficient of interest is reported in bold. Differences are tested using t-tests. The 
differences shown in red colour are statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. All 
variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 3.1. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
There are three points to discuss. We start by looking at the difference (column-
wise) between the mean of four variables (Modified DD, Performance Match, 
CFO and Disc) after and before disasters. In the flooding sample, we find that 
only the magnitude of Modified DD variable for the treatment group increases 
from -0.005 in the pre-flooding to 0.008 in the post-flooding and the increment of 
0.013 is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.12). However, there is no evidence that 
the magnitude of all variables for the treatment group are statistically different 
from before and after the tsunami occurred. In the control group, we find 
statistically differences from before and after the tsunami and flooding occurred 
in only CFO variable which are -0.019 and 0.011 at 1% and 5% level (t = -3.19 
and 2.21), respectively. 
Second, we consider the difference (row-wise) between the mean of four 
variables (Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO and Disc) in the treatment 
group minus the control group. We find that after the tsunami occurred, the 
magnitude of Modified DD and Disc variables for the treatment group are 
significantly higher than for the control group which are 0.012 and 0.015 both at 
5% level (t = 1.97 and 2.21). However, before the tsunami occurred, the 
magnitude of CFO variable in the treatment group are significantly lower than 
the control group which are -0.017 at 1% level (t = -2.62). In the flooding 
sample, the magnitude of CFO and Disc variables for the treatment group after 
flooding occurred is statistically different from the control group, whereas, 
before the flooding occurred, only the magnitude of Disc variable for the 
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treatment group are significantly higher than the control group which are 0.024 
at 1% level (t = 3.64). 
Third, the main coefficient of interest is the diff-in-diff between the two groups 
(treatment and control) and two periods (before and after the disasters), which 
is reported in bold. As presented in Table 3.5, the average coefficients of the 
treatment group for the tsunami sample is significantly higher than the control 
group in three out of four variables, the Modified DD, the CFO and the Disc, 
which are 0.003, 0.020, and 0.008, respectively. In the flooding sample, the diff-
in-diff is only significant when we measure abnormal accruals based on the 
modified Dechow and Dichev model, 0.012 at 10% (t = 1.78). Despite our 
univariate results being somewhat weak, the analysis in Table 3.5 corroborates 
our earlier evidence and the predictions in H1a and H1b on the impact of the 
natural disasters on accruals and real based-earnings management. 
The correlation among discretionary accruals variables (Modified DD and 
Performance Match), abnormal real earnings management variables (CFO and 
Disc), and control variables during the disasters is reported in Table 3.6. This 
table presents Spearman correlation (above the diagonal) and Pearson 
correlation (below the diagonal) for the entire sample of 4,006 firm-years over 
the period 2001-2006 to test the effect of the tsunami in 2004 on earnings 
management (Panel A) and 5,786 firm-years over the period 2008-2013 to test 
the effect of the flooding in 2011 on earnings management (Panel B). 
In both Panels, the correlation coefficients between the two discretionary 
accrual measures (Modified DD and Performance Match) are positive and 
statistically significant at 1 % confidence level. In the tsunami sample as shown 
in Panel A, both Spearman and Pearson correlation show a significant positive 
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correlation between Performance Match and CFO variables. This high positive 
correlation can be explained by firms engaging in accruals and real earnings 
management at the same time. This is consistent with prior researches (i.e. 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Alissa et al., 2013; 
and Lin and Shen, 2015) showing that managers can manipulate earnings to 
achieve the target by using both REM and AEM, because REM occurs during 
the fiscal year, while AEM occurs after the end of the accounting period but 
within the confines of a generally accepted accounting system. Hence, if 
managers decide to manipulate real operations, in which the amount being 
managed fell short of the desired threshold, there would be sufficient time to 
engage in accruals earnings management to meet or beat the target. Moreover, 
consistent with past research (Cohen et al., 2008; and Zang, 2012), the 
correlation coefficient between CFO and Disc variables as reported in both 
Spearman and Pearson correlation are negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that firms are likely to substitute.  
In addition, we find that accruals and real earnings management are 
significantly and positively associated with profitability, and growth, whereas, 
they are negative associated with leverage. Furthermore, as reported in both 
Spearman and Pearson correlation, we also find a negative association 
between accruals earnings management (Performance Match) and audit quality 
(Big-4), while, we also find a positive association between real earnings 
management (CFO) and audit quality (Big-4). This is consistent with the 
evidence in Alhadab et al. (2016) that high quality auditors are important in 
detecting and mitigating level of accruals based earnings management but may 
lead firms to manage in a higher level of real earning management.  
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In general, correlations in Panel B are consistent with correlations in Panel A 
and prior researches. In the flooding sample, both Spearman and Pearson 
correlation show a significant positive correlation at less than 5% level between 
CFO variable and two discretionary accruals variables (Modified DD and 
Performance Match). Moreover, the correlation coefficient between Modified DD 
and Performance Match variables is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. On the other hand, the correlation coefficients between (1) Modified DD 
and Disc variables, and between (2) two REM variables (CFO and Disc) are 
negative and statistically significant. Further, we find that accruals and real 
earnings management are both significantly and positively associated with 
profitability and growth, whereas, they are negatively associated with leverage. 
Finally, we do not find an association between discretionary accruals variables 
(Modified DD and Performance Match) and audit quality (Big-4), but, find a 
positive association at 1% confidence level between CFO and audit quality (Big-
4) for Spearman correlation. These findings support that firms with higher 
quality auditors may prefer real earnings management activity to avoid 
detection. 
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Table 3.6: Pearson and spearman correlation 
Panel A: Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006) 
 
Pearson 
correlation 
Spearman 
correlation 
 
 
Modified 
DD 
Performanc
e Match CFO Disc ROA 
 
 
 
Growth 
 
 
 
Lev 
 
 
 
Size 
 
 
 
Big-4 
 
Modified DD  0.190*** -0.007 -0.017 
 
0.221*** 
 
0.054*** 
 
-0.073*** 
 
0.004 
 
0.024 
  
(0.000) (0.652) (0.272) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.781) (0.126) 
Performance Match 0.180*** 
 
0.251*** 0.018 0.000 -0.039** 0.016 0.002 -0.032** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.259) (0.986) (0.014) (0.301) (0.895) (0.042) 
CFO 0.006 0.272*** 
 
-0.104*** 0.366*** 0.059*** -0.072*** 0.072*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.698) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Disc -0.017 -0.016 -0.065*** 
 
0.101*** 0.151*** -0.039** -0.044*** 0.020 
 
(0.276) (0.314) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.005) (0.196) 
ROA 0.227*** -0.002 0.331*** 0.068***  0.423*** -0.043*** 0.132*** 0.144*** 
 (0.000) (0.906) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth 0.024 -0.035** -0.030* 0.146*** 0.386***  -0.002 0.065*** 0.027* 
 (0.134) (0.028) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.912) (0.000) (0.091) 
Lev -0.079*** 0.040** -0.052*** -0.025 -0.086*** -0.060***  0.369*** 0.018 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.263) 
Size 0.010 0.015 0.056*** -0.056*** 0.132*** -0.012 0.221***  0.233*** 
 (0.528) (0.333) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.452) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Big-4 0.019 -0.027* 0.092*** 0.012 0.121*** 0.073*** -0.017 0.234***  
 (0.229) (0.089) (0.000) (0.431) (0.000) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000)  
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Panel B: Flooding (Data in 2008-2013) 
 
 
Pearson 
correlation 
Spearman 
correlation 
 
 
Modified 
DD 
Performanc
e Match CFO Disc ROA 
 
 
 
Growth 
 
 
 
Lev 
 
 
 
Size 
 
 
 
Big-4 
 
Modified DD  0.228*** 0.029** -0.039*** 
 
0.189*** 
 
0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
0.035*** 
 
0.007 
 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.003) (0.000) (0.423) (0.419) (0.007) (0.610) 
Performance Match 0.230***  0.235*** 0.001 0.007 0.010 0.018 0.008 -0.010 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.973) (0.612) (0.462) (0.164) (0.538) (0.463) 
CFO 0.048*** 0.215***  -0.115*** 0.312*** 0.017 -0.065*** 0.001 0.083*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.206) (0.000) (0.946) (0.000) 
Disc -0.052*** -0.020 -0.087***  0.146*** 0.146*** -0.010 0.026* 0.036*** 
 
(0.000) (0.130) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.461) (0.050) (0.006) 
ROA 0.177*** 0.022 0.272*** 0.153***  0.426*** -0.025* 0.107*** 0.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth 0.033** 0.024* -0.033** 0.162*** 0.390***  0.022* 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.013) (0.072) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.090) (0.003) (0.003) 
LEV -0.024* 0.013 -0.013 0.017 -0.067*** -0.031**   0.036*** 
 (0.066) (0.337) (0.311) (0.200) (0.000) (0.020)   (0.007) 
Size 0.026* 0.000 0.015 0.045*** 0.123*** 0.020 0.320***   
 (0.051) (0.999) (0.248) (0.001) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000)   
Big-4 -0.002 -0.012 0.063*** 0.015 0.126*** 0.025* 0.015 0.270***  
 (0.892) (0.361) (0.000) (0.263) (0.000) (0.055) (0.249) (0.000)  
 
This table presents Spearman correlation (above the diagonal) and Pearson correlation (below the diagonal) for the entire sample of 4,006 firm-
years over the period 2001-2006 and 5,786 firm-years over the period 2008-2013 to test the effect of the tsunami in 2004 on earnings 
management (Panel A) and flooding in 2011 on earnings management (Panel B), respectively. Variables used in our primary analyses are 
reports. The correlations of CFO and Disc variables are multiplied by minus one to allow real and accruals earnings management proxies to have 
the same interpretation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 3.1. *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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4.2 Multivariate analyses 
Table 3.7 presents the estimation results for equation (1). Our first hypotheses 
(H1a and H1b) is tested looking at the b3 coefficient, which captures the impact 
of the natural disasters on accruals and real based-earnings management, and 
base on our first hypotheses it should be statistically significant. 
 
Table 3.7: Natural disaster as determinants of accruals and real earnings 
management  
  EM i,t= f i,t (b0+b1treated+b2disaster+b3treated*disaster+b4control variables +e)   (1) 
 
Panel A: Continuous earnings management variable 
  
Tsunami   Flooding 
AEM   REM   AEM   REM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc   
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc 
treated -0.020*** -0.017  -0.008 0.032***  -0.005 -0.008  -0.014** 0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.007) 
disaster 0.012 0.013  0.003 0.033***  0.000 -0.015  0.009 0.015** 
  (0.008) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.008) 
treated*
disaster 0.015** -0.003  0.017* 0.006  0.012* 0.007  -0.008 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009) 
ROA 0.598*** 0.154***  -0.376*** -0.013  0.330*** -0.102***  -0.544*** -0.106*** 
  (0.017) (0.031)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.031)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Growth -0.062*** -0.058*** 0.062*** -0.061***  -0.036*** -0.018*  0.087*** -0.066*** 
  (0.006) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Lev 0.000 -0.000**  -0.001*** -0.000**  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.004*** -0.005**  -0.002 -0.004**  -0.001 -0.003*  0.000 -0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Big-4 -0.001 -0.008  -0.014*** -0.005  0.000 -0.012*  -0.009** 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.002 0.019  -0.023** -0.104***  0.010 0.003  0.006 -0.066*** 
  (0.008) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Fixed 
effects I, Y I, Y  I, Y I, Y  I, Y I, Y  I, Y I, Y 
Adjust 
R
2 0.256 0.014  0.092 0.033  0.065 0.005  0.120 0.040 
n. of 
observ. 4,006 4,006   4,006 4,006   5,786 5,786   5,786 5,786 
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Panel B: Absolute earnings management 
  
Tsunami   Flooding 
AbsAEM   AbsREM   AbsAEM   AbsREM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc   
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc 
treated -0.003 0.000   0.008 -0.027***   0.002 -0.023**   0.002 -0.032*** 
  (0.006) (0.009)   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.009)   (0.005) (0.006) 
disaster -0.041*** -0.026**   -0.002 0.023***   -0.002 0.008   -0.011** -0.004 
  (0.008) (0.012)   (0.007) (0.008)   (0.006) (0.011)   (0.006) (0.006) 
treated*
disaster -0.003 -0.013   -0.003 -0.016**   -0.002 0.025**   0.013** 0.014** 
  (0.007) (0.011)   (0.007) (0.008)   (0.007) (0.012)   (0.006) (0.007) 
ROA -0.106*** -0.060*   0.246*** 0.032   -0.026 -0.004   0.256*** 0.090*** 
  (0.019) (0.031)   (0.018) (0.020)   (0.017) (0.029)   (0.015) (0.017) 
Growth 0.053*** 0.062***   0.049*** 0.059***   0.058*** 0.109***   0.049*** 0.059*** 
  (0.006) (0.010)   (0.006) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.010)   (0.005) (0.006) 
Lev 0.000*** 0.000   -0.000*** 0.000   0.000*** 0.000   0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.012*** -0.017***   -0.012*** -0.012***   -0.010*** -0.018***   -0.014*** -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Big-4 -0.003 -0.004   0.004 0.008**   -0.006* -0.004   0.002 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.006)   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.006)   (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.167*** 0.228***   0.141*** 0.172***   0.148*** 0.235***   0.172*** 0.166*** 
  (0.008) (0.014)   (0.008) (0.009)   (0.007) (0.012)   (0.006) (0.007) 
Fixed 
effects I, Y I, Y   I, Y I, Y   I, Y I, Y   I, Y I, Y 
Adjust 
R
2 0.074 0.039   0.144 0.057   0.041 0.047   0.140 0.049 
n. of 
observ. 4,006 4,006   4,006 4,006   5,786 5,786   5,786 5,786 
 
Table 3.7 presents the result from an OLS regressions with accruals and real earnings 
management proxies as equation (1) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors.  The final 
sample includes 4,006 and 5,786 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2006 and 2008-
2013 to test the effect of the tsunami and flooding, respectively. In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is the regression residual from EM models (Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO and 
Disc variables), while in Panel B, the dependent variable is the regression of absolute of the 
residual from EM models. Both panels have the main independent variable of interest, which is 
(treated*disaster). 
Columns (1-2) and (5-6) report the results from regressions of AEM proxies on tsunami and 
flooding, respectively; while, columns (3-4) and (7-8) report the results from regressions of REM 
proxies on tsunami and flooding, respectively. The coefficients shown in bold are statistically 
significant at less than 10 percent level. The table also reports the mean R
2
 for each of these 
regressions. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 3.1. We include 
industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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In Panel A, the dependent variable is the regression residual from accruals 
earnings management models (Modified DD and Performance Match variables) 
and real earnings management models (CFO and Disc variables).  
In the tsunami sample, the coefficient b3 (treated*disaster) is positive (0.015) 
and highly significant (p < 0.05) when accruals are measured based on the 
modified Dechow and Dichev model as shown in column (1). Further, the 
coefficient b3 (treated*disaster) is positive (0.017) and highly significant (p < 
0.10) where CFO variable is the dependent variable as reported in column (3). 
In the flooding sample, we find a positive coefficient of 0.012 (p < 0.10) on b3 
(treated*disaster) in the discretionary accruals regression in modified Dechow 
and Dichev model as shown in column (5), while, the coefficient b3 
(treated*disaster) in REM models (CFO and Disc variables) is not significant. 
Therefore, the increase in accruals and real earnings management after the 
disasters suggest that treated firms tend to manage earnings upwards after the 
disaster than the control firms, in order to transmit a positive signal or avoid the 
loss of investors’ confidence in the survival of the firms. This is consistent with 
the market incentives hypothesis of earnings management. 
In addition, Panel A shows that the coefficient b2 (disaster) is significantly 
positive only for the Disc variable for firms in the tsunami and flooding samples. 
This means that firms exhibit evidence of real earnings management after a 
natural disaster. The coefficient b1 (treated) is significant when discretionary 
accruals (Modified DD) and abnormal real earning management (Disc) are 
measured for tsunami samples and when real earning management (CFO and 
Disc) are measured for flooding samples. This suggests that treated firms 
exhibit evidence of earnings management.  
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Further, we find that the coefficient (Size) is negative and significant when 
discretionary accruals and abnormal real earning management are measured 
for the tsunami and flooding samples. For example, we find negative and 
significant correlations for discretionary accruals variable (Performance Match) 
and REM variable (Disc) for the flooding sample as shown in columns (6 and 8) 
on Panel A in Table 3.7. This means that large firms are less likely to be 
motivated to manipulate earnings than small firms because of the need to 
disclose more information according to regulations of stock market (Kousenidis 
et al., 2013). However, we find that the coefficient (Lev) for the tsunami sample 
is negative and significant for both discretionary accruals variable (Performance 
Match) and REM variables (CFO and Disc). This implies that earnings 
management is lower for firms that have higher leverage. In contrast, there is no 
evidence that the coefficient (Lev) for the flooding sample is significantly 
associated with the level of accruals and real earnings management. 
Interestingly, we find that the coefficient audit quality (Big-4) and earnings 
management measured for tsunami and flooding samples are negative and 
highly significant as shown in columns (3, 6, and 7) for Panel A in Table 3.7. 
This suggests that firms that use big 4 auditors tend to manage earnings 
downwards after the disaster.  
Next, we run a sensitivity analysis considering the absolute value of earnings 
management as our dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 3.7 
Panel B. As mentioned above, our first hypotheses do not predict any specific 
direction for EM. Therefore, we use the absolute value, which is the alternative 
dependent variable, to measure the magnitude of earnings management (rather 
than the signed). This panel, the main independent variable of interest is the 
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same as in Panel A, the coefficient b3 (treated*disaster), which we use to 
assess the effects of each disaster on the level of earnings management. 
Consistent with the preliminary analysis as reported in Panel A, we find a 
positive trend in the level of accruals and real earnings management for 
flooding sample. For example, the coefficient b3 (treated*disaster) in the 
discretionary accruals and REM regression (Performance Match, CFO, and 
Disc variables) are positive (0.025, 0.013, and 0.014, respectively) and highly 
significant (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, and p < 0.05, respectively) as shown in columns 
(6-8) in Panel B in Table 3.7. This indicates that the level of accruals and real 
earnings management increased over the flooding sample.  
On the other hand, we find a negative trend on b3 (treated*disaster) in the level 
of real earnings management (Disc variable) for tsunami sample (-0.016, p < 
0.05). This suggests that the level of real earnings management decreased over 
the tsunami sample. From the analysis of the results in Panel B taking into 
account the results in Panel A, we find that firms engagement in real earnings 
management decreased over the tsunami sample, while firms engagement in 
accruals and real earnings management increased over the flooding sample. 
Consistent with our conjecture, the occurrence of natural disaster is associated 
with the level of earnings management 15. 
Moreover, we find that in Panel B of Table 3.7, the coefficient b1 (treated) is 
significantly negative for Disc variable for firms in the tsunami sample and for 
Performance Match and Disc variables for firms in the flooding sample. This 
                                                          
15
 We also run an additional analysis by deleting the year of the disaster from the sample. Thus, 
the disaster variable takes the value of 1 in 2005-2006 for the tsunami tests, while, disaster 
takes the value of 1 in 2012-2013 for the flooding tests. The additional results (not tabulated) 
remain qualitatively similar to those reported in the main result in Table 3.7. We also include 
market-to-book ratio as a control variable and the results again (not tabulated) remain 
unchanged.  
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suggests that treated firms exhibit evidence of earnings management. The 
coefficient b2 (disaster) is significant when discretionary accruals (Modified DD 
and Performance Match) and abnormal real earning management (Disc) are 
measured for tsunami samples and when abnormal real earning management 
(CFO) is measured for flooding samples. This means that firms exhibit evidence 
of earnings management after a natural disaster. 
Further, we find that the coefficient (Growth) is positive and significant in all 
regressions for the tsunami and flooding samples as shown in Panel B. It can 
be inferred that earnings management is higher for firms that have higher 
growth opportunities. The coefficient (Size) is negative and significant 
correlations for all earnings management variables as shown in Panel B of 
Table 3.7. This means that large firms are less likely to be motivated to 
manipulate earnings than small firms because of the need to disclose more 
information according to regulation of stock market (Kousenidis et al., 2013).  
Interestingly, we note that the coefficient audit quality (Big-4) and real earnings 
management measured for tsunami sample is positive and highly significant as 
shown in column (4), however, the coefficient audit quality (Big-4) and accruals 
earnings management measured for flooding sample is negative and highly 
significant as shown in column (5). This is consistent with the document by 
Alhadab et al. (2016) that high quality auditors are important in detecting and 
mitigating the level of accrual-based earnings management but may lead firms 
to engage in more real earning management.  
We test the second hypothesis by running two separate regressions, one each 
for tsunami and flooding setting as equation (1) and shown before in Table 3.7 
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(Panel B). We then test whether the interaction (treated*disaster) coefficients 
across the two regressions are statistically different from each other.  
Table 3.8 compares the coefficients on (treated*disaster) in flooding and 
tsunami group across to regression in equation (1). The difference is the 
coefficient on (treated*disaster) in flooding group minus coefficient on 
(treated*disaster) in tsunami group. The evidence in Table 3.8 shows that the 
level of earnings management is conditional on the severity of the disaster if 
coefficient of interest in flooding group shows greater statistically magnitude 
than the coefficient of interest in tsunami group.  
We find that the coefficient of interest in the flooding setting is statistically 
different from tsunami group as shown in red colour in Table 3.8. These results 
support the conjecture because firms in the flooding group present greater 
magnitude of the coefficients in the models for the absolute EM than firms in the 
tsunami group. We can imply that the more intense the disaster, the higher the 
level of earnings management. This is consistent with the H2 that the level of 
earnings management is conditional on the severity of the disaster16. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 In addition, we consider how different industries have been affected by the disaster. We 
separate the overall sample in two groups (high impact vs low impact industries). The high 
impact industries group includes manufacturing and service industries, while the low impact 
industries group includes the rest of industries. We use the absolute value of the residuals 
regressions as earnings management proxy to test H2. Consistent with the analysis reported in 
Table 3.8, our additional results (not tabulated) suggest that the increase in the level of earnings 
management is higher for the high impact industries group, as they were more seriously 
affected by the disaster. We find no evidence that the intensity of the disaster has affected the 
level of earnings management for the low impact group. 
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Table 3.8: Comparing the coefficient across the two samples 
      
  
AbsAEM   AbsREM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc 
treated*disaster in flooding group -0.002 0.025**   0.013** 0.014** 
treated*disaster in tsunami group -0.003 -0.013   -0.003 -0.016** 
Difference 0.001 0.038*   0.016** 0.030*** 
P-value 0.561 0.069   0.025 0.003 
 
Table 3.8 compares the coefficients on (treated*disaster) from regression (1) below of the 
flooding and tsunami group. 
EM i,t    = f I,t (b0 + b1treated + b2disaster + b3treated*disaster + b4control variables + e)    (1) 
Four different measures of earnings management are used for the comparison, the Modified 
DD, the Performance Match, the CFO, and the Disc variable as shown in Panel B in Table 3.7. 
Differences are tested using t-tests. The coefficients shown in bold are statistically significant 
at less than 10 percent level. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 
3.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Overall these results provide support for our set of hypotheses that firms exhibit 
evidence of accruals and real earnings management after natural disasters; and 
further, that they manage earnings more as the severity of the disaster 
increases. 
4.3 Additional tests and analysis 
4.3.1 Additional test for the trend in earnings management  
We test our first set of hypotheses considering the trend in earnings 
management in each year following the disaster to examine how fast firms 
engage in earnings management. We create year dummies for the period after 
disaster to examine the time-series profiles of signed accruals and real earnings 
management.  
EM i,t = f i,t (b0 + b1treated + b2disastery0 + b3disastery1 + b4disastery2 +  
               b5treated*disastery0 + b6treated*disastery1 + 
b7treated*disastery2 + b8control variables + e)               (2) 
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We base our conclusion about H1a and H1b on the statistical significance of 
coefficients of treated*disastery0, treated*disastery1, and treated*disastery2, 
which are b5, b6 and b7 in equation (2). The disastery0 is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 for the fiscal year during which the disaster occurred (2004 
for the tsunami sample and 2011 for the flooding sample), and zero otherwise. 
The disastery1 takes the value of 1 for the first year after the disaster (2005 for 
the tsunami sample and 2012 for the flooding sample), and disastery2 takes the 
value of one for the second year after the disaster (2006 for the tsunami sample 
and 2013 for the flooding sample). The treated is as previously defined. 
Table 3.9 reports the OLS coefficient estimated using equation (2). The 
dependent variables are the regression residuals from accruals and real 
earnings management models (Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, and 
Disc variables), while the main independent variables of interest are the 
coefficient b5, b6 and b7 (treated*disastery0, treated*disastery1, and 
treated*disastery2) in equation (2) which are used to assess the effects of 
disasters on earnings management in each year following the disasters. 
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Table 3.9: The trend in earnings management in each year following the disaster 
    EM i,t =  f i,t (b0 + b1treated + b2disastery0 + b3disastery1 + b4disastery2 + 
b5treated*disastery0 + b6treated*disastery1 + b7treated*disastery2 + 
b8control variables + e)            (2) 
 Continuous earnings management variable 
  
Tsunami  Flooding 
AEM 
 
REM 
 
AEM 
 
REM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match 
 
CFO Disc 
 Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match 
 
CFO Disc 
treated -0.020*** -0.017 
 
-0.008 0.032*** 
 
-0.005 -0.008 
 
-0.014** 0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.006) (0.010) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
disastery0 -0.004 0.027* 
 
-0.019* 0.007 
 
0.003 -0.008 
 
-0.015* 0.012 
  (0.009) (0.016) 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
 
(0.007) (0.012) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
disastery1 0.006 0.010 
 
-0.005 0.043*** 
 
-0.003 -0.014 
 
0.01 0.014* 
  (0.009) (0.016) 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
 
(0.007) (0.012) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
disastery2 0.013 0.010 
 
-0.009 -0.014 
 
-0.003 -0.009 
 
0.006 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.016) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.007) (0.012) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
treated*disastery0 0.006 -0.017 
 
0.007 0.010 
 
0.009 0.019 
 
0.006 0.000 
  (0.010) (0.018) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.010) (0.019) 
 
(0.012) (0.013) 
treated*disastery1 0.026*** 0.000 
 
0.031** -0.011 
 
0.024** 0.004 
 
-0.011 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.018) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.010) (0.018) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
treated*disastery2 0.012 0.006 
 
0.014 0.018 
 
0.004 -0.000 
 
-0.017 -0.010 
  (0.010) (0.018) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.010) (0.018) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
ROA 0.598*** 0.155*** 
 
-0.376*** -0.012 
 
0.330*** -0.102*** 
 
-0.544*** -0.106*** 
  (0.017) (0.031) 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
 
(0.017) (0.031) 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Growth -0.062*** -0.058*** 
 
0.063*** -0.061*** 
 
-0.037*** -0.018* 
 
-0.087*** 0.066*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.006) (0.010) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Lev 0.000 0.000** 
 
0.001*** -0.000** 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.004*** -0.005** 
 
-0.002 0.004** 
 
-0.001 0.003* 
 
0.000 -0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Big-4 -0.001 -0.008 
 
-0.014*** -0.005 
 
-0.000 -0.012* 
 
0.009** -0.004 
  (0.004) (0.007) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.007) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.002 0.019 
 
-0.023** -0.104*** 
 
0.010 0.003 
 
-0.009 -0.068*** 
  (0.008) (0.015) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.007) (0.013) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Fixed effects I, Y I, Y 
 
I, Y I, Y 
 
I, Y I, Y 
 
I, Y I, Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.256 0.014 
 
0.092 0.034 
 
0.065 0.005 
 
0.099 0.037 
n. of observ. 4,006 4,006 
 
4,006 4,006 
 
5,786 5,786 
 
5,786 5,786 
 
Table 3.9 shows the trend in AEM and REM in each year following the disasters. The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates as equation (2) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors. The dependent 
variable is the regression residuals from four different measures of earnings management (Modified DD, 
Performance Match, CFO and Disc variables). This table has the main independent variable of interest 
is (treated*disastery0, treated*disastery1, and treated*disastery2) which are used to assess the effects of 
disasters on earnings management in each year following the disasters. The coefficients shown in bold 
are statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. The table also reports the mean R
2
 for each of 
these regressions. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 3.1. We include 
industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively.  
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Overall, the evidence suggests that firms start to manage earnings by using 
both accruals and real-based earnings management in the first year after 
tsunami occurred; similarly, firms start to engage in only accruals earnings 
management in the first year after flooding occurred (+1y). Specifically, in the 
tsunami sample, we find positive coefficients for our dummy variable 
(treated*disastery1) of 0.026 (p < 0.01) and 0.031 (p < 0.05) when the 
dependent variable is Modified DD and CFO variables, respectively. Similarly, 
we find positive coefficients for (treated*disastery1) in flooding sample of 0.024 
(p < 0.05) when the dependent variable is discretionary accruals in modified 
Dechow and Dichev model (Modified DD variable). In contrast, there is no 
evidence that firms engage in both accruals and real earnings management in 
the period when the natural disasters hit (y0) (tsunami and flooding occurred in 
2004 and 2011, respectively) and in the second year after tsunami and flooding 
occurred (+2y).  
Next, we find that the coefficient b1 (treated) is statistically significant when 
discretionary accruals (Modified DD) and abnormal real earning management 
(Disc) are measured for tsunami samples and when abnormal real earning 
management (CFO and Disc) are measured for flooding samples. This 
suggests that treated firms exhibit evidence of earnings management. The 
coefficient b2 (disastery0) is significant when discretionary accruals 
(Performance Match) and abnormal real earning management (CFO) are 
measured for tsunami samples and when abnormal real earning management 
(CFO) is measured for flooding samples. This means that firms exhibit evidence 
of earnings management in the period when the natural disasters hit (y0) 
(tsunami and flooding occurred in 2004 and 2011, respectively). The coefficient 
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b3 (disastery1) is significantly positive for Disc variable for firms in the tsunami 
and flooding samples as shown in columns (4 and 8) in Table 3.9. This implies 
that firms are likely to manage earnings by using real earnings management in 
the first year after the disaster occurred (+1y). However, we find that the 
coefficient b4 (disastery2) is non-significant. This suggests that there is no 
significant effect of earnings management in the second year after the disaster 
occurred (+2y).  
4.3.2 Additional analysis: high and low leverage firms  
We separate the sample into two groups (high vs. low leverage) and run two 
separate regressions, to test whether the firms with higher leverage are more 
likely to use EM to re-assure investors and analysts about the firm’s survival 
prospects. Firms in the high leverage group are identified when the leverage is 
higher than or equal to the industry average for a given year; whereas, firms in 
the low leverage group have leverage ratios lower than that of the industry 
average for a given year. 
Table 3.10 presents the estimation results for equation (1) when separating the 
high and low leverage groups. Our first hypotheses (H1a and H1b) is tested by 
looking at the b3 coefficients in each regression, which capture the impact of the 
natural disasters on high and low leverage.  
The dependent variable is the regression residual from accruals earnings 
management models (Modified DD and Performance Match variables) and real 
earnings management models (CFO and Disc variables). 
In the high leverage group over the tsunami period, the coefficient b3 
(treated*disaster) is positive (0.017 and 0.085) and highly significant (p<0.10 
and p<0.05) when earnings management is measured as Modified DD, and 
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Disc. For the high leverage group over the flooding period, we find a positive 
coefficient of 0.025 at less than 10% level (treated*disaster) in the CFO 
regression, as shown in column (7). However, there is apparently no significant 
effect on AEM for the high leverage group during the flooding period. 
Table 3.10: Additional test for high and low leverage groups 
  EM i,t= f i,t (b0+b1treated+b2disaster+b3treated*disaster+b4control variables +e)   (1) 
 
Continuous earnings management variable 
  
High leverage group 
Tsunami   Flooding 
AEM   REM   AEM   REM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc   
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc 
treated -0.027*** 0.008  -0.002 -0.132***  0.006 0.004  0.011 -0.041*** 
  (0.007) (0.017)  (0.011) (0.036)  (0.009) (0.017)  (0.011) (0.012) 
disaster 0.006 0.022  0.022 0.072  -0.011 -0.011  -0.012 0.019* 
  (0.010) (0.021)  (0.014) (0.045)  (0.009) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.011) 
treated*
disaster 0.017* -0.001  -0.013 0.085**  -0.003 0.003  0.025* 0.011 
  (0.009) (0.020)  (0.013) (0.042)  (0.012) (0.021)  (0.014) (0.015) 
ROA 0.642*** 0.176***  0.252*** 0.126  0.686*** 0.273***  0.446*** 0.076** 
  (0.022) (0.043)  (0.028) (0.093)  (0.027) (0.050)  (0.033) (0.035) 
Growth 0.074*** 0.082*** -0.011 0.103***  0.057*** 0.078***  0.048*** 0.102*** 
  (0.007) (0.017)  (0.011) (0.036)  (0.009) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Lev 0.002*** 0.000  0.001*** -0.000  0.000 0.001**  0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.009*** -0.000  0.002 -0.009  -0.000 0.002  0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Big-4 -0.002 0.000  0.021*** 0.039*  -0.007 -0.024**  0.020*** -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.022)  (0.005) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant -0.042*** -0.027  -0.050*** -0.932***  0.008 -0.017  0.007 -0.091*** 
  (0.016) (0.028)  (0.018) (0.059)  (0.013) (0.024)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Fixed 
effects I,Y I,Y  I,Y I,Y  I,Y I,Y  I,Y I,Y 
Adjust 
R
2 0.262 0.026  0.084 0.027  0.244 0.027  0.099 0.061 
n. of 
observ. 1,465 1,465  1,465 1,465  2,076 2,076  2,076 2,076 
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Low leverage group 
Tsunami   Flooding 
AEM   REM   AEM   REM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc   
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc 
treated -0.004 -0.024*  0.009 -0.074***  -0.021*** -0.016  0.011 -0.017** 
  (0.010) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.028)  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.008) 
disaster 0.026** 0.018  0.026* -0.026  -0.011 -0.013  -0.007 -0.011 
  (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.038)  (0.008) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.010) 
treated*
disaster 0.007 -0.011  -0.019 -0.007  0.009 0.002  0.003 0.003 
  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.035)  (0.009) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.011) 
ROA 0.559*** 0.155***  0.459*** -0.032  0.545*** 0.165***  0.477*** 0.036 
  (0.026) (0.042)  (0.030) (0.085)  (0.019) (0.037)  (0.025) (0.024) 
Growth 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.088*** 0.077***  0.044*** 0.038***  0.064*** 0.065*** 
  (0.010) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.027)  (0.006) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Lev -0.000 0.002*  0.002*** -0.003  0.002** 0.001  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.002 -0.008**  0.001 -0.018***  -0.004*** 0.002  0.000 -0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Big-4 0.000 -0.013  0.010 0.030  0.001 -0.012  0.006 -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.019)  (0.004) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant -0.042*** 0.034  0.026* 0.707***  0.031*** -0.002  0.013 0.058*** 
  (0.016) (0.021)  (0.015) (0.042)  (0.009) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.011) 
Fixed 
effects I,Y I,Y  I,Y I,Y  I,Y I,Y  I,Y I,Y 
Adjust 
R
2 0.270 0.015  0.105 0.022  0.195 0.008  0.099 0.035 
n. of 
observ. 2,541 2,541  2,541 2,541  3,710 3,710  3,710 3,710 
 
 
Table 3.10 presents the result from an OLS regressions with accruals and real earnings 
management proxies as equation (1) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors.  The final 
sample includes 1,465 (2,541) and 2,076 (3,710) firm-year observations over the period 2001-
2006 and 2008-2013 to test the effect of the tsunami and flooding in high leverage group (low 
leverage group), respectively. The dependent variable is the regression residual from EM models 
(Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO and Disc variables). This table has the main independent 
variable of interest is (treated*disaster). 
Columns (1-2) and (5-6) report the results from regressions of AEM proxies on tsunami and 
flooding, respectively; while, columns (3-4) and (7-8) report the results from regressions of REM 
proxies on tsunami and flooding, respectively. The coefficients shown in bold are statistically 
significant at less than 10 percent level. The table also reports the mean R
2
 for each of these 
regressions. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 3.1. We include 
industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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For the low leverage group over the tsunami and flooding periods, there is no 
evidence that the coefficient b3 (treated*disaster) is significant. This suggests 
that it is the firms with high leverage that are more likely to manage earnings 
during disasters, to attract prospective investors or re-assure investors and 
analysts about the firm’s survival prospects. This is consistent with the market 
incentives hypothesis.  
4.3.3 Alternative earnings management proxies  
As reported in the previous section, we use modified Dechow and Dichev model 
and performance-matched Jones model to measure AEM (Modified DD and 
Performance Match variables), while, we use cash flow from operations model 
and discretionary expenses model to measure REM (CFO and Disc variables). 
However, we re-run our analyses by using three alternative measures of 
accruals and real earnings management in order to corroborate our results.  
We consider the modified cross-sectional Jones model and modified Jones with 
ROA model following Dechowet al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005), 
respectively; whereas, we also measure REM using production model following 
Roychowdhury (2006). Results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively similar to 
those reported in the main tables. In addition, all models are presented with 
industry and year fixed effects but we have also run the models using firm and 
year fixed effects. Once again, the results (not tabulated) remain unchanged. 
Finally, we re-run the analysis on quarterly data for the first hypothesis to 
account for seasonality and the results (not tabulated) also remain unchanged. 
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5 Conclusions 
This study provides evidence that exogenous shocks such as natural disasters 
can affect firms reporting incentives. We exploit two different disasters, the 2004 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 flood in Thailand, to investigate the 
effect of natural disasters on firms’ earnings management strategies. 
The results show that firms in countries that are hit by a natural disaster are 
likely to engage in more accruals and real earnings management, in order to 
boost the market confidence over the firm survival in line with the market 
incentive hypothesis. In contrast, we find no evidence that firms manage 
earnings downwards to increase governmental help or reduce scrutiny as 
suggested by the political cost. Next, we use the absolute value of the residuals 
from the earnings management models to study the level of earnings 
management and reconcile the sensitivity results with main test. Consistent with 
the preliminary analysis, firms in the tsunami sample that engage in the level of 
REM decreased, while firms in the flooding sample that engage in the level of 
AEM increased. Further, we use the absolute value of earnings management to 
examine that the severity of the disaster plays a role for the level of earnings 
management by comparing coefficient of interest across the tsunami and 
flooding samples. The results also show that the interaction (treated*disaster) 
coefficients across the two regressions are statistically different from each other 
and the difference indicates more earnings management in the flooding setting. 
This supports that the level of earnings management is conditional on the 
severity of the disaster. Additional analyses report that our evidence is robust to 
alternative measures and specifications.  
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Finally, the study helps to understand how managers react to natural disasters 
and supports for stewardship and valuation purposes as discussed above. 
However, future study may replicate the result with other research designs such 
as the distribution of earnings after management and specific accruals to obtain 
greater validity to the findings. 
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Appendix 3.1: Abbreviations and variables used in the chapter 
AEM Accruals earnings management 
REM Real earnings management 
EM Earnings management 
AbsAEM Absolute value of discretionary accruals 
AbsREM Absolute value of abnormal real earnings management 
DA Discretionary accruals 
TA Total assets 
∆sale Change in sales 
GrossPPE Gross property, plant and equipment 
NetPPE Net property, plant and equipment 
Modified DD Modified Dechow and Dichev model following McNichols 
(2002) 
Performance 
Match 
Performance-matched Jones model following Kothari et 
al. (2005) 
CFO Cash flow from operations model following Roychowdhury 
(2006)  
Disc Discretionary expenses model following Roychowdhury 
(2006) 
treated Treatment group is dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 in the countries which were hit by disasters and 0, 
otherwise 
disaster Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the year 
after the disasters occurred and 0, otherwise 
-2y Year (-2) is defined as second year before the disasters 
occurred 
-1y Year (-1) is defined as first year before the disasters 
occurred 
y0 Year (0) is defined as the fiscal year during which disaster 
occurs 
+1y Year (+1) is defined as first year after the disasters 
occurred 
+2y Year (+2) is defined as second year after the disasters 
occurred 
disastery0 Year dummy that the year (0) is defined as the fiscal year 
during which disaster occurred 
disastery1 Year dummy that the year (+1) is defined as first year 
after the disasters occurred 
disastery2 Year dummy that the year (+2) is defined as second year 
after the disasters occurred 
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ACCR ACCR = net income before extraordinary items (EBXI) - 
cash flow from operation/ TAt-1 
ROA A company’s return on assets 
Growth The percentage change in sales 
Lev The percentage of long-term liabilities to total assets 
Size The natural logarithm of the firm's total assets 
Big-4 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is one 
of the big 4 audit firms, namely PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young, and KPMG 
and 0, otherwise. 
treated*disaster Use to assess that natural disaster as determinants of 
earnings management 
treated*disastery0 Use to assess the effects of natural disaster on earnings 
management in the period immediately after natural 
disaster hit (y0) 
treated*disastery1 Use to assess the effects of natural disaster on earnings 
management in the first year after natural disaster hit 
(+1y) 
treated*disastery2 Use to assess the effects of natural disaster on earnings 
management in the second year after natural disaster hit 
(+2y) 
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Chapter 4 
 
Earnings Management and Credit Ratings during Natural 
Disasters  
 
 
Abstract 
The goal of this chapter is to study the impact of earnings management on 
credit ratings when a natural disaster occurs. Additionally, we investigate 
whether the effect of earnings management on the deviations from expected 
credit ratings is conditional on the severity of the disaster by comparing two 
different disasters, the 2004 tsunami in India Ocean and the 2011 flood in 
Thailand. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we further test whether 
the effect is different for investment vs. speculative grade firms. Collectively, our 
results support the view that (1) earnings management affects credit ratings 
negatively when a natural disaster hits, (2) the higher the intensity of the 
disaster, the stronger the effect of earnings management on credit ratings, and 
(3) the results are mainly driven by speculative grade firms. 
 
 
Keywords: Natural disasters, expected credit rating, and earnings management 
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1 Introduction 
Prior literature17 has extensively examined incentives for earnings management 
such as initial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings, season bond issuers, 
earnings targets (i.e. loss avoidance, increase earnings, earnings smoothness, 
and meet or beat the expectations of financial analysts), corporate executive 
compensation, mergers and acquisitions, violating lending contracts, regulatory 
costs or regulatory benefits, including natural disasters (see empirical paper in 
Chapter 3). In addition, prior literature18 investigates the consequences of 
earnings management (i.e. litigation propensity, market valuations, auditor 
opinions, and credit ratings). This chapter contributes to this second stream of 
literature by investigating the impact of earnings management on deviations 
from expected credit rating in a specific setting, i.e. when a natural disaster 
occurs. According to the World Economic Forum (2015), the occurrence of 
natural disasters is becoming more frequent and severe due to the climate 
change (i.e. extreme weather conditions and rise in CO2 emission). Moreover, 
the potential environmental disasters stemming from the climate change pose 
                                                          
17
 For example, Francis et al., 2003; Beaver et al., 2003; Carter, 2015; Graham et al., 2005; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Amy, 2005; Zang, 2012; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Alissa et al., 
2013; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Teoh et al., 1998; Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; 
Healy and Wahlem, 1999; Healy, 1985; Zang, 2012; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Cohen et al., 
2008; Turner and Guilding, 2011; Mendes et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2008; Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn, 2009; Zamri et al., 2013; Roychowdhury, 2006; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Leuz et 
al., 2003; Cahan, 1992; Jones, 1991; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Han and Wang, 1998; 
Byard et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011; and Hall and Stammerjohan, 1997. 
18
 For example, Dechow et al., 2011; Lennox and Li, 2014; DuCharme et al., 2004; Gong et al., 
2008; Chan et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 1996; Dechow et al., 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; 
Gill et al., 2013; Cupertino et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2011; Koumanakos, 2008; Chen et al., 2013; 
Omid, 2015; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Bartov et al., 2001; Abolverdi and Kheradmand, 2017; 
Herbohn and Ragunathan, 2008; Butler et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002; Odders-White and Ready, 2006; and Lennox and Pittman, 2011. 
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as one of the most prominent risks for business that cannot always be 
adequately protected (World Economic Forum, 2018b). In other words, even if 
many firms have set plans to reduce disasters risk, their ability to remain in 
business in the aftermath of a disaster it may still be uncertain. This could 
encourage managers to engage in earnings management not only to increase 
credit rating agencies confidence in the survival of the firm after the occurrence 
of a disaster but also to convey information about future earnings prospects. We 
study the reaction of credit rating agencies to such earnings management 
efforts. 
Although prior research has investigated the timeliness of credit ratings, the role 
of credit rating agencies and accuracy of credit ratings, little research (i.e. Kim 
et al., 2013; Hovakimian et al., 2009; Krichene and Khoufi, 2016; Alissa et al., 
2013; and Jung et al., 2013) has directly examined the role that managerial 
incentives play in the process of credit rating. For example, Demirtas and 
Cornaggia (2013) find that firms make accounting choices around the time of 
initial credit rating to enhance their credit ratings, while Kim et al. (2013) find 
that firms are likely to engage in real earnings management to influence 
upcoming changes of credit rating.  
To our knowledge, no study has examined managerial incentives around 
natural disasters and credit ratings before. Yet, the environmental issue is one 
of four key areas of the global risks report in 2018 that firms face (World 
Economic Forum, 2018a). Moreover, World Economic Forum (2016) suggests 
that the frequency of disasters between 2005 and 2014 increased 14% on the 
previous 10 years (1995-2004), and nearly double the level recorded from 1985 
to 1994. Further, such cascading events (i.e. hurricanes, flooding, tsunami, 
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landslides, extreme temperatures, and rise in CO2 emission) take an immediate 
effect on human life, disrupt local businesses in the short term (such as 
deteriorate production capacity), and can devastate local economics for years 
(World Economic Forum, 2018b). So, it is important to look at the relationship 
between credit ratings and earnings manipulation around natural disasters, and 
for this purpose, we consider two different events: the 2004 tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean and the 2011 flood in Thailand. Recognizing the potential 
influence of earnings management during natural disasters on deviations from 
expected credit rating is of interest not only to credit rating agencies and those 
who rely on their ratings (e.g. investors, regulators, and lenders), but also to 
researchers and those interested in the consequences of earnings management 
for the debt market during events such as natural disasters.  
Compared to previous work studying financial reporting after natural disasters 
(i.e. Byard et al., 2007), this study offers a more robust methodological 
approach by employing a differences-in-differences design to assess 
differences between a treated (i.e. hit by a disaster) and a control group before 
and after the disasters. Specifically, we use a sample of companies from four 
countries, namely, Indonesia and Thailand (treatment sample), Korea and 
Philippines (control sample) between 2001-2006 for the tsunami test and a 
sample of companies from the same four countries, namely, Thailand 
(treatment sample), Indonesia, Korea and Philippines (control sample) between 
2008-2013 for the flooding test, to investigate the consequences of earnings 
management on deviations from expected credit rating during such natural 
disasters. 
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Natural disasters tend to have a negative effect on firms’ financial performance, 
so it would not be surprising to see that credit rating agencies provide a lower 
credit rating or credit rating downgrades over the disaster period. This is aligned 
with Standard and Poor’s (2015) findings which indicate that natural disasters 
affect firms with credit rating downgrades. However, firms pay strong attention 
to their credit ratings (Graham and Harvey, 2001; and Alissa et al., 2013) and 
might try to offset this downgrading by manipulating their accounting accruals 
and/or real activities. For example, Kisgen (2006) finds that firms near a broad 
rating boundary (plus and minus) are more likely to decrease their financial 
leverage in order to obtain rating upgrades or avoid rating downgrades 
compared to firms in the middle of rating categories. Jung et al. (2013) further 
find that firms with credit ratings in the upper or lower end of each broad rating 
category (i.e. firms straddling the investment-grade cutoff (BBB- and BB+)) are 
more likely to smooth earnings to achieve or avoid a change in credit rating. 
Similarly, in order to obtain a more favourable credit rating or avoid a 
downgrade during natural disasters, managers might engage in earnings 
management around such events. 
On the other hand, credit rating agencies choices around a natural disaster may 
be driven by two alternative concerns: reputational and financial. According to 
the reputational concerns hypothesis, when credit rating agencies recognize 
that the accounting process has been “tempered” after a natural disaster hits, 
they penalize firms with managed earnings by lowering their credit rating. This 
is consistent with the idea that credit rating agencies always defend themselves 
to build and protect their reputation because if a firm with high rating fails, the 
investors may doubt the credit rating agencies’ integrity which leads to a 
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reputation cost (which in turn results in the loss of future business). At the same 
time, however, credit rating agencies might be financially motivated not to 
“penalize” earnings management when a disaster hits. This contradicting 
financial motive may arise because credit rating agencies are paid by rated 
firms themselves, so more lenient ratings may ensure client loyalty (Loana, 
2014)19. If the financial motive prevails, credit rating agencies will not adjust for 
earnings management during disaster periods, resulting in a higher than 
expected credit ratings. Accordingly, whether firms are likely to affect their credit 
rating by managing earnings in periods of natural disasters is an empirical 
question. 
Operationally, our focus is on the relation between earnings management and 
the deviation from the expected credit rating. Jiang (2008) suggests using 
changes in credit ratings which mitigate the effects of correlated omitted 
variables and autocorrelation in the error terms. However, credit rating levels 
are typically sticky (Demirtas and Cornaggia, 2013). To overcome these biases, 
we hence choose to use the deviations from expected credit rating (diff), which 
is a firm’s actual rating minus its expected credit rating. To estimate expected 
credit ratings, we follow Alissa et al. (2013). Their model uses firm’s 
fundamentals as predictors which is similar to the credit rating agencies 
approach. 
In the first part of the analysis, we investigate whether engaging in earnings 
management around the disaster is related to deviations from the expected 
credit rating. Overall, our evidence indicates that firms’ earnings management 
activities are negatively associated with deviations from their expected credit 
                                                          
19
 Loana (2014) finds that almost two-thirds of the total income of a credit rating agency is paid 
by issuers being rated. 
176 
 
rating during disasters. We interpret this as evidence that credit rating agencies’ 
reputation incentives prevail, and they penalize firms for manipulating earnings 
during natural disasters by lowering their credit rating.  
Our analysis expands the scope of the previous study by Alissa et al. (2013) on 
the consequences of earnings management on deviations from expected credit 
rating by considering the moderating role of natural disasters. In addition, we 
extend the findings by Carter (2015), who examines the joint interaction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), earnings management, and credit ratings. In 
contrast, we examine the joint relationship of earnings management, credit 
ratings, and natural disasters, which is a very different type of exogenous shock 
compared to regulation changes (SOX), to investigate the impact of external 
factor (natural disaster) on earnings management instant impact of internal 
factor (governance and internal controls) on earnings management for credit 
rating.  
In additional analysis we consider the consequences of earnings management 
on deviations from expected credit rating separately for each year following the 
disasters in order to examine how fast earnings management affects deviations 
from expected credit ratings when a natural disaster hits. We find that earnings 
management is negatively associated with deviations from expected credit 
rating in the first year after tsunami hit (+1y) and in the second year after the 
flooding occurred (+2y). The difference in the time period of each disaster may 
affect the timing of the issuance of the corporate financial statements including 
the effects from the disaster to the public and may therefore reflect the credit 
rating adjustment made by the credit rating agencies. Generally, floods have 
more long-lasting effects than a tsunami. The hospitality industry that was 
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affected by a series of tsunami needed less time to estimate the total damages 
and losses from the tsunami which lasted between 10 minutes to 2 hours, 
compared to the manufacturing industry that was affected by the flooding for a 
period of 2-3 months. Moreover, the flooding caused disruptions to 
manufacturing supply chains affecting the regional automobile production and 
causing a global shortage of hard disk drives which lasted throughout 2012. It 
can be shown that corporate financial statements disclosing the amount of total 
economic loss from flooding were issued publicly after 2012. It can be inferred 
thus that firms in the tsunami sample were able to issue the corporate financial 
statements including the effects from the disaster to the public sooner than the 
firms in the flooding sample; thus, it comes as no surprise that credit rating 
agencies can recognize that firms are managing earnings during the tsunami 
period sooner than during the flooding period. This is consistent with the result 
that credit rating agencies penalize firms in the tsunami sample engaging in 
earnings management in the first year after the disaster occurred by lowering 
their credit ratings. Whereas, they penalize firms in the flooding sample 
engaging in earnings management in the second year after the disaster 
occurred. 
Throughout our analysis we distinguish between accrual earnings management 
(AEM) and real earnings management (REM). In doing so we contribute new 
insights into the influence of earnings management on debt market literature by 
trading-off the consequences between the two types of earnings management 
(AEM and REM) on the deviations from expected credit rating around natural 
disasters. Interestingly, we find that the difference in timing of each disaster has 
affected the selection of earnings management techniques by the managers. 
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Firms in the tsunami sample can manipulate earnings by using only accruals 
earnings management to affect deviations from expected credit rating because 
the tsunami occurred on the Boxing Day (26 December 2004), resulting in 
insufficient time to manipulate real operations. In contrast, firms in the flooding 
sample have more time to manage earnings by using real earnings 
management during the last quarterly reporting because flooding occurred at 
the beginning of the last quarter. Our results remain unchanged if we delete 
firms with high and low credit ratings levels of creditworthiness. 
In the second set of our analysis, we expand the results in Chapter 3 regarding 
whether the effect of earnings management on the deviations from expected 
credit rating is conditional on the severity of the disaster. We measure the 
intensity of disasters by comparing the actual financial damage from the 
tsunami and the flooding. According to The Economist (2011) and the World 
Bank (2011), the actual financial damage and loss derived from the flooding is 
relatively larger than those of the tsunami. Overall, we find that the magnitude of 
the coefficients of interest for the tsunami sample is statistically lower than the 
magnitude of the coefficients of interest in the flooding group both for accruals 
and real earnings management. This suggests that the higher the level of 
intensity of the disaster, the more likely the credit rating agencies will adjust 
their ratings for earnings management. 
Finally, we want to test the difference between bad and good performance 
firms. Therefore, we separate speculative grade (SG) firms and investment 
grade (IG) firms to examine whether the moderating role a natural disaster 
plays in the relation between deviations from expected credit rating and 
earnings management is different between SG and IG firms. Interestingly, we 
find that accruals earnings management is negatively associated with 
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deviations from expected credit rating during the tsunami occurrence only for 
speculative-grade firms. Similarly, we find that both accruals and real earnings 
management are negatively associated with deviations from expected credit 
rating during the flooding occurrence only for speculative-grade firms. However, 
we do not find evidence that earnings management is associated with 
deviations from expected credit rating during the tsunami and flooding 
occurrence for investment-grade firms. 
Because of investors’ and analysts’ reluctance to invest and guide forecasts in 
non-investment grades loans, managers with SG firms have motivation to 
achieve upgrades to IG firms or to have a higher level of credit ratings. 
Moreover, SG firms have many constraints (i.e. cash flow problems and high 
level of cumulative accruals management) in earnings management. Thus, 
credit rating agencies tend to detect earnings management in SG firms easily 
and they penalize SG firms for manipulating earnings during the disaster by 
lowering their credit rating. While IG firms are likely to manage earnings to avoid 
downgrades to SG group, credit rating agencies are reluctant to adjust ratings 
of IG firms because they believe that IG’s risk profile are unchanged (i.e. low 
bankruptcy risk) or they may not able to detect earning management in IG firms.  
In summary, we contribute new insights into the credit ratings literature by 
providing empirical evidence that (1) the relation between accrual an real 
earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating is moderated 
by natural disasters, (2) the effect of earnings management on the deviations 
from expected credit rating is conditional on the severity of the disaster, and (3) 
earnings management by speculative grade firms is related to deviations from 
expected credit rating in areas affected by natural disaster.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
prior literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research 
design and methods. Section 4 provides an overview of the empirical evidence 
and sensitivity analyses. Section 5 presents our study’s conclusions.  
 
2 Prior literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Credit ratings 
2.1.1 Importance of credit ratings in capital markets 
There are many reasons why credit ratings (CR) matter and are widely used by 
various market participants (Jorion et al., 2009; Covitz and Harrison, 2003; and 
Lin and Shen, 2015). First, firms having higher credit ratings are viewed as 
having higher liquidity, resulting in lower borrowing costs, which typically 
increase firm value (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). According to Dichev and 
Piotroski (2001), the stock market reacts negatively in response to 
announcements of ratings revisions or downgrades news. Moreover, Kim et al. 
(2013) suggest that credit ratings have significant implications for issuers and 
determine firms’ future borrowing costs, while Jung et al. (2013) document that 
managers are strongly motivated to improve or maintain their credit ratings 
because credit ratings have significant cost implications for firms, including the 
cost of future borrowing and valuation of stocks and bonds. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that issuers care deeply about credit ratings. This is also consistent 
with the results of a survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) finding that credit 
ratings are CFO’s second highest concern when making capital structure 
decisions.  
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Second, credit ratings can also be used by investors (i.e. banks, bond funds, 
pension funds, and insurance firms) to assess credit risk and to comply with 
internal by-law restrictions or investment policies. For instance, bond fund 
managers pay strong attention to firms’ credit ratings to comply with regulation-
based cut-offs that require certain minimum ratings for bond investments (e.g. 
investment guidelines may indicate that bond fund managers can only invest in 
the investment-grade bonds). Moreover, in the U.S., broker-dealers need to 
maintain a minimum amount of capital on their balance sheet according to 
SEC’s Net Capital Rule. The SEC determined that securities with a lower credit 
rating require higher capital, and vice versa. Additionally, credit ratings are used 
by broker-dealers to determine the amount of collateral to hold against 
derivatives credit exposure. But credit ratings can also be used in private 
contracts (e.g. financial contracts and trading contracts). For example, financial 
contracts between firm and lenders can specify that lenders may demand more 
collateral or accelerate payment of existing debt, if the credit rating of the firm 
falls below some specified level.  
Finally, credit ratings are widely used by regulators to formulate appropriate 
policies or regulations (e.g. set capital requirements for financial institutions, 
and exempt certain financial transactions from disclosure requirements).  
2.1.2 Criteria for determining credit ratings 
Credit rating agencies play a prominent role as capital market participants 
because they provide ratings that are stable across time and consistent across 
issuers as a signal of overall quality of the firm (Jorion et al., 2009). Moreover, 
credit ratings reflect the agency’s opinion about the creditworthiness of the firms 
and the overall risks of the firms (e.g. financial risks, and credit risks). SEC 
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(2013) suggests that the ability to pay financial obligations is one of the factors 
to assess an entity’s creditworthiness by credit rating agencies. 
As part of the credit rating process, credit rating agencies use both public (such 
as corporate financial statements and reporting choices) and non-public private 
information (such as minutes of broad meetings, detailed financials by product 
line or division, budget, internal capital spending plans, new product plans, and 
information obtained though frequent discussions and communication with the 
firm) to assess the firm’s credit rating (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Kim et al., 
2013; and Demirtas and Cornaggia, 2013). Vast literature suggests that credit 
rating agencies take into account earnings, profitability, interest coverage, 
liquidity, and leverage in their rating analysis (Jorion et al., 2009; Jung et al., 
2013; and Carter, 2015). For example, Kim et al. (2013) document that the 
stability of earnings is considered a critical component of rating, while Demirtas 
and Cornaggia (2013) state that rating agencies focus on profit and reductions 
in debt costs as important factors in their rating analysis. In addition, Standard 
and Poor’s (2006) notes that firms without growth in revenues, even if they 
generate cash, are considered as financially weak, and that they pay attention 
also to new competition or technology, changing debt burdens, capital spending 
requirements, and regulatory changes to use on credit rating process because 
these issues affect firms expected future profitability, competitive position, and 
credit risk (Standard and Poor’s, 2011). 
The quality of accounting information is also named by credit agencies as one 
of criteria in the credit ratings process (Standard and Poor’s, 2003). Several 
recent studies demonstrate that opportunistic earnings management, deficiency 
in accounting standards, poor disclosure quality, poor internal controls, or 
weakness in firms’ internal governance structures increase the noise in 
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accounting reports and could lead to lower credit ratings (Dechow et al., 2010; 
Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Dechow et al., 1996; and Jorion et al., 2009). For 
example, Yu (2005) suggests that lower disclosure quality, as proxied by lower 
accounting quality, is associated with higher credit spreads. Moreover, greater 
information risk associated with declining accounting quality and increasing 
costs of debt will lead to overall lower credit ratings (Francis et al., 2005; and 
Carter, 2015).  
Carter (2015) indicates that credit rating standards are stiffer in the post-SOX 
period compared to pre-SOX period. As a result, an average firm experiences a 
rating downgrade after the introduction of SOX.  Jorion et al. (2009) document 
that a tightening of credit standards by credit rating agencies could not only 
undermine the usefulness of credit ratings, but also have an adverse impact on 
the cost of debt financing. They find that a tightening of credit standards would 
result in significant decrease in the level of credit ratings (the average rating fell 
from A+ to A-) and increase in funding costs (average yields increased from 
4.98% to 5.23%). Interestingly, they report a downward trend as a systematic 
tightening of ratings standards for only investment-grade firms but not for 
speculative-grade firms. Furthermore, a tightening of rating standards would not 
only affect issuers but also providers of capital. According to the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2004), banks have to hold a 
percentage of capital charge that maps to their credit rating. For example, BBB 
or BB- rated debt should hold an 8% capital charge, whereas, A- rated debt 
should hold only 4% capital charge. Suppose, for example, that credit rating 
agencies tighten credit standards, downgrading the debt of a bank from A- to 
BBB without any actual change in the default probability, the bank would be 
forced to raise more capital even though there is no fundamental change in the 
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risk of its loan portfolio. Thus, the tightening of credit standard can create 
severe distortions in capital requirements, which leads to cut lending and 
increased funding costs. 
2.2 Earnings management and credit rating 
The prior literature is inconclusive as to whether credit rating agencies can see 
through earnings management. One the one hand, Jorion et al. (2009) report 
that declining accounting quality due to earnings management would lead to 
greater default risk and higher debt yield spread and therefore to lower credit 
ratings. This is consistent with the idea that credit rating agencies are able to 
detect earnings management activities and adjust for discretionary accruals, 
resulting in low levels of ratings. On the other hand, credit ratings agencies role 
is not one of an auditor, thus, they rely on financial information provided by 
issuers that it is supposed to be reasonable and accurate (Standard and Poor’s, 
2006; Carter, 2015; and Jung et al., 2013). This creates a potential opportunity 
for firms to benefit from earnings manipulation in the credit ratings process. 
Indeed, Demirtas and Cornaggia (2013) find that managers of issuing firms can 
utilize the discretion afforded by accounting standards to obtain more 
favourable credit ratings because credit rating agencies believe issuer-reported 
financial and are reluctant to adjust ratings promptly.  
Alissa et al. (2013) support the idea that credit ratings are a vehicle to reduce 
information processing costs for market participants (e.g. investors, banks, and 
customers). For example, investors pay strong attention to firms’ credit ratings 
to make decisions on investment in firms’ stocks or bonds, while, banks use 
firms’ credit ratings in order to consider a minimum amount of collateral or loan 
interest rates. Alissa et al. (2013) also state that firms with ratings drifting away 
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from their expected levels bear additional costs (i.e. investors could be forced to 
liquidate their positions due to a prohibition from holding lower expected rated 
bonds, or a quantity restriction) when compared to their competitors, resulting in 
pressure on managers to reach their expected rating by managing earnings. 
This would be consistent with evidence in Lin and Shen (2015), who find that 
managers may boost credit rating by adopting discretionary accruals-based or 
real earnings management to acquire funds with lower capital costs, and to 
attract more investment. Similarly, Kim et al. (2013) indicate that managers 
have incentives to influence their future rating changes to maintain or improve 
their credit ratings, if firm managers can anticipate the changes in their firms’ 
credit ratings before the information is revealed to capital markets. A downgrade 
of the credit rating significantly affects both stock and bond valuation, thus, 
managers use earnings management technique to avoid credit rating 
downgrades. Moreover, previous empirical studies (i.e. Alissa et al., 2013; and 
Jung et al., 2013) document that firms straddling the investment grade threshold 
(BBB- and BB+) are exhibiting greater earnings management behaviour. There 
are two reasons for managers to avoid downgrades from investment-grade 
firms to speculative-grade (SG) firms or to obtain upgrades from speculative-
grade firms to investment-grade (IG) firms (Alissa et al., 2013; and Graham and 
Harvey, 2001). First, market participants believe that firms in the same rating 
category can be pooled together as being of the same quality, assuming that all 
such firms have similar default probabilities since credit ratings are a key metric 
in evaluating default risk. Second, SG firms have the tendency to be more 
costly (e.g. borrowing costs) than the IG firms. Hence, firms with BBB- rating 
level are more likely to manage earnings to avoid downgrades to speculative-
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grade firms, whereas, firms with BB+ rating level tend to manage earnings to 
achieve upgrades to investment-grade firms. 
As described above, credit ratings agencies rely heavily on financial information 
provided by issuers to assess the financial health of an entity and provide credit 
ratings as accurately and timely as possible. On the other side, managers have 
the incentive to obtain the most favourable credit rating and hence have 
incentives to manage earnings. Earnings management can take the form of 
upward bias in reported earnings through discretionary accounting adjustments 
by overstating revenues and underestimating expenses to artificially inflate 
reported earnings (Lo, 2008; Ghosh and Olsen, 2009; and Irani and Oesch, 
2016). Managers can also change the business model or the operating 
environment by extending more lenient credit terms, offering significant price 
cuts, and increasing the product volume to manage the level of reported 
earnings upward (Roychowdhury, 2006; Alhadab et al., 2016; Cohen et al., 
2008; and Bozzolan et al., 2015). To get the benefits of higher ratings, 
managers choose the earnings management strategy (i.e. real vs. accrual) by 
trading off the benefits and costs. On the one hand, managers can engage in 
accruals-based earnings management which have no direct cash flow 
consequences and can be done easily but can be detected easily as well (Kim 
et al., 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2016; and Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). On the 
other hand, managers can manipulate earnings through real earnings 
management with direct cash flow consequences and therefore, jeopardizing 
the firm’s competitive advantage. The benefit of this method is that it is harder 
for auditors or investors to detect (Trombetta and Imperatore, 2014; Zang, 
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2012; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2015; and Irani and 
Oesch, 2016). 
Alissa et al. (2013) find that managers use more discretion and income-
increasing real earnings management when firms are below their expected 
ratings and Demirtas and Cornaggia (2013), find that firms borrow from future 
earnings in order to boost earnings and achieve a desired initial credit rating. 
Kim et al. (2013) find that managers actively engage in more real earnings 
management (REM) rather than income-increasing accruals manipulation 
before credit rating changes, to avoid credit rating downgrades. In addition, Kim 
et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between REM and credit rating 
upgrades, but no relationship between REM and credit rating downgrades. 
Firms with credit rating downgrades tend to have cash flow problems, thus, it is 
too hard to actively engage in REM. Moreover, Graham et al. (2005) indicate 
that the high degree of scrutiny lowers the likelihood of accruals earnings 
management (AEM) with respect to REM. In other words, credit ratings 
agencies perceive accruals management practices as a negative signal. Jung et 
al. (2013) argue that the incentive for earnings management on credit ratings 
could be weakened by possible constraints in (1) earnings management, and 
(2) credit rating agencies’ ability to detect earnings management.  
2.2.1 Credit rating agencies incentives 
Prior literature (i.e. Jorion et al., 2009; Covitz and Harrison, 2003; and Alissa et 
al., 2013) indicates that there are two contradicting incentives for credit rating 
agencies. On the one hand, credit rating agencies have a countervailing 
incentive to protect their reputation for being objective and independent. Jung et 
al. (2013) document that the reputation of credit rating agencies plays a critical 
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role in revenues generation, while Alissa et al. (2013) indicate that any 
reduction in reputational capital in the views of investors could potentially 
decrease the value that credit rating agencies provide to issuers. If the 
reputational incentives prevail and credit rating agencies recognize the 
manipulation of the accounting accruals generating process and/or any changes 
in the operating environment/business model by issuers, then credit rating 
agencies will make analytical adjustment to the firms’ financial statements to 
better portray the underlying corporate performance. Ultimately, credit rating 
agencies adjust the credit rating to be consistent and informative about the 
firms’ economic reality. This incentive of credit rating agencies is consistent with 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Lin and Shen (2015) showing that accruals 
quality is positively associated with credit rating. In the same vein, Jiang (2008) 
finds that firms meeting earnings benchmarks increase their probability of rating 
upgrades and benefit from lower cost of debt, whereas firms that meet earnings 
benchmarks by managing earnings actually have a lower probability of rating 
upgrades. This implies that credit rating agencies can quickly and accurately 
detect earnings management, whether accruals- or real-based, and provide 
accurate ratings.  
On the other hand, credit rating agencies have a conflict of interest related to 
the compensation received by the issuer. Because the majority of rating 
agencies revenue stems from ratings fees paid by issuers, credit rating 
agencies may be motivated to accommodate the preferences of a bond issuer 
by fully ignoring firms’ potential manipulation of reported earnings in order to 
maintain a good relationship. In this view, credit ratings may be too lax (Jorion 
et al., 2009; Jung et al., 2013). Covitz and Harrison (2003) perform an empirical 
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study of these two different views (reputational and financial incentives). Their 
findings strongly suggest that reputation incentives dominate, while the financial 
incentive argument does not appear to play a role in rating changes by credit 
ratings agencies. 
2.3 Joint interactions among earnings management, natural disasters and 
credit ratings 
As mentioned earlier, there are several reasons why managers manage 
earnings to influence credit ratings. For example, they may want to issue stocks 
with higher prices, obtain financing with lower cost, and prevent contractual 
violation. While there is extant literature investigating whether earnings 
management is associated with credit ratings, the impact of earnings 
management on deviations from expected credit ratings around natural 
disasters has not yet been analysed. As natural disaster risk arises (World 
Economic Forum, 2016) and environmental risks are among the top five in the 
list of global risks20 (World Economic Forum, 2015), it seems important and 
timely to understand whether the association between earnings management 
and deviations from expected credit ratings is moderated by the occurrence of a 
natural disaster.  
Natural disasters cause losses and a weaker financial status which, in turn, lead 
to lower future credit ratings/ rating downgrades. Unfortunately, some firms hit 
by natural disasters may become bankrupt after the disaster occurs. Table 4.1 
below presents some descriptive data from Bloomberg about bankruptcy and 
                                                          
20
 Global risks are uncertain event, if it occurs, can also lead to serious disruption of critical 
infrastructure and so seem to be bad for the economy. 
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delisting rates for the sample of companies used in this study which is 
consistent with this view. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics about bankruptcy and delisting rates 
Panel A: Distribution of the observations breakdown by country 
Country Unique firms 
Firm-years 
affected by a 
disaster 
Firm-years 
not affected 
by a disaster Sample 
Indonesia 42 30 208 238 
Korea 20 0 154 154 
Philippines 29 0 152 152 
Thailand 45 86 179 265 
Total 136 116 693 809 
 
Panel B: Bankruptcy and delisting breakdown by firms that are hit by disaster 
and firms that are not hit by disaster 
 
Firms 
affected by 
a disaster % 
Firms not 
affected by a 
disaster % Total % 
Delisting and bankruptcy firms 8 12.12% 4 5.71% 12 8.82% 
Non-delisting and bankruptcy firms 58 87.88% 66 94.29% 124 91.12% 
Total       66 
 
      70 
 
 136  
Table 4.1 illustrates the distribution of the observations and breakdown by 
country (Panel A), and the ratio of bankruptcy and delisting breakdown by firms 
that are hit by disaster and firms that are not hit by disaster (Panel B). As can 
be seen, the percentage of bankruptcy and delisting in firms that are hit by 
disaster is twice as high as the respective percentage for firms that are not hit 
by disaster (12.12% for firms that are hit by disaster and 5.71% for firms that 
are not hit by disaster) as shown in Panel B.  
In order to avoid bankruptcy and maintain the level of their credit ratings during 
natural disaster, managers may have incentives to increase earnings through 
accruals and real earnings management. Interestingly, the question of whether 
earnings management has an effect on credit rating during disasters is a 
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controversial one. Whether credit ratings move upwards or downwards over the 
disaster period will ultimately depend on the trade-off between the reputational 
and financial incentives of the credit rating agencies, as shown in figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1: Summary of the relations in earnings management on credit 
ratings during natural disasters  
 
 
Figure 4.1 summarises the arguments presented above. On the one hand, firms 
that manage earnings in the disaster period may experience a lower credit 
rating or a credit rating downgrade. This would be consistent with the idea that 
earnings management is associated with lower quality and the prevailing of 
reputational concerns. This would further mean that firms with earnings 
management during disasters cannot deceive credit rating agencies. In other 
words, credit rating agencies can detect earnings management and penalize 
firms with earnings management during natural disaster, resulting in lower than 
expected credit ratings. Following this argument, managers would not be able to 
favourably influence their credit rating by managing earnings.  
Firms during disasters suffer from loss 
and a weakening of their financial status 
Managers engage in 
earnings management 
Credit ratings "downgrades" 
Firms cannot deceive credit 
rating agencies 
or 
Credit rating agencies 
penalize firms with earnings 
management 
Credit ratings "upgrades" or 
"maintain" credit ratings 
Credit rating agencies concerns on fees 
or 
Credit rating agencies unable to detect 
earnings management 
Credit rating agencies have 
information efficiency reason 
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On the other hand, firms that manage earnings in the disaster period may have 
a higher credit rating if credit rating agencies are unable to detect issuers’ 
earnings management activities during disasters. Alternatively, credit rating 
agencies may be able to see through earnings management during the 
disasters but choose to not adjust for discretionary activity because of their 
financial incentives21. Following this argument, managers can engage in 
earnings management during disasters to affect credit rating upgrades or 
maintain credit ratings. 
In summary, given the benefits and constraints related to earnings management 
during disaster, the ability (or lack thereof) of ratings agencies to uncover 
accruals and real based earnings management during disaster, and the 
opposing incentives for rating agencies to detect earnings management 
behaviour during disaster (reputation concerns versus their dependence on 
revenues), the question of whether managers are able to influence credit ratings 
during the disasters by managing earnings can only be answered empirically. 
Based on the preceding discussion, we develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: The association between earnings management and deviations 
from expected credit rating is moderated by the occurrence of a 
natural disaster. 
 
While the first hypothesis focuses on the moderating role of occurrence of a 
natural disaster in the relation between earnings management and deviations 
                                                          
21
 Another plausible explanation for why credit rating agencies do not adjust for earnings 
management is that even though credit rating agencies are able to see through earnings 
management, they view discretionary accruals as being informative about future performance at 
assisting managers’ communication with outsiders and act accordingly (Demirtas and 
Cornaggia, 2013; Choi et al., 2011; and Bowen et al., 2008). 
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from an expected credit rating, our second hypothesis is concerned with 
whether the effect of earnings management on the deviations from expected 
credit rating, if any, is higher for firms that were more seriously hit by a disaster. 
More specifically, we expect that the loss of investors’ confidence in the survival 
of the firm shortly after the disaster would be more (less) severe in countries 
with high (low) level intensity of disaster and this could affect how earnings 
management relate to the deviations from expected credit rating. Building upon 
the preceding arguments, we formulate the second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: The moderating role of a natural disaster in the relation 
between earnings management and deviations from expected credit 
rating will is conditional on the severity of the disaster. 
 
Generally, credit ratings are separated into two categories, investment-grade 
firms and speculative-grade firms, to set minimum quality investment standards 
for money market funds. According to Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) long-term 
credit ratings level, investment-grade ratings include BBB- and higher ratings, 
whereas, speculative-grade ratings include BB+ and lower ratings. Firms with 
speculative grade (SG) are typically more volatile and less liquid than firms with 
investment grade (IG) (Demirtas and Cornaggia, 2013).  
A survey by Graham et al. (2005) finds that high level of earnings management 
is associated with large firms and high credit rating, typically investment-grade 
firms. This is because investment-grade firms have higher pressure to meet 
their earnings benchmarks or to meet the market expectations than speculative-
grade firms. Additionally, Alissa et al. (2013) report that downgrading to SG 
could be costly for firms because most investors are unwilling to invest in these 
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firms due to self-imposed or regulation-based cut-offs. For example, SG firms 
may force investors to liquidate their positions as the rating-based triggers in 
debt covenants.  Moreover, the scale of investment-grade firms’ operations 
makes it easier to shift earnings, while, SG firms could be more constrained in 
earnings management (i.e. a high level of cumulative accruals management, 
cash flow problems, and close monitoring by credit rating agencies). Therefore, 
SG firms are likely to be less able to engage in as large earnings management 
as investment-grade firms (Jung et al., 2013). This is consistent with the 
evidence by Matsumoto (2002) that firms with higher institutional ownership, 
which correspond to investment-grade firms, can better manage earnings.  
Demirtas and Cornaggia (2013) indicate that many institutional investors (e.g. 
insurance firms, securities firms, banks, mutual funds, and private pensions) are 
prohibited or limited from holding debt downgraded to non-investment grades or 
purchasing SG debt. This is one of the reasons why firms with non-investment 
grades (or SG firms) need to manage earnings to have a higher level of credit 
ratings or move to IG firms.  
In summary, IG firms tend to manage earnings to avoid downgrading to SG 
group, while, SG firms are likely to engage in income-increasing earnings 
management to move to IG group. Nonetheless, we expect that credit ratings of 
SG firms are less stable than those of IG firms. The reason is that credit rating 
agencies are able to detect engagement in earnings management in the period 
of natural disasters in SG firms easier than IG firms due to the several 
constraints in SG firms mentioned above, resulting in a higher tendency to 
adjust their credit rating in SG firms. Accordingly, the effect of a natural disaster 
on the relation between earnings management and deviations from expected 
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credit ratings should be larger for SG firms than IG firms. Based on the 
preceding discussion, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: The moderating role of a natural disaster in the relation 
between earnings management and deviations from expected credit 
rating will be different between speculative grade and investment 
grade firms. 
 
3 Research design and methodology 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our empirical investigation requires drawing data from Bloomberg and Capital 
IQ. All financial firms are excluded from the sample due to differences in their 
financial reporting. We obtain accounting data for listed firms from four 
countries, namely, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea and Philippines from Bloomberg. 
In our analysis we consider only firms with fiscal year end in December because 
both the tsunami in 2004 and the flooding in 2011 occurred during the last 
quarter of the calendar year. Corporate financial statement including the effect 
on disasters (both tsunami and flooding) are issued to the public by the end of 
March in 2005 and 2012, respectively. Therefore, we focus on credit rating as of 
31st March, instant of credit rating as of 31st December following Alissa et al. 
(2013), Kim et al. (2013), and Hovakimian et al. (2009). We obtain firms’ S&P’s 
long-term issuer level credit rating as of 31st March each year from Capital IQ. 
The final sample includes 281 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2006 
(tsunami sample) and 528 firm-year observations over the period 2008-2013 
(flooding sample). Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the observations for 
actual credit rating as of 31st March by separating treatment (i.e. hit by the 
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disaster) and control groups for firms in the tsunami sub-sample and firms in the 
flooding sub-sample. 
Table 4.2: Sample selection and distribution of actual credit rating as of 31st March 
      
Tsunami 
 (Data in 2001-2006)   
Flooding  
(Data in 2008-2013) 
 
Score 
S&P 
credit 
ratings Description Treated Control Total 
 
Treated Control Total 
 
1 D In default 11 20 31 
 
0 63 63  
2 C 
Default imminent with 
little prospect for 
recovery 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0  
3 CC 0 4 4 
 
0 1 1  
4 CCC- 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0  
5 CCC Extremely speculative 0 3 3 
 
0 0 0  
6 CCC+ Substantial risks 0 4 4 SG 0 2 2 SG 
7 B- 
Highly speculative 
1 3 4 135 4 13 17 256 
8 B 6 5 11 
 
4 35 39  
9 B+ 6 12 18 
 
4 51 55  
10 BB- 
Non-investment 
grade speculative 
6 17 23 
 
6 32 38  
11 BB 0 19 19 
 
2 24 26  
12 BB+ 4 14 18 
 
3 12 15  
13 BBB- 
Lower medium grade 
5 17 22 
 
2 54 56  
14 BBB 6 20 26 
 
13 58 71  
15 BBB+ 5 27 32 
 
7 34 41  
16 A- 
Upper medium grade 
7 24 31 IG 6 50 56 IG 
17 A 2 17 19 146 3 37 40 272 
18 A+ 0 5 5 
 
2 3 5  
19 AA- 
High grade 
1 9 10 
 
0 3 3  
20 AA 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0  
21 AA+ 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0  
22 AAA Prime 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0  
      60 221 281 
 
56 472 528  
 
In Table 4.2, the level of credit ratings as of 31st March (Actual CR) is a numeric 
transformation of Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) long-term issuer level ratings by 
assigning a value of one for the lowest S&P’s credit ratings (D) and a value of 
twenty-two to the highest credit rating (AAA). Thus, a higher number indicates a 
better rating. It follows that a decrease in the rating variable is associated with 
an increase in firms’ credit risk. In Table 4.2 we further present the number of 
observations separately for speculative-grades and investment-grades firms in 
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both the tsunami and flooding samples to facilitate comparative analysis of the 
distribution between bad and good performance firms. 
3.2 Research models and variables measurement 
Jiang (2008) indicates that most empirical research on the determinants of 
credit ratings suffers from potential correlated omitted variable concerns 
because the researchers do not know the exact metric that credit rating 
agencies use and what weight they put on these metrics in producing ratings. In 
addition, credit ratings are potentially sticky because credit ratings are changed 
only when credit rating agencies are confident that observed changes in the 
firm’s risk profile are permanent (Demirtas and Cornaggia, 2013). This may 
cause concerns about the effect of any correlated omitted variables and the 
error terms in a rating-level regression over time. To solve these problems, 
Jiang (2008) suggests that credit ratings change is the dependent variable, to 
control for mitigating effects of correlated omitted variables and autocorrelation 
in the error terms. However, changes in credit ratings are not common and they 
may also be influenced by credit rating agencies bias such as conservatism 
(Jorion et al., 2009). To address these concerns, we use deviations from 
expected credit rating (diff) as the dependent variable.  
We calculate deviations from expected credit rating (diff), as a firm's actual 
rating as of 31st March minus its expected credit rating, which we estimate 
based on the work of Alissa et al. (2013). To test the first hypothesis on whether 
the association between earnings management and deviations from expected 
credit rating is moderated by the occurrence of a natural disasters, we run the 
following regression with year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered 
at industry level as follows: 
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diffi, t+1    = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2em + b3treatedT/treatedF*em                 
+ b4control variables + e)                   (1)  
In equation (1) the dependent variable (diff) is the difference in credit rating 
(actual minus expected credit rating) which takes positive values for above-
expected-rating firms22 and negative values for below-expected-rating firms23. 
Appendix 4.1 provides the definition for the variables used throughout this 
study. Subscripts form firm (i) and year (t) are omitted from all models for 
simplicity. 
This study uses a differences-in-differences approach to assess differences 
between the treatment (i.e. treatedT – i.e. tsunami sample, and treatedF – i.e. 
flooding sample) and the control groups before and after the disasters. We 
include dummy variables, which are treatedT and treatedF in our model. 
TreatedT equals to one if the firm is located in the countries which were hit by 
the tsunami (Indonesia and Thailand) during 2005-2006, while, treatedF equals 
to one for firms in countries which were hit by the flooding (only Thailand) in 
2012-2013 and 0 otherwise.  
For our first hypothesis, we want to test whether the association between 
earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating is moderated 
by the occurrence of a natural disaster. The coefficient of treatedT/ treatedF*em 
in equation (1), b3, is our coefficient of interest as it captures the difference in 
the association of earnings management with the deviations from expected 
credit rating levels (diff) between firms that were hit by disasters (treatedT is 
Indonesia and Thailand in 2005-2006, and treatedF is Thailand in 2012-2013) 
                                                          
22
 Actual credit rating is above their expected credit ratings. 
23
 Actual credit rating is below their expected credit ratings. 
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and the control firms. If the coefficient is statistically significantly different to 
zero, it would indicate that treated firms, engaging in earnings management 
after the disasters occurred, have indeed influenced their credit rating more 
than control firms. In this case, we can infer that the association between 
earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating is moderated 
by the occurrence of a natural disaster. 
More importantly, we examine whether credit rating agencies will penalize firms 
engaging in earnings management during disasters. If the coefficient b3 is 
significantly negative, it would indicate that managers of treated firms with 
strong earnings management during the disaster are negatively associated with 
deviations from expected credit rating. Such a result would be evidence that 
credit rating agencies’ reputation incentives prevail, and they penalize firms for 
manipulating earnings in periods of natural disasters by lowering their credit 
rating. On the other hand, if the coefficient b3 is significantly positive or is a zero, 
it would suggest that managers of treated firms can improve or maintain their 
credit rating by engaging in earnings management during the disaster. In other 
words, earnings management affects positively deviations from expected credit 
rating in periods of natural disaster. In this case, at least one of three things 
would be true. First, credit rating agencies may be able to see through earnings 
management during natural disaster, but, they do not penalize firms with 
earnings management because of their financial incentives. Second, credit 
rating agencies are unable to detect issuers’ earnings management activities 
during natural disaster, thus, actual credit rating is higher than expected credit 
rating. Finally, credit rating agencies view discretionary accruals as being 
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informative about further performance at assisting managers’ communication 
with outsiders. 
For our second hypothesis, we want to test whether the effect of earnings 
management on the deviations from expected credit rating is conditional on the 
severity of the disaster. To do this, we run regression (1) separately for the 
tsunami and flooding samples. In particular, we expect the coefficient of 
interest, b3, to be statistically different between the tsunami and the flooding 
group. If firms in the flooding group have a higher (lower) in magnitude 
coefficient, we can infer that the more important the level of intensity of the 
disaster, the more (less) the credit rating agencies will adjust their credit ratings 
for earnings management. 
For our third hypothesis, we want to test whether the effect on the relationship 
between earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating 
during the natural disaster in SG firms will be different from that of IG firms. To 
do this, we run regression with robust standard errors clustered at industry level 
and year fixed affects as in equation (1) by separating speculative and 
investment grade groups. According to the rating level on the S&P scale, BBB- 
rating level is the lowest rated investment grade rating, whereas, BB+ rating 
level is the highest rated speculative grade rating. 
Again, coefficient b3 is our coefficient of interest when investigating whether the 
relation between earnings management and deviations from expected credit 
rating for bad and good performance firms is moderated by the occurrence of a 
natural disaster. If the coefficient b3 is significantly positive (negative) and of 
similar magnitude for SG and IG firms, it would suggest that credit rating 
agencies treat both types of firms the same way. If, on the other hand, the 
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relationship between earnings management and deviations from expected 
credit rating during the natural disaster in bad performance firms is different 
from that of good performance firms, it would be evidence that credit rating 
agencies differentiate between the two. 
 3.2.1 Earnings management variables 
To measure earnings management, we use two variants: (1) continuous 
earnings management variables, using the residual from the modified Dechow 
and Dichev model (Modified DD), the performance-matched Jones model 
(Performance Match), cash flow from operations model (CFO) and discretionary 
expenses model (Disc) following McNichols (2002), Kothari et al. (2005), 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), respectively; (2) earnings 
management dummies (em dummy), taking the value of one if Modified DD, 
Performance Match, CFO, and Disc variables are higher than or equal to the 
industry average for a given year, and zero otherwise. This alternative measure 
allows us to control for changes in economic conditions that influence earnings 
management across different industry groups.  
3.2.2 Credit rating variables 
To test whether earnings management during disasters affects the deviations 
from expected credit rating, we use the level of credit ratings as of 31st March 
(Actual CR) following each fiscal year end and we perform a numeric 
transformation of Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer level ratings as shown in 
Table 4.2.  
We estimate a firm’s “expected” credit rating in a given year using observations 
before the disasters occurred and a model from the target capital structure 
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literature. Following Alissa et al. (2013) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) we run 
equation (2) below: 
Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + 
b6profit + b7size + b8oprisk + e)   (2) 
For the estimation of the “expected” credit rating of years after the disasters we 
use the coefficients estimated from equation (2) applied to the pre-disaster 
periods. More specifically, we use the period from 2001 to 2003, which is the 
period before the tsunami occurred, to estimate expected credit rating for firms 
in the tsunami sample. Then the period from 2008 to 2010 is used to estimate 
expected credit rating for firms in the flooding sample (tsunami and flooding 
occurred in 2004 and 2011, respectively). The final samples used to estimate 
expected credit rating for firms in the tsunami and firms in the flooding periods is 
152 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2003 and 304 firm-year 
observations over the period 2008-2010, respectively.  
The dependent variable in equation (2) is the actual credit rating as of 31st 
March after the fiscal year end and it is an ordinal variable taking on values from 
1 to 20 representing the firm’s S&P long-term credit rating (e.g. D=1, and 
AA=20 as shown in appendix 4.2). However, as shown in Table 4.2, our sample 
has some scores missing (i.e. C, CCC-, AA+, and AAA in tsunami sample, and, 
C, CCC-, CCC, AA, AA+, and AAA in flooding sample). For that reason, we also 
run sensitivity analysis by grouping all junk range as having the same rating 
(e.g. D to CCC- equal to one in tsunami sample and D to CCC equal to one in 
flooding sample). We present the range of credit ratings which we use for the 
preliminary analysis and sensitivity analysis in appendix 4.2. 
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We estimate the coefficient of expected credit rating by comparing four different 
models, ordered probit, ordered logit, normal regression, and poisson model, to 
select the one with the best fit. Based on our analysis, we conclude that the 
ordered probit model is the best model in estimating expected credit rating 
because the coefficients of firms’ expected rating in ordered probit model are 
the most statistically significant and consistent with previous research (i.e. 
Alissa et al., 2013; and Hovakimian et al., 2009).  
 
Table 4.3: Coefficients of expected credit rating 
Dependent variable 
 Ordered probit   Ordered probit   
   
 
Tusnami 
2004 
  Flooding 
2011   Alissa et al., 
2013     
mb  0.107*** 
 
0.047*  0.027*  
 
 (5.16) 
 
(0.029)  (0.016)  
tang  0.849*** 
 
-0.002  0.025*  
 
 (7.43) 
 
(0.023)  (0.015)  
rd  0.009 
 
-33.972  8.232  
 
 -1.14 
 
(23.247)  (11.358)  
rdind  0.251*** 
 
1.499**  -0.235  
 
 (5.03) 
 
(0.593)  (0.176)  
sga  0.291*** 
 
-2.818  0.753  
 
 (2.92) 
 
(1.726)  (0.777)  
profit  3.084*** 
 
-0.000  0.004*  
 
 (17.72) 
 
(0.006)  (0.002)  
size  0.411*** 
 
-0.160  0.007  
 
 (24.65) 
 
(0.101)  (0.046)  
oprisk  -3.237** 
 
-0.000  -0.006**  
 
 (-11.36) 
 
(0.002)  (0.003)  
Industry  Y 
 
Y   Y 
 Country  N   Y   Y   
Pseudo R
2
  0.117 
 
0.321  0.160 
 n. of observ.  23,909    152   304   
 
This table presents estimated coefficients for equation (2) using an ordered probit model. We 
estimate a firm’s “expected” credit rating for a given firm in a given year before the disasters by 
using a model from the target capital structure literature, following Alissa et al. (2013) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2009) as shown in equation (2) 
     Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e) (2) 
We use the first period (2001-2003) and the second period (2008-2010), which are the period 
before tsunami and flooding occurred, to estimate expected credit rating for firms in the tsunami 
and flooding samples, respectively. Column (2) for the results of Alissa et al. (2013) presents t-
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statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates, while, columns (3-4) for the results of firms 
in the tsunami and flooding sample report standard error in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. The final sample to estimate expected credit ratings is 152 and 304 firm-year 
observations over the period 2001-2003 and 2008-2010. To avoid the influence of outliers all 
continuous financial data are winsorized at 1% and 99% by separating firms in the tsunami and 
flooding sample. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 4.1. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. Industry and 
country fixed effects are included. 
 
In Table 4.3, we present the results from estimating equation (2). Note that 
Column (2) for the results of Alissa et al. (2013) presents t-statistics in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates, while, columns (3-4) for the results of 
firms in the tsunami and flooding sample report standard error in parentheses 
below coefficient estimates. 
Alissa et al. (2013) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) identify five firm 
characteristics, growth opportunities, asset specialization, profitability, size, and 
operating risk as determinants of firms’ expected credit rating. As per equation 
(2), we include market-to-book ratio (mb), the ratio of a firm’s research and 
development expenses to sales (rd), R&D indicator (rdind), and the ratio of a 
firm’s selling, general, and administrative expenses to sales (sga) as controls 
for growth opportunities. The results in Table 4.3 are consistent with Alissa et al. 
(2013) that firms in the tsunami and flooding samples with higher market-to-
book ratios, and firms in the tsunami sample with research and development 
expenses are likely to have less risk which, in turn, translates to higher 
expected credit ratings. We also control for asset specialization by using 
tangible assets (tang). Firms with more tangible assets are likely to have more 
specialized assets and product. Alissa et al. (2013) and Hovakimian et al. 
(2009) assume that firms with this characteristic should be willing to bear more 
bankruptcy risk. Hence, they should have higher expected credit ratings. This is 
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consistent with our results that firms in the flooding sample with more tangible 
assets have higher expected credit rating as shown in Table 4.3. 
Controlling for a firm’s profitability is also important because firms that generate 
more income, should have higher expected credit rating because of their lower 
default risk (Alissa et al., 2013). Thus, we include profitability (profit) in equation 
(2), to estimate a firm’s expected credit rating and the result is consistent with 
prior studies, for firms in the flooding sample. Next, we control for firm risk by 
using size (size) measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets in 
the model. Alissa et al. (2013) document that larger firms have higher expected 
credit ratings because they are better able to survive market volatility and have 
greater transparency and lower bankruptcy risk. However, the coefficient of size 
for firms in the tsunami and flooding samples in Table 4.3 is non-significant. 
Finally, following Alssia et al. (2013) we control for operating risk by using a 
firm’s operating income scaled by lagged total assets (oprisk). Our result for 
firms in the flooding sample is consistent with Alissa et al. (2013) that riskier 
firms face a greater likelihood of failure. Thus, such firms should have lower 
expected credit rating24. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 In addition, we run sensitivity analysis where the dependent variable, the actual credit rating 
as of 31
st
 March, takes on values from 1 to 17 for the tsunami sample and 1 to 15 for the to 
correct for some scores missing as mentioned above. We present the level of credit ratings 
which we use for those sensitivity analyses in appendix 4.2 (columns 4-5). The sensitivity 
results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively similar to those reported in the main result in Table 
4.3. 
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Table 4.4: Distribution of actual rating deviations from expected credit ratings 
Panel A: Tsunami (Data in 2001-2003) 
Actual CR Expected CR 
 
Total 
Ordinal variable Score D CCC+ BB- BB BBB BBB+ A- AA-  
Non-Investment-grade ratings 
1 D 13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 
3 CC 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
5 CCC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
6 CCC+ 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 
7 B- 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
8 B 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
9 B+ 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 6 
10 BB- 0 0 9 3 0 0 0 0 12 
11 BB 0 0 2 6 0 4 0 0 12 
12 BB+ 0 0 1 2 0 6 0 0 9 
Investment-grade ratings 
13 BBB- 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 8 
14 BBB 0 0 1 3 1 11 0 0 16 
15 BBB+ 0 0 2 0 0 21 0 1 24 
16 A- 0 0 0 2 0 4 7 1 14 
17 A 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 
18 A+ 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 
19 AA- 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 10 
20 AA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total  19 4 26 19 4 60 10 10 152 
Panel B: Flooding (Data in 2008-2010) 
Actual CR Expected CR 
 
Total 
Ordinal variable Score D B B+ BBB- BBB A AA-  
Non-Investment-grade ratings 
1 D 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
3 CC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
7 B- 1 3 2 2 3 0 0 11 
8 B 2 7 9 2 4 0 0 24 
9 B+ 0 5 21 6 3 1 0 36 
10 BB- 0 0 11 3 5 1 0 20 
11 BB 0 0 6 6 5 0 0 17 
12 BB+ 0 0 2 4 3 0 0 9 
Investment-grade ratings 
13 BBB- 0 1 10 12 17 3 0 43 
14 BBB 0 0 5 10 29 4 0 48 
15 BBB+ 0 0 1 1 14     3 0 19 
16 A- 0 0 1 4 17 9 0 31 
17 A 0 0 0 0 14 21 0 35 
18 A+ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
19 AA- 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 
20 AA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  4 17 69 51 117 43 3 304 
 
This table presents the distribution of actual credit ratings as of 31
st
 March by expected credit 
ratings based on annual estimations of the expected rating ordered probit model for firms in the 
tsunami sample (Panel A) and firms in the flooding sample (Panel B). In this table, actual credit 
rating is an ordinal variable taking on values from 1 to 20 representing the firm’s S&P long-term 
credit rating (e.g. D=1, and AA=20). 
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We estimate a firm’s “expected” credit rating for a given firm in a given year before the disasters 
occurred by using a model from the target capital structure literature, following Alissa et al. 
(2013) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) as shown in equation (2) 
      Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e) (2) 
Actual credit ratings are showed by row and expected credit ratings are showed by column. The 
bold numbers are row and column, which combinations for the same rating level indicate at-
expected-rating firms. For example, in Panel A for firms in the tsunami sample, the 9 firm-years 
with both a BB- actual rating as of 31
st
 March and BB- expected rating are considered at-
expected. 
Table 4.4 presents the distribution of actual credit ratings as of 31st March by 
expected credit ratings based on annual estimations of the expected rating 
ordered probit model in equation (2) for firms in the tsunami sample (Panel A) 
and firms in the flooding sample (Panel B). In this table, actual and expected 
credit ratings are ordinal variables taking on values from 1 to 20 representing 
the firm’s S&P long-term credit rating (e.g. D=1, and AA=20). Actual credit 
ratings are presented in rows and expected credit ratings are presented in 
columns. The numbers in bold represent instances where the actual and 
expected credit ratings are the same.  Based on the results reported in Table 
4.4, overall the expected rating is a good proxy for actual credit rating. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Following prior research (e.g. Alissa et al., 2013; Demirtas and Cornaggia, 
2013; Kim et al., 2013; Jiang, 2008; and Jung et al., 2013), we include eight 
control variables that could affect both the actual and expected credit ratings. 
This controls include growth opportunities, asset specialization, profitability, 
size, operating risk, and performance. Three control variables (mb, profit, and 
size) also appear in equation (2), to estimate a firm’s expected credit rating as 
discussed above. Moreover, we computed sales growth (growth) as the 
percentage of the year growth in sales to control for growth opportunities. Firms 
with higher future growth options should expect a higher credit rating (Alissa et 
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al., 2013). Moreover, we include a firm’s return on assets (roa) to control for 
firm’s performance. Jiang (2008) indicates that firms with better performance 
have a lower cost of debt and are considered to have higher credit ratings. 
Jiang (2008) also documents that firms with higher leverage ratios have a 
higher cost of debt, and are considered to have lower credit ratings because of 
high probability of bankruptcy. Thus, we include the leverage ratios (lev) as a 
control variable too. Next, we control for a firm’s expected ability to repay 
interest and principal. This is important because a greater value of a firm’s 
interest coverage ratio implies that the firm is able to meet future debt 
obligations, suggesting higher credit ratings (Carter, 2015). Thus, we include, as 
a control variable, the interest coverage ratio (intcov) which is measured as 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expense. Finally, 
we include dummy variables for the firms close to broad credit rating categories 
cut-off points (plusminus) to control for differences in incentives for earnings 
management activity across the firms. Kisgen (2006) indicates that firms near a 
broad rating boundary (plus and minus) are more likely to decrease their 
financial leverage than firms in the middle of ratings in order to achieve rating 
upgrades or avoid rating downgrades. All of these variables are based on 
information obtained from Bloomberg. All continuous non-log transformed 
variables are winsorized at 1%.  
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
We begin with descriptive statistics of the various credit ratings and earnings 
management metrics for the two disaster periods (tsunami and flooding). Table 
4.5 presents sample descriptive statistics for credit ratings in pre- and post- 
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disasters occurred (Panel A), independent variables that influence firm’s 
expected credit ratings (Panel B), accruals earnings management (Panel C), 
real earnings management (Panel D), and other variables (Panel E). Note that 
the CFO and Disc variables in Panel D are multiplied by minus one to allow real 
and accruals earnings management proxies to have the same interpretation. 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for credit ratings in pre- and post- disasters occurred 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Pre-disaster periods       
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2004)       
Actual CR 195 11.687   5.085 13.000 0.000 20.000 10.000 15.000 
Expected CR 195 11.786 5.042 15.000 1.000 19.000 10.000 15.000 
diff  195 -0.005   2.353 0.000 -8.000 9.000 -1.000 1.000 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2011)     
Actual CR 374 11.066   5.102 13.000 0.000 19.000 9.000 15.000 
Expected CR 374 11.650  4.076 13.000 1.000 19.000 9.000 14.000 
diff  374 -0.413   3.330 0.000 -9.000 9.000 -1.000 1.000 
Post-disaster periods       
Tsunami (Data in 2005-2006)      
Actual CR 86 12.779   3.513 13.000 1.000 19.000 10.000 16.000 
Expected CR 86 12.605 3.692 14.000 1.000 19.000 10.000 15.000 
diff  86 0.174   2.943 0.000 -9.000 8.000 -2.000 2.000 
Flooding (Data in 2012-2013)    
Actual CR 154 12.318   3.281 13.000 1.000 18.000 9.000 15.000 
Expected CR 154 12.188  2.890 13.500 1.000 17.000 9.000 14.000 
diff  154 0.130   2.943 1.000 -8.000 8.000 -1.000 2.000 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics for independent variables that influence firm’s 
expected credit ratings 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2003)       
mb 152 1.061 2.260 0.598 0.000 25.105 0.000 1.348 
tang 152 1.051 3.507 0.015 0.000 24.396 0.002 0.123 
rd 152 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 
rdind 152 0.421 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
sga 152 0.009 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.000 
profit 152 5.448 22.903 0.021 -0.692 160.411 0 .000 0.674 
size 152 5.268 2.608 5.206 0.464 9.834 3.177 7.577 
operrisk 152 13.406 35.443 2.848 0.000 211.712 0.000 10.746 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2010)      
mb 304 2.724  4.510    1.383    0.000   31.120      0.858     2.577 
tang 304 2.054 5.801  0.019   0.000  26.918  0.002   0.222 
rd 304 0.005  0.013 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 
rdind 304 0.632 0.483 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
sga 304 0.023   0.088      0.000 0.000 0.614 0.000 0 .000 
profit 304 7.523 21.294  0.252 -5.043  164.041          0.008 4.006 
size 304 6.216 2.631 6.563 1.228   9.841  3.925  8.867 
operrisk 304 18.023  32.869 4.180        0.000 188.833 0.153   16.743 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for accruals earnings management 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006)       
Accruals earnings management       
AEM_Modified DD 281 -0.013 0.198 -0.003 -0.575 0.455 -0.083 0.072 
AEM_Performance 
Match 281 -0.008 0.194 -0.009 -0.927 0.805 -0.086 0.077 
Accruals earnings management dummies      
AEM_Modified DD 
dummy 281 0.466 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
AEM_Performance 
Match dummy 281 0.498 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
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Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)       
Accruals earnings 
management        
AEM_Modified DD 528 0.019 0.181 0.021 -0.550 0.535 -0.037 0.075 
AEM_Performance 
Match 528 -0.003 0.294 -0.007 -0.927 0.805 -0.097 0.088 
Accruals earnings management 
dummies       
AEM_Modified DD 
dummy 528 0.491 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
AEM_Performance 
Match dummy 528 0.504 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for real earnings management 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006)       
Real earnings management       
REM_CFO 281 -0.018 0.206 -0.019 -0.642 0.607 -0.087 0.045 
REM_Disc 281 -0.057 0.165 -0.022 -0.357 0.748 -0.091 0.014 
Real earnings management dummies      
REM_CFO dummy 281 0.544 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
REM _Disc dummy 281 0.630 0.484 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)       
Real earnings management        
REM_CFO 528 -0.031 0.254 -0.013 -0.642 0.607 -0.119 0.057 
REM_Disc 528 -0.090 0.224 -0.038 -0.385 0.748 -0.143 0.173 
Real earnings management dummies      
REM _CFO dummy 528 0.509 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
REM _Disc dummy 528 0.587 0.493 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
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Panel E: Descriptive statistics for other variables 
Description Samples mean SD median min max P25 P75 
Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006)       
mb 281 1.242   1.923      0.859    0.000    25.105          0.174 1.667 
profit 281 7.730   26.384   0.069 -1.441   164.041 0.000 2.344 
size 281 5.743   2.683  5.791  0.464   9.834   3.661  7.877 
growth (%) 281 0.117   0.215  0.071 -0.357   1.070 0.002 0.196 
roa 281 0.015   0.128    0.017   -0.472   0.631 -0.034   0.056 
lev (%) 281 14.956   18.537    6.993          0.000   85.299     0.018    27.510 
intcov 281 4.754 5.947 3.244 0.000 15.651 0.390 10.961 
plusminus 281 0.612 0.488 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Flooding (Data in 2008-2013)      
mb 528 2.870 4.773 1.437 0.000 31.120 0.844 2.890 
profit 528 7.977 22.782 0.324 -5.043 164.041 0.007 3.614 
size 528 6.382 2.524 6.682 1.228 9.841 4.125 8.753 
growth (%) 528 0.100 0.316 0.055 -0.753 1.551 -0.014 0.168 
roa 528 0.047 0.138 0.030 -0.495 0.620 0.003 0.085 
lev (%) 528 12.148 18.678 2.907 0.000 98.806 0.000 17.970 
intcov 528 6.962 7.982 3.704 0.000 22.374 0.740 13.098 
plusminus 528 0.540 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analyses. Panel A presents 
sample descriptive statistics for credit ratings in pre- and post- disaster periods and Panel B 
presents independent variables that influence firms’ expected credit ratings. We estimate a firm’s 
“expected” credit rating for a given firm in a given year before the disasters occurred (2001-2003 
for firms in tsunami and 2008-2010 for firms in flooding) by using a model from the target capital 
structure literature, following Alissa et al. (2013) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) as shown in 
equation (2) 
      Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e) (2) 
The coefficients obtained from regression (2) above use to estimate expected credit ratings for 
both pre- and post- disaster years.  
Panels C and D show sample descriptive statistics for AEM and REM respectively. EM is 
measured as the residuals from EM models and a dummies (Modified DD, Performance Match, 
CFO, Disc, Modified DD dummy, Performance Match dummy, CFO dummy, and Disc dummy 
variables). Panel E presents sample descriptive statistics for control variables, which we use to 
assess the consequences of earnings management during natural disasters on deviations from 
expected credit rating as shown in equation (1) 
diffi,t+1    = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2em + b3treatedT/treatedF*em + b4control variables + e)   (1)       
To avoid the influence of outliers all continuous financial data are winsorized at 1% and 99% by 
separating firms in the tsunami and flooding samples. All variables are otherwise calculated as 
described in appendix 4.1. 
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As discussed above, annual corporate financial statements including the effects 
of the tsunami and flooding are issued to the public by the end of March in 2005 
and 2012, respectively, because we consider only firms with fiscal year ending 
in December in our analysis and both tsunami and flooding occurred during the 
last quarter in 2004 and 2011, respectively. Therefore, we focus on credit 
ratings as of 31st March, instead of credit ratings as of 31st December. To be 
consistent with the setting of credit ratings term, we set two periods which are 
the periods before and after disaster in Panel A of Table 4.5 as follows: (1) the 
periods before the tsunami and flooding occurred are 2001-2004 and 2008-
2011, respectively; and (2) the periods after the tsunami and flooding occurred 
are 2005-2006 and 2012-2013, respectively. However, to estimate the 
coefficients applied in the calculation of expected credit rating for both the pre- 
and post- disaster periods, we use two samples periods before the disasters 
occurred (2001-2003 and 2008-2010), corresponding to the two natural 
disasters investigated, the tsunami and flooding which occurred in 2004 and 
2011, respectively. The size of the final samples we use to estimate expected 
credit ratings is 152 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2003 and 304 
firm-year observations over the period 2008-2010. 
In Panel A, the mean expected CR for firms in the pre-disaster sub-samples is 
only slightly higher than the mean actual CR, while, the mean expected CR for 
firms in the post-disaster sub-samples is only slightly lower than the mean 
actual CR. Specifically, the mean expected CR for firms in the pre- (post) 
tsunami and firms in the pre- (post) flooding samples are 11.786 (12.605) and 
11.605 (12.188), respectively, while, the mean actual CR for firms in the pre- 
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(post) tsunami and firms in the pre- (post) flooding samples are 11.687 (12.779) 
and 11.066 (12.318), respectively.  
Because our study was conducted on the behaviour of firms whose credit 
ratings diverge from their expected credit rating, it is useful to understand the 
distribution of rating deviations (diff) in our sample. The interquartile range 
extends from -1.000 to 1.000 for firms in the pre-disasters sample, which 
indicates that 50% of the sample possesses a credit rating between one notch 
below and one notch above its expected value for both firms in the pre-tsunami 
sample and firms in the pre-flooding sample. In contrast, we find that the 
interquartile range extends from -2.000 to 2.000 (-1.000 to 2.000) for both firms 
in the post-tsunami and firms in the post-flooding samples. Interestingly, mean 
rating deviations (diff) for firms in the pre-tsunami and firms in the pre-flooding 
samples are negative, which are -0.005 and -0.413, respectively, while, mean 
rating deviations (diff) for firms in the post-tsunami and firms in the post-flooding 
samples are positive, which are 0.174 and 0.130, respectively.  
As shown in Panel B, the tsunami sample firms have an average market value 
to total book assets of 1.06, net property, plant, and equipment, to total assets 
of 1.05, research and development (R&D) expenses to sales of 0.00, R&D 
indicator of 0.42, selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses to sales 
of 0.01, operating income to lagged total assets of 5.45, a size of 5.27, and 
standard deviations of operating income to lagged total assets of 13.41 (2.72, 
2.05, 0.01, 0.63, 0.02, 7.52, 6.22, and 18.02 respectively for flooding sample 
firms).  
Next, we provide descriptive statistics for the two main time periods (2001-2006 
and 2008-2013), which are the periods we use to test the consequences of 
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earnings management on deviations from expected credit rating around the 
tsunami and flooding disasters. The final sample is 281 firm-year observations 
over the period 2001-2006 and 528 firm-year observations over the period 
2008-2013. 
In Panel C, mean Modified DD and Performance Match variables for both firms 
in the tsunami and firms in the flooding samples are negative (between -0.003 
to -0.013), except from the mean Modified DD variable for firms in the flooding 
sample which is approximately 0.019. This means that, at the descriptive level, 
firms appear to manipulate earnings both upward and downward by using 
discretionary accruals.  
In Panel D, the mean real earnings management in all models (CFO and Disc 
variables) for firms in the tsunami and firms in the flooding samples are negative 
(between -0.018 to -0.090). This suggests that on average firms engaging in 
downward earnings management by changing their real decision or expenses 
(e.g. cutting price discounts, reducing credit terms, increasing R&D expenses, 
increasing advertising expenditure, and decreasing product volume).  
Furthermore, when we compare the magnitude of (1) mean accruals and real 
earnings management, and (2) mean accruals and real earnings management 
dummies, we find at the descriptive level that firms in the tsunami and firms in 
the flooding samples are more likely to manage earnings via REM than AEM. 
For example, in the tsunami sample, the magnitude of mean CFO variable is 
higher than the magnitude of mean Modified DD variable (0.018 - 0.013 = 
0.005), whereas, mean CFO dummy variable is higher than mean Modified DD 
dummy variable (0.544 - 0.466 = 0.078). Similarly, the magnitude of mean CFO 
and Disc dummy for firms in the flooding sample are 0.031 and 0.587, 
respectively, while, the magnitude of mean Modified DD and Performance 
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Match dummy for firms in the flooding sample are 0.019 and 0.504, 
respectively. From the analysis of EM and EM dummy at the descriptive level 
above, we can infer that firms are less likely to manage earnings via AEM 
compared to REM because REM are harder for auditors or investors to detect.  
In Panel E, tsunami sample firms have firm’s market value to total book assets 
of 1.24, operating income to lagged total assets of 7.73, a size of 5.74, a 
11.70% annual growth in sales, a ROA of 0.02, a 14.96% of long-term liabilities 
to total assets, interest coverage ratio of 4.75, and plus minus of 0.61 (2.87, 
7.98, 6.38, 10.00%, 0.05, 12.15%, 6.96, and 0.54, respectively for flooding 
sample firms).  
Before turning to the formal empirical analysis, we examine the time-trends 
behaviour of actual CR and expected CR as illustrated by the graphs below. 
Figure 4.2 presents the graphs for yearly mean actual CR as at 31st March and 
mean expected CR for the event years, one year before and two years after the 
disasters occurred for each group (treatment and control groups). Panel A 
provides time-series plots of mean actual CR for firm-years in treatment and 
control groups; whereas, Panel B shows time-series plots of mean expected CR 
for firm-years in treatment group and control group.  
The graphs illustrate that mean actual CR in Panel A and mean expected CR in 
Panel B for the treatment group (green dot) appear to decrease immediately in 
the fiscal year during which disasters occurred (y0) (tsunami and flooding occur 
in 2004 and 2011, respectively). In the control group (red line), the trend of 
actual CR in Panel A and expected CR in Panel B during post-tsunami is higher 
than pre-tsunami, while, the trend of expected CR in control group (red line) 
during post-flooding occurred is a little bit lower than during the pre-flooding 
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period. Overall, graphs imply that natural disasters affected expected CR 
downgrades for treated firms in the tsunami and firms in the flooding samples. 
Figure 4.2: Time-series plots of actual credit rating and expected credit 
rating 
Panel A: Comparing trends of actual credit rating between treatment and control 
groups 
Tsunami in 2004 
 
Flooding in 2011 
 
 
 
Panel B: Comparing trends of expected credit rating between treatment and control 
groups 
Tsunami in 2004 
 
Flooding in 2011 
 
 
Figure 4.2 provides time-series plots of actual and expected CR for the event years, one year 
before and two years after the disaster occurred for each group (treatment and control groups). 
Year0 (i.e. the fiscal year during which each disaster occurred) is respectively 2004 for the 
tsunami and 2011 for the flooding. Panel A compares trends of actual CR between treatment 
and control groups. Panel B compares trends of expected CR between treatment and control 
groups. 
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To support the visual results reported above, we compare the differences 
between treatment group and control group before and after two disasters 
(tsunami and flooding) by actual credit ratings (Panel A), expected credit ratings 
(Panel B), and the deviations from expected credit rating (Panel C) as shown in 
Table 4.6. Again, we set two periods to be consistent with the setting of credit 
rating term which are the periods before and after disaster in Table 4.6 as 
follows: (1) the periods before the tsunami and flooding occurred are 2001-2004 
and 2008-2011, respectively; and (2) the periods after the tsunami and flooding 
occurred are 2005-2006 and 2012-2013, respectively. 
 
Table 4.6: Comparing differences between the two groups (treatment and 
control) before and after the disasters 
Panel A: Comparing differences of actual credit rating 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
Group Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference  Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference 
Actual credit rating       
   Treated 10.330  10.133  -0.197    12.660 12.678     0.018 
   Control  14.044  13.967    0.078    10.352    10.380    0.029 
Difference -3.714*** -3.833***  -0.275***    2.309***  2.298***  -0.011** 
Panel B: Comparing differences of expected credit rating 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
Group Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference  Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference 
Expected credit rating      
  Treated    10.330    9.867  -0.464     12.890    12.286   -0.604* 
  Control    14.149  14.300    0.151       11.104     10.788      0.316 
Difference -3.819*** -4.433*** -0.615***    1.786*** 1.498***    -0.920*** 
Panel C: Comparing differences of the deviations from expected credit rating 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
Group Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference  Before 
disaster 
After 
disaster 
Difference 
Deviations from expected credit rating     
   Treated   0.081    0.267   0.186      -0.009    0.393     0.402 
   Control  -0.104   -0.333  -0.229       -0.707      -0.407     0.300 
Difference   0.185   -0.600   0.043        0.698*      0.800       0.102** 
 
Table 4.6 presents differences between the two groups (treatment and control) before and after 
the two disasters (tsunami and flooding) based on actual CR (Panel A), expected CR (Panel B), 
and diff (Panel C). The actual CR is an ordinal variable taking on values from 1 to 20 
representing the firm’s S&P long-term credit rating. We estimate a firm’s “expected” credit rating 
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for a given firm in a given year before the disasters occurred by using a model following Alissa 
et al. (2013) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) as shown in equation (2) 
      Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e) (2) 
Deviations from expected credit ratings (diff) is a firm's actual CR as at 31
st
 March minus its 
expected CR as estimated based on equation (2). The “Difference” in the last column is the 
mean of actual CR, expected CR, and diff after disasters minus the corresponding mean before 
the disasters; whereas, “Difference” in the last row is the mean of actual CR, expected CR, and 
diff in treated group minus that of the control group. The main coefficient of interest is reported 
in bold. Differences in means are tested using t-tests. The differences shown in red colour are 
statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. All variables are otherwise calculated as 
described in appendix 4.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
 
There are three points to discuss. We start by looking at the difference (column-
wise) between the mean actual CR (Panel A), mean expected CR (Panel B), 
and mean diff (Panel C) before and after disasters. We cannot find statistical 
differences between the mean actual CR and the mean diff for the treatment 
and control groups between before and after disasters as shown in Panel A and 
Panel C. However, we find that mean expected CR for the treatment group 
decreases from 12.890 in the pre-flooding to 12.286 in the post- flooding and 
the decrease (-0.604) is significant at the 10% level (t = -1.66), while we cannot 
find statistically significant differences in the mean expected CR for the control 
group before and after the disasters. 
Next, we consider the difference (row-wise) between the mean actual CR 
(Panel A), mean expected CR (Panel B), and mean diff (Panel C) in the 
treatment group minus the control group. We find that before and after the 
disasters, the magnitude of mean actual CR and magnitude of mean expected 
CR for the treatment group are significantly different from the control group at 
1% level as shown in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.6. Interestingly, we find 
that during pre- and post-tsunami, the magnitude of mean actual CR and 
expected CR in the treatment group are lower than the control group. In 
contrast, during pre- and post-flooding, the magnitude of mean actual CR and 
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expected CR in the treatment group are higher than the control group. In Panel 
C, there is no evidence that during pre- and post-disasters, the mean diff in the 
treatment group is significantly different from the control group, except during 
pre-flooding, the mean diff in the treatment group is significantly different from 
the control group which is 0.698 at 10% level (t = 1.90).  
The main coefficient of interest is the diff-in-diff between the two groups 
(treatment and control) and two periods (pre- and post-disasters), which is 
reported in bold. As presented in Table 4.6 in Panel A, after both disasters the 
post- minus pre- mean of the actual CR is significantly lower for the treatment 
group compared to the control group. The same is true for expected CR in 
Panel B. However, the magnitude of the diff-in-diff for the expected CR is 
significantly higher compared to the actual CR, providing some very preliminary 
evidence consistent with treated firms managing to manipulate their actual CR. 
Similarly, in Panel C, we find a positive (0.102) and statistically significant at 5% 
level (t = -2.48) difference between the average diff of the treatment and control 
group.   
The correlation among rating deviations (diff), AEM, REM, and control variables 
for our main analysis is reported in Table 4.7. Table 4.7 presents Spearman 
correlation (above the diagonal) and Pearson correlation (below the diagonal) 
for the entire sample of 281 firm-years over the period 2001-2006 (Panel A) and 
528 firm-years over the period 2008-2013 (Panel B). 
In the tsunami sample as shown in Panel A, both Spearman and Pearson 
correlation show a significant positive correlation at 10% confidence level 
between rating deviations (diff) and the Disc variable. This suggests that firms 
engaging in REM have achieved to influence their credit rating following the 
tsunami in 2004. Furthermore, we find that both Spearman and Pearson 
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correlation show a significant negative correlation at 1% confidence level 
between (1) Performance Match and CFO variables, and (2) Performance 
Match and Disc variables. This high negative correlation between AEM and 
REM can be explained by the fact that firm managers utilize accruals and real 
earning management in tsunami period by trading-off the costs and benefits of 
each other as substitute. This is consistent with past research findings (e.g. 
Irani and Oesch, 2016; and Alhadab et al., 2016) and the idea that managers 
prefer to use discretionary accruals for firms in the tsunami sample and REM for 
firms in the flooding sample (also confirmed by sensitivity analysis tests below). 
On the other hand, the correlation coefficient between (1) Modified DD and 
Performance Match variables, and (2) CFO and Disc variables are positive and 
statistically significant at 1 % confidence level, consistent with these types of 
earnings management being complementary in this setting.  
Further, we find that rating deviations (diff) is significantly higher for firms that 
are more profitable and larger in size, have high growth opportunities, higher 
firm’s performance and higher interest coverage ratio. Lastly, we find that 
accruals and real earnings management are significantly higher for firms that 
are more profitable, larger in size, and have higher firm’s performance; 
whereas, they are lower for firms that have higher leverage. 
In general, correlations in Panel B are consistent with correlations in Panel A 
and prior research work. In the flooding sample, only Spearman correlation 
show a significant positive correlation at less than 5% level between rating 
deviations (diff) and REM (CFO and Disc variables). We, further, find a 
significant negative correlation at less than 10% level between AEM and REM 
variables, suggesting that firms are likely to use these two earnings 
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management techniques as substitutes. However, the correlation coefficient 
between (1) Modified DD and Performance Match variables, and (2) CFO and 
Disc variables are positive and statistically significant at less than 10 % level. 
Finally, we find that rating deviations (diff) is significantly higher for firms that 
have higher firm’s performance, higher interest coverage ratio, and are near a 
broad rating boundary (plus and minus); whereas, AEM and REM are 
significantly higher for firms that have higher firm’s performance, are more 
profitable, growing larger, have higher interest coverage ratio, and are near a 
broad rating boundary. 
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Table 4.7: Pearson and Spearman correlation 
Panel A: Tsunami (Data in 2001-2006) 
 
 
 
Pearson 
correlation 
Spearman 
correlation 
 
 diff 
 
 
Modified 
DD 
 
 
Performance 
Match 
 
 
 
CFO 
 
 
 
Disc mb profit size growth roa lev intcov 
Plus 
minus 
diff  -0.051 -0.033 0.001 0.104* 0.101* 0.034 0.158*** 0.148** 0.130** -0.007 0.158*** 0.080 
 
 (0.395) (0.579) (0.983) (0.083) (0.091) (0.572) (0.008) (0.013) (0.030) (0.910) (0.008) (0.184) 
Modified DD -0.059  0.214*** 0.081 0.058 -0.098 0.134** 0.033 -0.022 0.383*** -0.043 0.020 -0.061 
 (0.324)  (0.000) (0.178) (0.338) (0.101) (0.025) (0.579) (0.721) (0.000) (0.471) (0.738) (0.309) 
Performance Match -0.028 0.217***  -0.352*** -0.187*** -0.038 0.089 0.127** 0.023 0.016 -0.055 0.003 -0.094 
 (0.647) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.532) (0.137) (0.033) (0.707) (0.787) (0.356) (0.955) (0.118) 
CFO 0.003 0.084 -0.354***  0.185*** 0.023 0.048 0.048 -0.020 0.165*** -0.050 0.010 -0.094 
 (0.957) (0.161) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.708) (0.423) (0.427) (0.741) (0.006) (0.403) (0.864) (0.117) 
Disc 0.103* 0.060 -0.189*** 0.187***  0.003 0.125** 0.161*** -0.076 0.079 -0.099* -0.057 -0.048 
 (0.085) (0.316) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.965) (0.036) (0.007) (0.204) (0.189) (0.097) (0.340) (0.431) 
mb 0.085 -0.022 0.011 -0.063 0.068  0.445*** 0.443*** 0.292*** -0.157*** 0.036 0.383*** 0.067 
 (0.158) (0.710) (0.851) (0.290) (0.255)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.545) (0.000) (0.261) 
profit 0.123** 0.008 0.064 0.074 0.259*** 0.047 
 
0.379*** 0.205*** -0.121** 0.105* 0.359*** 0.023 
 
(0.040) (0.891) (0.282) (0.219) (0.000) (0.437) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.044) (0.080) (0.000) (0.702) 
size 0.179*** 0.034 0.125** 0.054 0.160*** 0.227*** 0.131** 
 
0.167*** 0.012 0.075 0.138** 0.096 
 
(0.003) (0.571) (0.036) (0.369) (0.007) (0.000) (0.028) 
 
(0.005) (0.844) (0.209) (0.021) (0.110) 
growth 0.126** 0.007 0.027 -0.056 -0.054 0.078 0.041 0.033  -0.086 0.025 0.318*** 0.095 
 
(0.035) (0.913) (0.650) (0.351) (0.369) (0.192) (0.498) (0.580)  (0.152) (0.673) (0.000) (0.112) 
roa 0.038 0.314*** 0.021 0.157*** 0.025 -0.109* -0.016 0.093 -0.037  0.008 -0.066 -0.053 
 (0.523) (0.000) (0.723) (0.008) (0.682) (0.068) (0.788) (0.120) (0.533)  (0.898) (0.272) (0.381) 
lev 0.050 -0.004 -0.060 -0.018 -0.111* 0.012 -0.117* 0.146** -0.043 0.072  0.010 0.087 
 (0.402) (0.950) (0.314) (0.758) (0.064) (0.844) (0.051) (0.014) (0.469) (0.229)  (0.872) (0.147) 
intcov 0.009 0.008 -0.057 -0.050 0.062 -0.006 -0.055 -0.155*** -0.040 0.028 -0.017  0.190*** 
 (0.882) (0.907) (0.342) (0.408) (0.299) (0.927) (0.355) (0.009) (0.501) (0.637) (0.733)  (0.001) 
plusminus 0.067 -0.065 -0.098 -0.098 -0.051 0.064 -0.013 0.091 0.031 -0.044 0.095 0.125**  
 (0.264) (0.275) (0.102) (0.103) (0.399) (0.287) (0.823) (0.129) (0.603) (0.463) (0.114) (0.037)  
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Panel B: Flooding (Data in 2008-2013) 
 
 
Pearson 
correlation 
   
Spearman 
correlation 
 
 diff 
 
 
Modifie
d DD 
 
 
 
Performance 
Match 
 
 
 
 
CFO 
 
 
 
 
Disc mb profit size growth roa lev intcov 
Plus 
minus 
diff  -0.064 0.025 0.088** 0.125*** 0.009 -0.043 -0.058 0.041 0.172*** -0.005 0.197*** 0.096** 
 
 (0.146) (0.561) (0.044) (0.004) (0.838) (0.321) (0.188) (0.345) (0.000) (0.902) (0.000) (0.028) 
Modified DD -0.020  0.192*** -0.053 -0.072* -0.050 0.052 0.086** -0.038 0.428*** -0.067 -0.038 0.010 
 (0.641)  (0.000) (0.223) (0.099) (0.252) (0.232) (0.049) (0.384) (0.000) (0.124) (0.383) (0.813) 
Performance Match 0.038 0.130***  -0.400*** 0.031 0.015 -0.042 0.043 -0.031 0.029 -0.025 0.017 0.073* 
 (0.385) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.480) (0.733) (0.340) (0.321) (0.473) (0.509) (0.563) (0.694) (0.095) 
CFO 0.057 -0.142*** -0.347***  0.086* -0.005 0.085* -0.037 0.007 0.267*** -0.008 -0.008 0.023 
 (0.192) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.050) (0.913) (0.052) (0.399) (0.876) (0.000) (0.862) (0.860) (0.607) 
Disc 0.020 -0.036 -0.091** 0.020  0.009 0.198*** 0.080* -0.046 0.186*** 0.023 -0.038 0.090** 
 (0.645) (0.408) (0.036) (0.647)  (0.837) (0.000) (0.066) (0.293) (0.000) (0.594) (0.385) (0.040) 
mb -0.033 -0.018 -0.026 0.014 0.076*  0.163*** -0.011 0.077* 0.004 -0.000 0.148*** 0.060 
 (0.451) (0.676) (0.550) (0.748) (0.080)  (0.000) (0.808) (0.077) (0.925) (0.995) (0.001) (0.169) 
profit -0.047 0.023 0.021 -0.011 0.215*** -0.010 
 
0.622*** 0.239*** 0.036 0.172*** 0.483*** -0.008 
 
(0.285) (0.592) (0.639) (0.800) (0.000) (0.816) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.409) (0.000) (0.000) (0.862) 
size -0.021 0.047 0.042 0.074* -0.054 -0.124*** 0.283*** 
 
0.091** 0.130*** 0.061 0.227*** -0.047 
 
(0.634) (0.282) (0.339) (0.088) (0.214) (0.004) (0.000) 
 
(0.037) (0.003) (0.165) (0.000) (0.286) 
growth 0.022 -0.052 0.046 0.040 -0.019 -0.005 0.041 0.015  -0.013 -0.002 -0.261*** -0.035 
 
(0.616) (0.237) (0.293) (0.358) (0.661) (0.902) (0.352) (0.735)  (0.763) (0.968) (0.000) (0.429) 
roa 0.124*** 0.394*** -0.027 0.386*** 0.194*** -0.015 -0.002 0.138*** -0.051  -0.166*** -0.094** -0.030 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.538) (0.000) (0.000) (0.734) (0.956) (0.002) (0.244)  (0.000) (0.032) (0.497) 
lev -0.054 -0.040 -0.052 -0.005 -0.000 -0.089** -0.046 0.004 -0.058 -0.113***  0.139*** -0.003 
 (0.214) (0.363) (0.237) (0.916) (0.993) (0.041) (0.294) (0.927) (0.185) (0.009)  (0.001) (0.952) 
intcov 0.081* -0.043 -0.013 0.044 0.120*** -0.034 -0.057 -0.170*** -0.020 -0.072* -0.021  -0.032 
 (0.065) (0.323) (0.767) (0.319) (0.006) (0.431) (0.194) (0.000) (0.646) (0.097) (0.637)  (0.463) 
plusminus 0.093** 0.034 0.064 -0.007 0.041 0.084* 0.061 -0.049 0.007 0.003 -0.024 0.100**  
 (0.033) (0.443) (0.143) (0.873) (0.343) (0.053) (0.163) (0.263) (0.876) (0.940) (0.580) (0.021)  
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Table 4.7 presents Spearman correlation (above the diagonal) and Pearson correlation (below the diagonal) for the entire sample of 281 firm-years over the 
period 2001-2006 for firms in the tsunami sample (Panel A) and 528 firm-years over the period 2008-2013 firms in the flooding sample (Panel B) to assess the 
consequences of EM during natural disasters on diff. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 4.1. To avoid the influence of outliers all 
continuous financial data are winsorized at 1% and 99% by separating firms in the tsunami and firms in the flooding samples *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
4.2 Multivariate analyses 
As mentioned before, we use a diff-in-diff approach to assess differences 
between two groups (treatedT/treatedF and control) before and after the 
disasters. Table 4.8 presents the estimation results for equation (1).  
Table 4.8: The consequences of earnings management during natural 
disasters on deviations from expected credit rating 
  diffi,t+1    = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2em + b3treatedT/treatedF*em 
+ b4control variables + e)            (1)       
 
Panel A: Continuous earnings management variable 
  Tsunami   Flooding 
 
AEM  REM 
 
AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF 0.097 -0.045 
 
-0.362 -0.006 
 
-0.246 -0.293 
 
0.007 -0.232 
 
(0.638) (0.655) 
 
(0.637) (0.723) 
 
(0.390) (0.403) 
 
(0.418) (0.398) 
em 0.966* 1.010*** 
 
0.286 -1.611 
 
-0.708 -0.099 
 
-0.123 -1.096 
 
(0.548) (0.294) 
 
(0.639) (1.747) 
 
(0.600) (0.187) 
 
(0.460) (0.786) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -7.181** -3.106** 
 
-4.862 -0.312   1.792 -1.139** 
 
-1.715* -3.972*** 
  (3.225) (1.542) 
 
(3.926) (0.630)   (1.544) (0.452) 
 
(1.023) (1.416) 
mb 0.003 0.022 
 
-0.003 0.001 
 
-0.107*** -0.116*** 
 
-0.098*** -0.094*** 
 
(0.031) (0.030) 
 
(0.032) (0.027) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) 
profit -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.026*** -0.027*** 
 
-0.003 -0.005 
 
-0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.011) (0.010) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
size 0.677** 0.702** 
 
0.638** 0.692** 
 
0.198 0.184 
 
0.589* 0.591* 
 
(0.299) (0.287) 
 
(0.253) (0.294) 
 
(0.224) (0.227) 
 
(0.337) (0.329) 
growth -0.517 -0.745 
 
-1.137** -1.007* 
 
0.194 0.185 
 
0.431*** 0.545*** 
 
(0.598) (0.677) 
 
(0.545) (0.518) 
 
(0.234) (0.238) 
 
(0.138) (0.144) 
roa 0.575 0.922 
 
1.174 1.173 
 
-0.734 -0.021 
 
-1.251* -1.356*** 
 
(1.504) (1.470) 
 
(1.615) (1.587) 
 
(0.862) (0.042) 
 
(0.652) (0.467) 
lev 0.005 0.005 
 
-0.002 -0.003 
 
-0.041 -0.039 
 
-0.054* -0.052* 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.031) (0.029) 
intcov -0.000** -0.000** 
 
-0.000 -0.000** 
 
0.000 0.000** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.698** 0.660* 
 
0.500* 0.563**  0.599 0.567 
 
0.561 0.543 
 (0.332) (0.336) 
 
(0.265) (0.272)  (0.589) (0.576) 
 
(0.548) (0.546) 
Intercept -3.970** -4.086*** 
 
-3.323** -3.572**  -0.650 -0.544 
 
-2.946 -2.847 
 (1.514) (1.456) 
 
(1.313) (1.472)  (1.513) (1.533) 
 
(2.094) (2.058) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.247 0.199 
 
0.213 0.196 
 
0.132 0.127 
 
0.173 0.183 
Observ. 281 281 
 
281 281   528 528 
 
528 528 
227 
 
Panel B: Earnings management dummy 
 
  Tsunami   Flooding 
 
AEM  REM  AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
 Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF 0.161 -0.048 
 
0.118 -0.273 
 
-0.255 -0.295 
 
-0.181 -0.431 
 
(0.643) (0.667) 
 
(0.615) (0.809) 
 
(0.427) (0.403) 
 
(0.428) (0.381) 
em dummy 0.081 0.212* 
 
0.148 0.431 
 
-0.106 0.065 
 
-0.069 -0.427 
 
(0.169) (0.105) 
 
(0.202) (0.361) 
 
(0.151) (0.097) 
 
(0.172) (0.337) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -6.483** -2.331 
 
-0.512 -0.026   1.264 -1.256*** 
 
-1.452 -2.452** 
  (2.964) (1.538) 
 
(0.603) (0.683)   (1.372) (0.343) 
 
(0.956) (1.083) 
mb -0.000 -0.001 
 
0.001 -0.012 
 
-0.109*** -0.116*** 
 
-0.113*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) 
 
(0.029) (0.031) 
 
(0.027) (0.027) 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
profit -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.005 -0.005 
 
-0.006 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
size 0.691** 0.695** 
 
0.733** 0.702** 
 
0.194 0.174 
 
0.213 0.178 
 
(0.304) (0.291) 
 
(0.301) (0.304) 
 
(0.231) (0.228) 
 
(0.249) (0.234) 
growth -0.625 -0.629 
 
-0.705 -0.553 
 
0.210 0.186 
 
0.226 0.228 
 
(0.546) (0.642) 
 
(0.656) (0.635) 
 
(0.231) (0.242) 
 
(0.234) (0.255) 
roa 0.823 0.431 
 
0.362 0.001 
 
-1.169 -0.020 
 
-1.222 -1.469 
 
(1.670) (1.565) 
 
(1.624) (1.626) 
 
(0.909) (0.042) 
 
(0.868) (0.920) 
lev 0.007 0.007 
 
0.007 0.007 
 
-0.040 -0.039 
 
-0.039 -0.042 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 
 
(0.025) (0.027) 
intcov -0.000** -0.000** 
 
-0.000** -0.000**  0.000 0.000** 
 
0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.631* 0.673* 
 
0.669* 0.655*  0.528 0.556 
 
0.554 0.514 
 (0.360) (0.370) 
 
(0.364) (0.363)  (0.570) (0.585) 
 
(0.570) (0.551) 
Intercept -4.067** -4.222*** 
 
-4.331*** -4.360** 
 
-0.507 -0.502 
 
-0.664 -0.201 
 
(1.568) (1.473) 
 
(1.502) (1.604) 
 
(1.523) (1.531) 
 
(1.599) (1.571) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.236 0.177 
 
0.164 0.168 
 
0.131 0.127 
 
0.134 0.141 
Observ. 281 281 
 
281 281   528 528 
 
528 528 
Table 4.8 presents the result from an OLS regressions with firms' deviations from expected credit 
ratings (Diff) proxies as equation (1) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors. Diff as the 
dependent variable, which is a firm's actual CR as at 31
st
 March minus its expected CR as estimating 
the ordered probit model in equation (2). 
     Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e)     (2) 
The final sample includes 281 and 528 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2006 and 2008-
2013 to test the consequences of earnings management during tsunami and flooding occurred on 
deviations from expected credit rating, respectively. Both panels have the main independent variable 
of interest, which is coefficient for (treatedT/treatedF*em) in equation (1). We use two earnings 
management measures, which are the independent variable, as follows: (1) the residuals of AEM and 
REM from four models as shown in Panel A; and (2) accruals and real earnings management dummy 
as shown in Panel B. The coefficients shown in bold are statistically significant at less than 10 percent 
level. Table 4.8 also reports the mean R
2
 for each of these regressions. All variables are otherwise 
calculated as described in appendix 4.1. We include industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the 
models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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In Table 4.8, the dependent variable is the deviation of the actual credit rating 
from the expected credit rating (diff), where the expected CR is estimated by the 
ordered probit model in equation (2). Our first hypothesis is tested using the b3 
coefficient, which captures the consequences of earnings management during 
the natural disasters on deviations from expected credit rating for the treatment 
compared to the control group. To be consistent with our first hypothesis, b3 
should be statistically significant. 
In Panel A earnings management is measured as the residuals from AEM 
models (Modified DD and Performance Match variables) and REM models 
(CFO and Disc variables). In the tsunami sample, the coefficient b3 
(treatedT*em) is negative (-7.181 and -3.106) and highly significant (p < 0.05 
and p < 0.05), where Modified DD and Performance Match variables are used 
to measure AEM, as shown in columns (1) and (2). However, there is 
apparently no significant difference in the credit rating of firms engaging in REM 
(CFO and Disc variables) for firms in the tsunami sample. In the flooding 
sample, we find a negative coefficient of -1.139 (p < 0.05) on b3 (treatedF*em) 
when Performance Match variable is used as a measure of AEM, as shown in 
column (6). Further, the coefficient b3 (treatedF*em) is negative (-1.715 and -
3.972) and highly significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.01), when CFO and Disc 
variables are used to measure REM, as reported in columns (7) and (8).  
Our results indicate that earnings management affects negatively deviations of 
actual credit ratings from expected credit ratings in periods of natural disaster. 
This indicates that credit rating agencies can detect earnings management 
activities in periods of natural disaster and penalize firms with earnings 
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management by lowering their credit rating as dictated by their reputation 
incentives.  
Next, we run additional analyses with an alternative earnings management 
measure as reported in Panel B. In this panel, we attempt to controls for 
changes in economic conditions that influence earnings management across 
different industry groups by using an earnings management dummy, taking the 
value of one if Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, and Disc variables are 
higher than or equal to the industry average for a given year, and zero 
otherwise. 
Consistent with the preliminary analysis reported in Panel A, we find b3 to be 
negative (-6.483) and highly significant (p < 0.05) in the Modified DD dummy 
regression for firms in the tsunami sample as shown in column (1). In the 
flooding sample, we find a negative relationship between deviations from 
expected credit rating (diff) and both Performance Match dummy and Disc 
dummy interaction variables. For example, the coefficient b3 (treatedF*em) for 
firms in the flooding sample in Performance Match dummy and Disc dummy 
variables are negative (-1.256, and -2.452, respectively) and highly significant 
(p < 0.01, and p < 0.05, respectively) as shown in columns (6) and (8) of Panel 
B. These results are evidence that natural disasters moderate the relation 
between earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating, and 
they are consistent with the first hypothesis. Moreover, the results in Panel B 
are consistent with the results reported in Panel A that earnings management 
affect negatively deviations from expected credit rating during disasters. Hence, 
the results in Panel B also imply that credit rating agencies are able to detect 
firms with earnings management activities in the higher level than or equal to 
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industry average in periods of natural disaster and protect their reputation by 
lowering the credit rating of those firms.  
In addition, Panel A and Panel B show that the coefficient b2 (em) is significantly 
positive for only AEM variables (Modified DD, Performance Match, and 
Performance Match dummy variables) and for firms in the tsunami sample. This 
means that credit ratings penalized firms for engaging in accrual earnings 
management in general. In contrast, there is no significant relation between 
accruals and real earnings management variables and deviations from 
expected credit ratings for firms in the flooding sample. Moreover, Panel A and 
Panel B show that the coefficient b1 (treatedT/ treatedF) is insignificant in both 
AEM and REM regressions and for both the tsunami and the flooding samples. 
This implies that deviations from expected credit ratings are not unconditionally 
different for firms in the treatment and control countries.  
Consistent with our expectations, we find that the coefficient of size in Panel A 
for firms in the tsunami and firms in the flooding samples is positive and 
significant for both discretionary accruals and real earnings management 
regressions. Also, the coefficient of size in Panel B for firms in the tsunami 
samples is positive and significant for both discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management regressions. This implies that larger firms have higher 
deviations from expected credit rating. However, we find that the coefficients of 
mb (in Panel A and Panel B), roa (in Panel A), and lev (in Panel A) for firms in 
the flooding sample and the coefficient of profit (in Panel A and Panel B) for 
firms in the tsunami sample are negative and significant. This means that firms 
in the flooding sample with higher market-to-book ratio, better performance, 
higher leverage ratios and firms in the tsunami sample that generate more 
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income have lower deviations from expected credit rating. Finally, we find that 
the coefficient of plusminus (in Panel A and Panel B) for firms in the tsunami 
sample is positive and significant for all regressions. This means that firms near 
a broad ration boundary (plus and minus) have higher deviations from expected 
credit rating. 
Next, we test our second hypothesis by testing whether the interaction 
coefficients (treatedT/treatedF*em), as reported in Table 4.8 Panel A, are 
statistically different between the tsunami and flooding samples. Table 4.9 
compares the coefficients on (treatedT/treatedF*em) in the flooding and the 
tsunami groups. The difference is the coefficient on (treatedF*em) in the 
flooding group minus coefficient on (treatedT*em) in the tsunami group. We find 
that the coefficient of interest in the flooding setting is statistically different from 
tsunami group (significant differences presented in red) for most earnings 
management measures. More specifically, the coefficients of interest in the 
tsunami group, are statistically different from the flooding group as shown in 
columns 1, 2, and 3, where Modified DD, Performance Match, and CFO are 
used as measures of earnings management. The different in the magnitude of 
the interaction coefficients in the Modified DD, Performance Match, and CFO 
regressions are 8.973 (at 5%), 1.967 (at 10%), and 3.147 (at 10%), 
respectively. Overall, the evidence in this table confirms that the effect of 
earnings management on deviations from expected credit ratings is conditional 
on the severity of the disaster, since the coefficient of interest in the flooding 
group has a greater statistical magnitude than the coefficient of interest in the 
tsunami group. 
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Table 4.9: Comparing the coefficient across the two samples 
 
  
  
  
AEM   REM 
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match   CFO Disc 
treatedT/treatedF*em in flooding group 1.792 -1.139**  -1.715* -3.972*** 
treatedT/treatedF*em in tsunami group -7.181** -3.106**  -4.862 -0.312 
Difference 8.973** 1.967*  3.147* -3.660 
P-value 0.035 0.058  0.096 0.349 
 
Table 4.9 compares the coefficients on (treatedT/treatedF*em) from regression (1) below of 
the flooding and tsunami groups. 
diffi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2em + b3treatedT/treatedF*em + b4control variables + e)(1)       
Four different measures of earnings management are used for the comparison, the 
Modified DD, the Performance Match, the CFO, and the Disc variable as shown in Panel A 
in Table 4.8. Differences are tested using t-tests. The coefficients shown in bold are 
statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. All variables are otherwise calculated 
as described in appendix 4.1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
We are, thus, able to conclude that the higher the intensity of disaster, the more 
the credit rating agencies will adjust their credit rating for earnings 
management. This analysis provides us with greater confidence in the earlier 
results (in Chapter 3) and confirms our second hypothesis that the effect of 
accruals and real based-earnings management on deviations from expected 
credit rating is conditional on the severity of the disaster. 
Finally, we test the third hypothesis by separating bad and good performance 
firms, and then, we run regression (1) with robust standard errors clustered at 
industry level and year fixed affects to assess whether the moderating role of a 
natural disaster in the relationship between earnings management and 
deviations from expected credit rating will be different between SG and IG firms. 
Our third hypothesis is tested again by the b3 coefficient, which captures the 
consequences of earnings management during disasters on deviations from 
expected credit rating for firms on speculative-grade and investment-grade. 
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Again, the dependent variable in this table is diff, which is a firm's actual CR as 
of 31st March minus its expected CR as estimating based on the ordered probit 
model in equation (2). In Panel A, earnings management is measured as the 
residuals from AEM and REM models (Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, 
and Disc variables), while, as additional analysis, in Panel B earnings 
management (em dummy) is measured as a dummy, taking the value of one if 
Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, and Disc variables are higher than or 
equal to the industry average for a given year, otherwise the value is zero. 
In the SG group over the tsunami period, the coefficient b3 (treatedT*em) is 
negative (-7.047 and -8.060 in Panel A, and -7.733 and -8.791 in Panel B) and 
highly significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 in Panel A, and p < 0.01 and p < 0.10 in 
Panel B) when Modified DD, Performance Match, Modified DD dummy, and 
Performance Match dummy variables are used to proxy for earnings 
management. However, there are apparently no significant effects of REM for 
SG firms in the tsunami sample as can be seen on both panels in Table 4.10. 
Next, for the SG group in the flooding sample, we find a negative coefficient of -
6.246, -3.997 and -6.043 at less 10% level on b3 (treatedF*em) in the 
Performance Match, CFO, and Disc regressions, as shown in column (6-8) in 
Panel A. The respective negative coefficient in EM dummy variables 
(Performance Match dummy, CFO dummy, and Disc dummy variables) are -
6.081, -4.062 and -4.561 at less than 10% level as reported on B. 
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Table 4.10: The consequences of earnings management during natural 
disasters on deviations from expected credit rating after separate SG and 
IG Groups 
  diffi,t+1    = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2em + b3treatedT/treatedF*em +  
                        b4control variables + e)          (1)       
Panel A: Continuous earnings management variable 
  Speculative grade (SG) 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
 
AEM  REM 
 
AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF -0.295 -0.819 
 
-0.715 -0.744 
 
-0.310 0.116 
 
0.033 0.013 
 
(0.993) (0.893) 
 
(1.001) (0.975) 
 
(0.754) (0.674) 
 
(0.648) (0.656) 
em -0.598 0.604 
 
-1.696 2.599 
 
-0.388 -0.496 
 
-0.039 1.480 
 
(1.008) (0.580) 
 
(1.513) (2.954) 
 
(1.260) (0.393) 
 
(0.501) (1.103) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -7.047** -8.060* 
 
-1.108 0.250   1.397 -6.246* 
 
-3.997*** -6.043*** 
  (2.893) (4.800) 
 
(3.318) (0.562)   (0.859) (3.618) 
 
(1.277) (1.399) 
mb 0.093 -0.020 
 
0.137 0.140 
 
-0.186** -0.201** 
 
-0.194** -0.198** 
 
(0.148) (0.195) 
 
(0.205) (0.182) 
 
(0.067) (0.077) 
 
(0.074) (0.078) 
profit 0.014 0.029* 
 
0.023 0.020 
 
0.016 0.007 
 
0.007 0.006 
 
(0.019) (0.016) 
 
(0.019) (0.020) 
 
(0.021) (0.015) 
 
(0.015) (0.017) 
size 0.926** 0.748** 
 
0.972** 1.014** 
 
0.442 0.432 
 
0.492 0.525 
 
(0.399) (0.276) 
 
(0.378) (0.398) 
 
(0.352) (0.352) 
 
(0.329) (0.333) 
growth -0.271 -2.746* 
 
-1.103 -0.662 
 
0.459 0.579 
 
0.754* 0.794* 
 
(1.775) (1.579) 
 
(1.733) (1.910) 
 
(0.365) (0.414) 
 
(0.439) (0.409) 
roa -0.086 1.314 
 
-0.882 -0.344 
 
-1.570 -0.089 
 
-2.522*** -2.122** 
 
(2.050) (2.385) 
 
(1.633) (1.599) 
 
(1.616) (0.067) 
 
(0.720) (0.771) 
lev 0.006 -0.017** 
 
0.011 0.012 
 
-0.064** -0.063** 
 
-0.067** -0.063** 
 
(0.010) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.011) 
 
(0.028) (0.029) 
 
(0.029) (0.028) 
intcov -0.000* -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000** 0.000** 
 
0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.769** 0.689 
 
0.776** 0.886**  1.455* 1.490* 
 
1.354* 1.387* 
 (0.347) (0.425) 
 
(0.367) (0.416)  (0.787) (0.770) 
 
(0.763) (0.759) 
Intercept -5.740** -3.704* 
 
-5.888** -6.086**  -2.560 -2.608 
 
-2.745 -2.835 
 (2.450) (1.975) 
 
(2.198) (2.249)  (2.156) (2.011) 
 
(1.948) (1.980) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.386 0.377 
 
0.293 0.271 
 
0.294 0.293 
 
0.292 0.306 
Observ. 135 135 
 
135 135   256 256 
 
256 256 
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  Investment grade (IG) 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
 
AEM  REM 
 
AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF 0.167 0.287 
 
0.127 2.046 
 
-0.965*** -0.983*** 
 
-0.920*** -1.004*** 
 
(0.536) (0.601) 
 
(0.542) (1.418) 
 
(0.315) (0.310) 
 
(0.303) (0.347) 
em 0.748 0.057 
 
0.072 -0.083 
 
-0.503* 0.080 
 
0.008 -0.105 
 
(0.484) (0.354) 
 
(0.649) (2.010) 
 
(0.253) (0.165) 
 
(0.246) (0.600) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -1.434 -0.977 
 
0.781 -2.133   -0.037 -0.085 
 
-0.582 -0.429 
  (2.033) (2.439) 
 
(0.951) (1.562)   (0.509) (0.327) 
 
(0.459) (1.492) 
mb 0.003 0.013 
 
-0.001 0.005 
 
-0.113*** -0.109*** 
 
-0.112*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.042) (0.037) 
 
(0.042) (0.036) 
 
(0.018) (0.019) 
 
(0.018) (0.019) 
profit -0.015*** -0.019*** 
 
-0.016*** -0.015*** 
 
-0.009 -0.010 
 
-0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.012) (0.011) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
size -0.071 -0.028 
 
-0.028 -0.056 
 
0.157 0.145 
 
0.154 0.145 
 
(0.383) (0.338) 
 
(0.354) (0.344) 
 
(0.139) (0.134) 
 
(0.140) (0.138) 
growth -0.427 -0.456 
 
-0.552 -0.644 
 
0.170 0.183 
 
0.179 0.175 
 
(0.700) (0.690) 
 
(0.643) (0.611) 
 
(0.256) (0.262) 
 
(0.253) (0.284) 
roa 0.209 0.820 
 
0.636 1.215 
 
0.921 0.378 
 
0.507 0.421 
 
(1.267) (1.544) 
 
(1.444) (1.549) 
 
(0.549) (0.555) 
 
(0.617) (0.548) 
lev -0.000 -0.003 
 
0.000 -0.000 
 
0.007 0.007 
 
0.007 0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
intcov -0.000** -0.000** 
 
-0.000** -0.000** 
 
0.000** 0.000** 
 
0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.295 0.471 
 
0.274 0.296  -0.798** -0.821** 
 
-0.796** -0.815** 
 (0.394) (0.416) 
 
(0.381) (0.425)  (0.327) (0.334) 
 
(0.344) (0.328) 
Intercept 0.586 0.317 
 
0.332 0.487  0.365 0.448 
 
0.378 0.440 
 (1.998) (1.762) 
 
(1.859) (1.854)  (1.063) (1.031) 
 
(1.076) (1.057) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.143 0.141 
 
0.131 0.167 
 
0.309 0.303 
 
0.305 0.303 
Observ. 146 146 
 
146 146   272 272 
 
272 272 
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Panel B: Earning management dummy 
  Speculative grade (SG) 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
 
AEM  REM 
 
AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF -0.179 -0.792 
 
-0.145 -0.813 
 
-0.349 0.139 
 
0.014 -0.054 
 
(1.002) (0.890) 
 
(0.945) (0.967) 
 
(0.802) (0.670) 
 
(0.644) (0.666) 
em dummy -0.032 0.357 
 
0.149 0.101 
 
-0.125 -0.108 
 
-0.200 -0.982 
 
(0.276) (0.283) 
 
(0.334) (0.500) 
 
(0.158) (0.205) 
 
(0.395) (0.977) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -7.733*** -8.791* 
 
-1.232 0.448   1.387 -6.081* 
 
-4.062*** -4.561*** 
  (2.825) (4.962) 
 
(1.015) (0.781)   (0.947) (3.529) 
 
(1.179) (0.593) 
mb 0.090 -0.016 
 
0.104 0.146 
 
-0.198** -0.199** 
 
-0.193** -0.181*** 
 
(0.131) (0.196) 
 
(0.209) (0.183) 
 
(0.074) (0.077) 
 
(0.075) (0.065) 
profit 0.013 0.032* 
 
0.022 0.022 
 
0.008 0.007 
 
0.007 0.009 
 
(0.021) (0.015) 
 
(0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.015) (0.016) 
 
(0.015) (0.015) 
size 0.922** 0.678** 
 
0.958** 0.976** 
 
0.479 0.451 
 
0.523 0.403 
 
(0.402) (0.289) 
 
(0.357) (0.384) 
 
(0.364) (0.347) 
 
(0.362) (0.359) 
growth -0.295 -2.714 
 
-0.811 -0.744 
 
0.444 0.566 
 
0.776* 0.723* 
 
(1.877) (1.586) 
 
(1.798) (1.891) 
 
(0.362) (0.404) 
 
(0.444) (0.369) 
roa 0.224 0.801 
 
-0.454 -0.251 
 
-1.717 -0.080 
 
-2.606*** -3.381** 
 
(1.934) (2.224) 
 
(1.500) (1.828) 
 
(1.013) (0.063) 
 
(0.848) (1.422) 
lev 0.006 -0.018** 
 
0.006 0.011 
 
-0.066** -0.062** 
 
-0.066** -0.072** 
 
(0.012) (0.007) 
 
(0.013) (0.010) 
 
(0.030) (0.030) 
 
(0.028) (0.033) 
intcov -0.000** -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000** 0.000** 
 
0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.708* 0.727* 
 
0.807* 0.874**  1.400* 1.479* 
 
1.352* 1.204* 
 (0.396) (0.411) 
 
(0.434) (0.400)  (0.765) (0.777) 
 
(0.756) (0.643) 
Intercept -5.626** -3.671* 
 
-5.873** -6.160**  -2.595 -2.684 
 
-2.845 -1.571 
 (2.361) (2.024) 
 
(2.154) (2.366)  (2.165) (2.003) 
 
(2.026) (2.352) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.378 0.384 
 
0.282 0.263 
 
0.288 0.290 
 
0.294 0.308 
Observ. 135 135 
 
135 135   256 256 
 
256 256 
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  Investment grade (IG) 
 Tsunami  Flooding 
 
AEM  REM 
 
AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF 0.185 0.173 
 
0.181 2.065 
 
-0.916** -0.993*** -0.928*** -1.027** 
 
(0.526) (0.528)  (0.450) (1.502) 
 
(0.339) (0.305)  (0.307) (0.363) 
em dummy 0.299 0.047  0.093 0.227 
 
-0.254 -0.205*  -0.057 -0.158 
 
(0.245) (0.235)  (0.306) (0.431) 
 
(0.166) (0.116)  (0.150) (0.282) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -1.334 -0.485 
 
0.009 -2.247   -0.295 -0.120 
 
-0.516 -0.390 
  (1.641) (1.985)  (0.392) (1.687)   (0.432) (0.327)  (0.434) (1.479) 
mb -0.013 -0.001  -0.001 -0.004 
 
-0.111*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.043) (0.040)  (0.041) (0.038) 
 
(0.019) (0.018)  (0.019) (0.018) 
profit -0.015*** -0.015** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 
-0.009 -0.010  -0.009 -0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.012) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.012) 
size -0.038 -0.014  -0.020 -0.066 
 
0.156 0.126  0.158 0.147 
 
(0.389) (0.353)  (0.353) (0.361) 
 
(0.136) (0.131)  (0.143) (0.139) 
growth -0.504 -0.590  -0.551 -0.585 
 
0.210 0.171  0.181 0.172 
 
(0.668) (0.652)  (0.584) (0.619) 
 
(0.256) (0.263)  (0.254) (0.279) 
roa 0.270 0.675  0.659 1.061 
 
0.972* 0.341  0.478 0.508 
 
(1.363) (1.513)  (1.480) (1.452) 
 
(0.516) (0.550)  (0.556) (0.561) 
lev 0.001 0.000  0.000 -0.001 
 
0.010 0.006  0.007 0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.009) 
 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
intcov -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 
0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.279 0.263  0.274 0.321  -0.798** -0.824**  -0.801** -0.814** 
 (0.428) (0.394)  (0.393) (0.399)  (0.324) (0.322)  (0.336) (0.324) 
Intercept 0.192 0.239  0.229 0.347  0.451 0.499  0.377 0.523 
 (1.974) (1.866)  (1.965) (1.685)  (1.020) (1.006)  (1.067) (1.047) 
Fixed 
effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.142 0.129  0.130 0.169 
 
0.315 0.312  0.305 0.306 
Observ. 146 146  146 146   272 272  272 272 
 
Table 4.10 presents the result from an OLS regressions with firms' deviations from expected 
credit rating (Diff) proxies as equation (1) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors. Diff as 
the dependent variable, which is a firm's actual CR as at 31
st
 March minus its expected CR as 
estimating the ordered probit model as following: 
     Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e) (2) 
This table separate SG and IG groups to assess the difference between consequences of 
earnings management for bad and good performance firms during natural disasters on 
deviations from expected credit rating. Both panels have the main independent variable of 
interest, which is coefficient for (treatedT/treatedF*em) in equation (1). We use two EM 
measures, which are the independent variable, as follows: (1) the residuals of AEM and REM 
(Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, and Disc) as shown in Panel A; and (2) accruals and 
real earnings management dummies (Modified DD dummy, Performance Match dummy, CFO 
dummy and Disc dummy) as shown in Panel B. The coefficients shown in bold are statistically 
significant at less than 10 percent level. Table 4.10 also reports the mean R
2
 for each of these 
regressions. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 4.1. We include 
industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the models as indicated, but do not report the 
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coefficients. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
 
Consistent with the preliminary analysis reported in Table 4.8 (non-separate 
between SG and IG groups), our results suggest that credit rating agencies 
penalize SG firms with earnings management by lowering their credit rating. 
Because of several constraints in earnings management for SG firms, it is not 
surprising that credit rating agencies are likely to detect earnings management 
in SG firms easily. However, both panels show that the coefficient b1 (treatedT/ 
treatedF) and b2 (em) are insignificant for both AEM and REM and for both the 
tsunami and the flooding samples. This means that treatment firms in the SG 
group and SG firms engaging earnings management do not affect deviations 
from expected credit rating during the disasters.   
In the IG group, there is no evidence that firms engaging in AEM and REM 
during the tsunami and flooding periods have affected deviations from expected 
credit rating as shown on both panels in Table 4.10. In other words, our results 
do not suggest that managers of treated IG firms that manipulate earnings 
management after disasters have been penalized by credit rating agencies. 
Thus, consistent with H3, the moderating role of a natural disaster in the relation 
between earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating is 
different between SG and IG firms. 
Moreover, we find that the coefficients b1 (treatedT/ treatedF) and b2 (em) are 
insignificant in all regressions for the tsunami sample of the IG group on both 
panels. On the other hand, both panels in IG group over flooding period show 
that the coefficient b1 (treatedT/ treatedF) is negative in all regressions. This 
implies that IG firms in Thailand have on average lower deviations from 
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expected credit rating compared to the control countries. The coefficient b2 (em) 
is insignificant in all specifications but one, this implies that generally credit 
rating agencies do not adjust IG firms credit score for earnings management.  
We find that coefficients of key variables are consistent with the preliminary 
analysis as reported in Table 4.8. For example, in SG group, the coefficients of 
size in Panel A and Panel B for firms in tsunami sample are positive and 
significant for AEM and REM regressions. Again, this suggests that larger firms 
have higher deviations from expected credit rating. 
In summary, these results provide support for our set of hypotheses that (1) 
firms managing significant earnings after natural disasters have influenced 
deviations from expected credit rating, (2) the effect of earnings management 
on deviations from expected credit rating increases when the severity of the 
disaster increases and (3) the moderating role of a natural disaster in the 
relation between earnings management and deviations from expected credit 
rating will be different between investment and non-investment grade firms. 
4.3 Additional tests and sensitivity analysis 
4.3.1 Additional test for trend in the consequences of earnings 
management on deviations from expected credit rating 
We study our first hypothesis further by considering the consequences of 
earnings management on deviations from expected credit rating separately for 
each year following each disaster to examine how fast earnings management 
affects deviations from expected credit ratings when a natural disaster hits. As 
discussed above, we focus on future credit rating as of 31st March in the next 
year, instead of credit rating as of 31st December. Hence, we create year 
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dummies for the first year (treatedTy1
25and treatedFy1
26) and the second year 
(treatedTy2
27and treatedFy2
28) after the disaster occurred to examine time-
series profiles of the consequences of AEM and REM on deviations from 
expected credit rating in the first and second year after the disaster occurred as 
shown in equation (3). 
diff i,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedTy1/treatedFy1 + b2treatedTy2/treatedFy2 + 
b3em + b4treatedTy1/treatedFy1*em + 
b5treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em + b6control variables + e)  (3)           
           
We base our conclusion about H1 on the statistical significance of coefficients 
of treatedTy1/treatedFy1*em and treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em, that are, b4 and b5 in 
equation (3), namely, the consequences of earnings management on deviations 
from expected credit rating of treated firms relative to control firms in the first 
and second year after the disaster occurred, respectively. Table 4.11 reports 
OLS coefficient estimates as shown in equation (3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 treatedTy1 is Indonesia and Thailand in 2005. 
26
 treatedFy1 is Thailand in 2012. 
27
 treatedTy2 is Indonesia and Thailand in 2006. 
28
 treatedFy2 is Thailand in 2013. 
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Table 4.11: Trend in the consequence of earnings management on 
deviations from expected credit rating in each year following the disaster 
  diffi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedTy1/treatedFy1 + b2treatedTy2/treatedFy2 + 
b3em + b4treatedTy1/treatedFy1*em + 
b5treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em + b6control variables + e)   (3)       
Panel A: Continuous earnings management variable 
  Tsunami   Flooding 
 
AEM  REM  AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
 Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedTy1/ 
treatedFy1 0.119 0.548 
 
0.181 0.468 
 
0.732 1.121 
 
0.410 0.418 
 
(0.498) (0.596) 
 
(0.584) (0.546) 
 
(0.796) (0.810) 
 
(0.625) (0.414) 
treatedTy2/ 
treatedFy2 0.185 0.302 
 
0.071 -0.113  1.076 1.213 
 
-0.117 -0.133 
 (0.568) (0.589) 
 
(0.559) (0.589)  (0.777) (0.828) 
 
(0.415) (0.442) 
em 0.361 -0.339 
 
-0.783 -1.218 
 
0.875 0.017 
 
-0.037 -1.053 
 
(1.117) (0.713) 
 
(1.046) (1.912) 
 
(0.563) (0.602) 
 
(0.287) (0.780) 
treatedTy1/ 
treatedFy1*em -2.102* 0.900 
 
-0.024 1.191   -1.464 3.337 
 
-0.381 0.778 
  (1.128) (0.765) 
 
(0.436) (3.499)   (2.413) (2.081) 
 
(0.588) (1.447) 
treatedTy2/ 
treatedFy2*em -3.642 -0.802* 
 
1.303 -2.885  -3.063*** 0.154 
 
-2.086 -4.226** 
 (3.590) (0.461) 
 
(1.274) (3.769)  (1.092) (1.956) 
 
(1.542) (1.684) 
mb -0.003 0.002 
 
-0.007 -0.005 
 
-0.046** -0.030 
 
-0.110*** -0.090*** 
 
(0.033) (0.035) 
 
(0.040) (0.031) 
 
(0.021) (0.031) 
 
(0.027) (0.029) 
profit -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 
-0.006 -0.007 
 
-0.006 -0.011 
 
(0.007) (0.005) 
 
(0.008) (0.005) 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
size 0.724** 0.666** 
 
0.716** 0.684** 
 
-0.035 0.009 
 
0.201 0.614* 
 
(0.306) (0.277) 
 
(0.302) (0.302) 
 
(0.179) (0.086) 
 
(0.239) (0.336) 
growth -0.710 -1.078** -0.657 -1.041** 
 
-0.317 -0.321 
 
0.237 0.513*** 
 
(0.569) (0.498) 
 
(0.515) (0.458) 
 
(0.495) (0.501) 
 
(0.255) (0.144) 
roa 0.291 1.549 
 
0.281 1.245 
 
-3.598*** -2.849** -1.434** -1.450*** 
 
(1.670) (1.766) 
 
(1.698) (1.675) 
 
(1.206) (1.188)  (0.692) (0.419) 
lev 0.006 -0.004 
 
0.007 -0.004 
 
-0.012 -0.015* 
 
-0.040 -0.052* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.008) 
 
(0.024) (0.009) 
 
(0.025) (0.029) 
intcov -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000***  0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.625 0.583** 
 
0.588* 0.560*  0.445 0.266 
 
0.544 0.547 
 (0.367) (0.267) 
 
(0.336) (0.279)  (0.560) (0.304) 
 
(0.564) (0.545) 
Intercept -4.136** -3.533** -1.381 -3.518** 
 
0.636 0.207 
 
-0.614 -2.997 
 
(1.563) (1.446) 
 
(1.291) (1.495) 
 
(1.011) (0.707) 
 
(1.587) (2.107) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.173 0.205 
 
0.198 0.198 
 
0.140 0.177 
 
0.134 0.185 
Observ. 281 281 
 
281 281   528 528 
 
528 528 
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Panel B: Earnings management dummy 
  Tsunami   Flooding 
 
AEM  REM  AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
 Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedTy1/ 
treatedFy1 0.139 0.338 
 
0.426 0.295 
 
0.087 0.249 
 
0.380 0.133 
 
(0.493) (0.540) 
 
(0.510) (0.580) 
 
(0.316) (0.344) 
 
(0.656) (0.378) 
treatedTy2/ 
treatedFy2 0.204 0.245 
 
0.360 0.007  -0.276 -0.297 
 
-0.121 -0.381 
 (0.576) (0.506) 
 
(0.497) (0.706)  (0.562) (0.444) 
 
(0.420) (0.401) 
em dummy -0.052 0.160 
 
0.169 0.403 
 
-0.101 0.079 
 
-0.070 -0.414 
 
(0.211) (0.137) 
 
(0.213) (0.377) 
 
(0.159) (0.094) 
 
(0.189) (0.346) 
treatedTy1/ 
treatedFy1*em -1.776*** -0.420 
 
-0.430 -0.131   -2.268 -0.992 
 
-0.326 0.970 
  (0.668) (0.261) 
 
(0.337) (0.599)   (1.528) (0.796) 
 
(0.653) (1.445) 
treatedTy2/ 
treatedFy2*em -3.352 -0.385 
 
-0.740 -1.055  0.346 -1.910*** -2.068 -2.776** 
 (3.191) (0.575) 
 
(0.498) (0.727)  (0.340) (0.549) 
 
(1.483) (1.304) 
mb -0.002 -0.007 
 
-0.004 -0.014 
 
-0.112*** -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) 
 
(0.031) (0.032) 
 
(0.026) (0.028) 
 
(0.027) (0.027) 
profit -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 
-0.005 -0.005 
 
-0.006 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.010) (0.009) 
size 0.725** 0.743** 
 
0.765** 0.711** 
 
0.201 0.185 
 
0.208 0.185 
 
(0.305) (0.307) 
 
(0.297) (0.309) 
 
(0.244) (0.228) 
 
(0.253) (0.239) 
growth -0.752 -0.596 
 
-0.696 -0.541 
 
0.184 0.199 
 
0.238 0.227 
 
(0.502) (0.565) 
 
(0.569) (0.659) 
 
(0.221) (0.250) 
 
(0.255) (0.250) 
roa 0.481 -0.255 
 
0.366 0.070 
 
-0.886 -0.024 
 
-1.444* -1.573* 
 
(1.717) (0.410) 
 
(1.662) (1.712) 
 
(1.122) (0.037) 
 
(0.760) (0.880) 
lev 0.007 0.008 
 
0.007 0.006 
 
-0.039 -0.040 
 
-0.040 -0.042 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.026) (0.025) 
 
(0.025) (0.026) 
intcov -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
 
0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.612 0.689* 
 
0.697* 0.635  0.577 0.567 
 
0.542 0.522 
 (0.368) (0.361) 
 
(0.371) (0.377)  (0.562) (0.576) 
 
(0.563) (0.548) 
Intercept -4.130** -4.436*** -4.518*** -4.357** 
 
-0.583 -0.568 
 
-0.623 -0.249 
 
(1.548) (1.526) 
 
(1.461) (1.631) 
 
(1.601) (1.535) 
 
(1.615) (1.607) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.172 0.163 
 
0.165 0.167 
 
0.133 0.132 
 
0.134 0.141 
Observ. 281 281 
 
281 281   528 528 
 
528 528 
 
Table 4.11 shows the trend in the consequences of earnings management on deviations from 
expected credit rating in the first and second year after the disasters. This table reports the 
results of OLS regressions as equation (3) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors. The 
dependent variable is the regression of firms' diff, which is a firm's actual CR as at 31
st
 March 
minus its expected CR as estimating the ordered probit model in equation (2). 
   Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e)  (2) 
Both panels have the main independent variable of interest, which is coefficient for 
(treatedTy1/treatedFy1*em, and treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em), respectively in equation (3). We 
use two earnings management measures, which are the independent variable, as follows: (1) 
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the residuals of accruals and real earnings management from four models as shown in Panel 
A; and (2) accruals and real earnings management dummy as shown in Panel B.  
The coefficients shown in bold are statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. Table 
4.11 also reports the mean R
2
 for each of these regressions. All variables are otherwise 
calculated as described in appendix 4.1. We include industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in 
the models as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
In Table 4.11, the dependent variable is the deviation from expected credit 
rating, which is a firm's actual CR as of 31st March minus its expected CR as 
estimated using the ordered probit model in equation (2). Panel A uses the 
residuals from AEM and REM models (Modified DD, Performance Match, CFO, 
and Disc variables) to measure earnings management; whereas, Panel B has 
Modified DD dummy, Performance Match dummy, CFO dummy, and Disc 
dummy variables as independent variable to measure earnings management.   
In the tsunami sample, we find negative coefficients b4 on our dummy variable 
(treatedTy1/treatedFy1*em) of -2.102 (p < 0.10) and -1.776 (p < 0.01) when 
earnings management measures are Modified DD and Modified DD dummy 
variables as shown in Panel A and B. Moreover, we find a negative coefficient 
b5 on (treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em) for firms in the tsunami sample of -0.802 (p < 
0.10) when earnings management measures are captured by the Performance 
Match variable as shown in Panel A. In contrast, there is no evidence that firms 
in the tsunami sample engaging in REM in the first and second year after the 
disaster occurred have affected deviations from expected credit rating as shown 
in both panels.  
In the flooding sample, both panels present evidence that firms in the flooding 
sample manipulating both accruals and real earnings management have 
influenced deviations from expected credit rating in the second year after the 
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flooding occurred (+2y). On the other hand, there is no evidence that firms in 
the flooding sample engaging in accruals and real earnings management have 
affected deviations from expected credit rating in the first year after the flooding 
occurred (+1y). For instance, the coefficient b5 (treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em) is 
negative (-3.063) and significant at 1% level when earnings management 
measures are Modified DD variable as shown in Panel A and -1.910 (p < 0.01) 
and when earnings management measures are Performance Match dummy 
variable as shown in Panel B. Similarly for REM measures and firms in the 
flooding sample, the coefficient b5 (treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em) is negative (-
4.226 and -2.776) and significant at 5% level and 5% level when earnings 
management measures are Disc and Disc dummy variables, respectively as 
shown in Panel A and B.  
Overall, we find the impact of AEM on deviations from expected credit rating in 
the first year after the tsunami occurred (+1y); whereas, we find the 
consequences of both accruals and real earnings management on deviations 
from expected credit rating in the second year after the flooding occurred (+2y).  
This is likely due to the difference in the time period of each disaster, which may 
affect the timing of the issuance of the corporate financial statements including 
the effects from the disaster to the public and may therefore reflect the credit 
rating adjustment made by the credit rating agencies. Generally, floods have 
more long-lasting effects than a tsunami. The hospitality industry that was 
affected by a series of tsunami needed less time to estimate the total damages 
and losses from the tsunami which lasted between 10 minutes to 2 hours, 
compared to the manufacturing industry that was affected by the flooding for a 
period of 2-3 months. Moreover, the flooding caused disruptions to 
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manufacturing supply chains affecting the regional automobile production and 
causing a global shortage of hard disk drives which lasted throughout 2012. It 
can be shown that corporate financial statements disclosing the amount of total 
economic loss from flooding were issued publicly after 2012. It can be inferred 
thus that firms in the tsunami sample were able to issue the corporate financial 
statements including the effects from the disaster to the public sooner than the 
firms in the flooding sample; thus, it comes as no surprise that credit rating 
agencies can recognize that firms are managing earnings during the tsunami 
period sooner than during the flooding period. This is consistent with the result 
that credit rating agencies penalize firms in the tsunami sample engaging in 
earnings management in the first year after the disaster occurred by lowering 
their credit ratings. Whereas, they penalize firms in the flooding sample 
engaging in earnings management in the second year after the disaster 
occurred. 
As mentioned above, our results show that the coefficients b4 and b5 are 
significantly negative for both the tsunami and the flooding samples. This is 
consistent with our prediction that treated firms with strong earnings 
management during disasters are negatively associated with deviations from 
expected credit rating. This suggests that credit rating agencies can detect 
earnings management activities in periods of natural disaster and penalize firms 
with earnings management by lowering their credit rating.  
In summary, consistent with the main analysis reported in Table 4.8, these 
results support the H1 that in the first and second year after the disasters hit, 
the managers managing earnings have affected deviations from expected credit 
rating. In other words, this analysis provides us with greater confidence in the 
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main results and strengthens the evidence over our first hypothesis that the 
association between earnings management and deviations from expected credit 
rating is moderated by the occurrence of a natural disaster. 
4.3.2 Additional test to trade-off the consequences of the preference 
between AEM and REM on deviations from expected credit rating during 
the disaster 
Next, we run additional tests to examine whether firms engaging in AEM over 
the disaster period have influenced deviations from their expected credit as well 
as firms engaging in REM. In other words, the purpose of this sensitivity 
analyse is to trade-off the consequences of the preference between accruals 
and real earnings management on deviations from expected credit rating during 
natural disasters. We employ the ordinary least square (OLS) regression model 
with robust standard errors clustered at industry level and year fixed effects as 
follow: 
diff i,t+1  = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2AEM + b3treatedT/treatedF*AEM 
+ b4REM + b5treatedT/treatedF*REM  + b6control variables + e)    (4) 
As equation (4), we interact the treatedT/treatedF*AEM (b3) and 
treatedT/treatedF*REM (b5) to trade-off the preference between two types of 
earnings management (AEM and REM) in four models as follows: (1) between 
Modified DD and CFO variables; (2) between Modified DD and Disc variables; 
(3) between Performance Match and CFO variables; and (4) between 
Performance Match and Disc variables.  
If the coefficients b3 and b5 are significant, treated firms prefer the use of both 
discretionary accruals and REM strategy to influence deviations from expected 
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credit rating during natural disaster more than control firms. However, if either 
coefficients b3 or b5 is statistically significantly different to zero, it indicates that 
treated firms prefer to use discretionary accruals or REM technique managing 
credit rating during natural disaster by trading-off the costs and benefits of each 
other as substitute.  
Table 4.12 reports OLS coefficient estimates as equation (4), in which the 
dependent variable is the regression of deviations from expected credit rating 
(diff), which is a firm's actual CR as of 31st March minus its expected CR as 
estimating the ordered probit model in equation (2). 
This table reports the results and presents evidence that firms in the tsunami 
sample engaging in only discretionary accruals (but not real earnings 
management) after the tsunami occurred have indeed influenced deviations 
from their expected credit rating. Furthermore, we find negative coefficients b3 in 
all models as reported in columns (1-4) on our dummy variable 
(treatedT/treatedF*AEM) for firms in the tsunami sample of -7.356, -6.998, -
3.536, and -2.923 (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10), respectively. 
However, in the flooding sample, our results show that firms engaging in only 
REM after the flooding occurred have indeed influenced deviations from their 
expected credit rating. Table 4.12 reports negative coefficients b5 in model 2 
and model 4 as reported in columns (6 and 8) on our dummy variable 
(treatedT/treatedF*REM) for firms in the flooding sample of -4.058, and -2.712 
(p < 0.01, and p < 0.05), respectively.  
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Table 4.12: Trading-off the consequences of the preference between 
accruals and real earnings management during disasters on deviations 
from expected credit rating 
      diffi,t+1    = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2AEM + b3treatedT/treatedF*AEM + 
b4REM + b5treatedT/treatedF*REM  + b6control variables + e)  (4)       
 
   Residual of earnings management  
 
Tsunami 
 
Flooding 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF 0.132 0.079 -0.110 -0.021 
 
-0.225 -0.359 -0.169 -0.338 
 
(0.641) (0.685) (0.670) (0.709) 
 
(0.537) (0.525) (0.400) (0.392) 
Modified DD 0.923* 0.931* 
   
-0.620 -1.122** 
  
 
(0.533) (0.539) 
   
(0.486) (0.431) 
  Performance 
Match 
  
1.360*** 0.968*** 
   
-0.155 -0.133 
   
(0.412) (0.299) 
   
(0.224) (0.213) 
CFO -0.334 
 
-1.451 
  
0.232 
 
0.113 
 
 
(1.052) 
 
(1.217) 
  
(0.451) 
 
(0.337) 
 
Disc 
 
0.937 
 
0.847 
  
1.041* 
 
0.614 
  
(1.363) 
 
(1.397) 
  
(0.587) 
 
(0.485) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*AEM -7.356** -6.998** -3.536** -2.923*   0.427 0.311 0.070 -0.256 
  (2.958) (3.405) (1.675) (1.502)   (0.373) (0.344) (0.271) (0.337) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*REM 1.301 0.380 0.642 2.166   -1.721 -4.058*** -1.467 -2.712** 
  (2.359) (2.139) (1.999) (2.094)   (1.171) (1.462) (1.040) (1.386) 
mb 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.023 
 
-0.101*** -0.098*** -0.115*** -0.113*** 
 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) 
profit -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.010 -0.012 -0.003 -0.004 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
size 0.677** 0.692** 0.701** 0.701** 
 
0.592* 0.601* 0.200 0.197 
 
(0.306) (0.305) (0.280) (0.286) 
 
(0.339) (0.333) (0.225) (0.224) 
growth -0.495 -0.506 -0.804 -0.689 
 
0.404*** 0.515*** 0.206 0.267 
 
(0.585) (0.597) (0.595) (0.655) 
 
(0.146) (0.154) (0.226) (0.230) 
roa 0.640 0.473 1.113 0.813 
 
-0.746 -0.463 -1.191 -1.357* 
 
(1.476) (1.465) (1.414) (1.431) 
 
(0.802) (0.658) (0.829) (0.713) 
lev 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 
-0.054* -0.052* -0.040 -0.039 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) 
intcov -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
 
0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.687** 0.688* 0.578** 0.662* 
 
0.575 0.579 0.594 0.583 
 
(0.293) (0.340) (0.268) (0.327) 
 
(0.546) (0.544) (0.587) (0.589) 
Intercept -3.969** -4.003** -4.038*** -4.080*** 
 
-3.006 -2.980 -0.633 -0.555 
 
(1.556) (1.506) (1.417) (1.422) 
 
(2.116) (2.082) (1.510) (1.520) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.251 0.249 0.215 0.200 
 
0.178 0.190 0.135 0.139 
Observ. 281 281 281 281   528 528 528 528 
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Table 4.12 trades-off the consequences of the preference between two types of earnings 
management (AEM and REM) during natural disaster on deviations from expected credit rating. 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions with firms' deviations from expected credit 
ratings (Diff) as equation (4) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors. Diff is a firm's actual 
credit rating as at 31
st
 March minus its expected credit rating as estimating the ordered probit 
model in equation (2). 
     Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e)  (2) 
Table 4.12 has the main independent variable of interest, which is coefficient for 
(treatedT/treatedF*AEM, and treatedT/treatedF*REM) in equation (4). We use the residuals of 
AEM and REM, which are independent variable. Moreover, we compare between AEM and 
REM by using four models: (1) between modified DD and CFO variables as shown in columns 
(1 and 5), (2) between modified DD and Disc variables as shown in columns (2 and 6), (3) 
between Performance Match and CFO variables as shown in columns (3 and 7); and (4) 
between Performance Match and Disc variables as shown in columns (4 and 8). The coefficients 
shown in bold are statistically significant at less than 10 percent level. Table 4.12 also reports 
the mean R
2
 for each of these regressions. All variables are otherwise calculated as described 
in appendix 4.1. We include industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the models as indicated, but 
do not report the coefficients. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Overall, coefficients b3 is significant for firms in the tsunami sample in all 
models, while, coefficients b5 is significant for firms in the flooding sample when 
we compare between (1) Modified DD and Disc variables, and (2) Performance 
Match and Disc variables. Therefore, it can be inferred that treated firm 
managers utilizing two types of earnings management as substitute have 
affected deviations from expected credit rating during disasters by selecting use 
discretionary accruals for firms in the tsunami sample and REM for firms in the 
flooding sample.  
Again, this analysis provides us with greater confidence in the main results as 
shown in Table 4.8 and supporting reason that the difference in timing of each 
disaster occurred is associated with the selecting on earnings management 
techniques of managers. The reason is that managers can engage in REM only 
during the quarterly reporting; whereas, they can manipulate earnings via AEM 
at the end of period. Thus, firms in the tsunami sample have insufficient time to 
have indeed influenced deviations from their expected credit rating by using 
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REM. In contrast, firms in the flooding sample have sufficient time to manipulate 
earnings via REM because flooding occurred at the beginning of the last 
quarter.  
Moreover, our results report that coefficients b3 and b5 are significantly negative. 
Hence, we can imply that credit rating agencies are able to detect earnings 
management and penalize firms with earnings management by lowering their 
credit rating. This supports the first hypothesis that the relation between 
earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating is moderated 
by the occurrence of a natural disaster. 
4.3.3 Additional test after deleting firms with high and low credit 
ratings levels of creditworthiness  
We run additional test to re-examine the relationship between deviations from 
expected credit rating and earnings management over the disasters period by 
deleting firms with actual and expected credit rating better than A+ and worse 
than C.  
Because firms with the highest levels of creditworthiness are more likely to 
obtain the most favourable credit ratings, they have the least incentives to 
manage earnings around natural disaster. Similarly, financially constrained firms 
with the low levels of creditworthiness may have the inability to manipulate 
earnings. Therefore, we re-examine the relationship between deviations from 
expected credit rating and earnings management over the disasters period as 
equation (1) after deleting firms with the high and low levels of creditworthiness.  
Again, the dependent variable is the firms' deviations from expected credit 
ratings (diff). However, we delete firms with actual CR and expected CR better 
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than A+ and worse than C. We present the level of credit ratings which we use 
for this sensitivity analysis as in appendix 4.2 (column 6). 
Table 4.13: Additional and sensitivity analyses by deleting firms with high 
and low credit ratings levels of creditworthiness 
difft+1    = fi,t (b0 + b1treatedT/treatedF + b2em + b3treatedT/treatedF*em +  
                  b4control variables + e)       (1)       
 
  Tsunami   Flooding 
 
AEM  REM 
 
AEM  REM 
  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc  
Modified 
DD 
Performance 
Match CFO Disc 
treatedT/ 
treatedF -0.240 0.027 
 
-0.216 0.162 
 
-0.681*** -0.271 
 
-0.489* -0.648** 
 
(0.609) (0.671) 
 
(0.645) (0.824) 
 
(0.208) (0.474) 
 
(0.243) (0.242) 
em 1.551** 1.488*** -1.044* -2.077 
 
-0.452 -0.003 
 
0.185 0.347 
 
(0.604) (0.449) 
 
(0.516) (2.199) 
 
(0.584) (0.197) 
 
(0.318) (0.354) 
treatedT/ 
treatedF*em -5.079* -1.715 
 
1.217 -0.608   0.772 -1.199*** -1.113** -2.004*** 
  (2.956) (1.790) 
 
(3.024) (0.712)   (1.160) (0.446) 
 
(0.567) (0.764) 
mb 0.044 0.062* 
 
0.038 0.034 
 
-0.073*** -0.107*** -0.077*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.031) (0.033) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) 
 
(0.020) (0.024) 
 
(0.020) (0.020) 
profit -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032*** 
 
-0.008 -0.005 
 
-0.010 -0.011 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
size 0.508*** 0.489*** 0.480*** 0.529*** 
 
0.183 0.227 
 
0.453* 0.430* 
 
(0.149) (0.167) 
 
(0.163) (0.178) 
 
(0.137) (0.254) 
 
(0.234) (0.230) 
growth -0.636 -0.198 
 
-0.561 -0.528 
 
0.146 0.168 
 
0.297* 0.307* 
 
(0.426) (0.409) 
 
(0.370) (0.561) 
 
(0.199) (0.237) 
 
(0.156) (0.166) 
roa 1.342 0.990 
 
1.075 0.843 
 
0.870 -0.018 
 
0.075 -0.186 
 
(1.560) (1.338) 
 
(1.585) (1.522) 
 
(0.540) (0.041) 
 
(0.431) (0.403) 
lev -0.004 0.004 
 
-0.003 -0.002 
 
0.014* -0.044 
 
0.011 0.009 
 
(0.008) (0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.008) (0.027) 
 
(0.011) (0.010) 
intcov -0.000*** -0.000* 
 
-0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000** 
 
0.000** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
plusminus 0.533* 0.562 
 
0.570** 0.528*  -0.408* 0.572 
 
-0.388* -0.414** 
 (0.270) (0.336) 
 
(0.257) (0.294)  (0.218) (0.614) 
 
(0.199) (0.193) 
Intercept -3.460*** -3.932*** -3.485*** -3.563***  -1.013 -0.963 
 
-2.590* -2.451* 
 (0.654) (0.733) 
 
(0.731) (0.690)  (0.895) (1.722) 
 
(1.396) (1.386) 
Fixed effects I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
 
I,Y I,Y 
Adjust R
2
 0.345 0.339 
 
0.324 0.324 
 
0.165 0.147 
 
0.187 0.191 
Observ. 221 221 
 
221 221   480 480 
 
480 480 
 
Table 4.13 presents the result from an OLS regressions with firms' deviations from expected 
credit ratings proxies as equation (1) and (in parentheses) robust standard errors by deleting 
firms with high and low credit ratings levels of creditworthiness. The final sample includes 221 
and 480 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2006 and 2008-2013, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the regression of firms' diff, which is a firm's actual CR as at 31
st
 March, 
which is an ordinal variable taking on values from 2 to 18 representing the firm’s S&P long-term 
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credit rating, minus its expected CR, which is an ordinal variable taking on values between 2 
and 18 as estimating the ordered probit model in equation (2). 
     Actual CRi,t+1 = fi,t (b0 + b1mb+ b2tang + b3rd + b4rdind + b5sga + b6profit + b7size + b8operrisk + e)  (2) 
This table has the main independent variable of interest, which is coefficient for 
(treatedT/treatedF*em) in equation (1). We use the residuals of two earnings management 
measures, which are the independent variable. The coefficients shown in bold are statistically 
significant at less than 10 percent level. Table 4.13 also reports the mean R
2
 for each of these 
regressions. All variables are otherwise calculated as described in appendix 4.1. We include 
industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects in the models as indicated, but do not report the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
 
We base our conclusion about H1 on the statistical significance of coefficients 
of treatedT/treatedF*em, that is, b3 in equation (1). In Table 4.13, we use only 
the residuals from four earnings management models (Modified DD, 
Performance Match, CFO, and Disc variables) as the independent variable to 
measure earnings management.  
For the tsunami sample, the coefficient b3 (treatedT/treatedF*em) is negative (-
5.079) and highly significant (p < 0.10), in the Modified DD regression as shown 
in column (1). However, results appear to be statistically insignificant for all 
REM regressions for firms in the tsunami sample. In the flooding sample, we 
find a negative coefficient of -1.199, -1.113, and -2.004 (p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and 
p < 0.01) on b3 (treatedT/treatedF*em) in Performance Match, CFO and Disc 
variables, respectively as shown in columns (6-8).  
Consistent with the main analysis reported in Table 4.8, these results confirm 
once again our first hypothesis that the relation between earnings management 
and deviations from expected credit rating is moderated by the occurrence of a 
natural disaster. Moreover, our results support the idea that credit rating 
agencies are able to detect earnings management and make adjustments in the 
financial report, including reconsider credit rating by lowering their credit rating. 
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In other words, they penalize firms with engage in earnings management as 
reputation incentive.  
4.3.4 Alternative earnings management proxies  
As reported in the previous section, we use two variants, the residuals from 
earnings management models and an earnings management dummy, to 
measure earnings management. However, we re-run our analyses by using 
alternative measures of accruals and real earnings management, which is the 
absolute value of earnings management in order to corroborate our results. 
Results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively similar to those reported in the main 
tables. Moreover, all models are presented with industry and year fixed effects 
but we have also run the models using firm and year fixed effects. Once again, 
the results (not tabulated) remain unchanged. 
5 Conclusions 
This research provides evidence that the occurrence of two different natural 
disasters, the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the 2011 flood in Thailand, 
affect the relationship of earnings management with deviations from expected 
credit rating. We test the joint relation among three important phenomena, the 
natural disasters, earnings management, and deviations from expected credit 
ratings and find that the relation between earnings management and deviations 
from expected credit rating is moderated by the occurrence of a natural 
disaster. Interestingly, results obtained are significantly negative between 
deviations from expected credit rating and earnings management during the 
disasters. This suggests that earnings management affect negatively deviations 
from expected credit rating during natural disaster, resulting in actual credit 
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rating to be a lower than expected credit rating. It implies that credit rating 
agencies are able to detect earnings management activities and make 
adjustments in the financial report during the disaster. In other words, they 
penalize firms with earnings management by providing a lower credit rating 
during the disaster as reputation incentive. 
Next, we also provide evidence to support the argument that the decline in the 
firm performance due to the disasters would be more severe in countries with 
high level of intensity of disaster. Our results also report that the interaction 
(treatedT/treatedF*em) coefficients across the two regressions are statistically 
different from each other, with firms in the flooding sample group showing 
greater statistically magnitude than firms in the tsunami group. This supports 
that the effect of earnings management on deviations from expected credit 
rating is conditional on the severity of the disaster. In other words, the more 
important the level of intensity of the disaster, the more likely the credit rating 
agencies will adjust their credit ratings for earnings management. 
Finally, we separate bad and good performance firms to examine and support 
that earnings management measures for SG and IG firms are related to 
deviations from expected credit rating in areas affected by natural disaster. The 
results show that managers manipulating earnings during disasters have 
affected deviations from expected credit rating for only SG firms but not for IG 
firms. This supports that the moderating role of a natural disaster in the relation 
between earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating will 
be different between SG and IG firms. 
Additional analyses confirm these primary results by considering the 
consequences of earnings management on deviations from expected credit 
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rating in each year following the disasters, trading-off the consequences of the 
two types of earnings management (AEM and REM) on deviations from 
expected credit rating during natural disaster, deleting firms with the high and 
low credit ratings levels of creditworthiness, and employing alternative proxies 
for earnings management.  
Our study helps investors to better understand how managers react to reduce 
the impact of natural disasters on rating deviations. However, our sample is 
relatively small compared to many archival studies examining credit rating due 
to limitations on data availability from Capital IQ. Moreover, this thesis is limited 
to ratings that were issued only by Standard and Poor's but does not contain 
ratings from the other two large credit rating agencies, which are Moody's and 
Fitch. Future studies could use larger sample sizes when and if more data 
becomes available to can be generalized to the larger population. 
. 
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Appendix 4.1: Abbreviations and variables used in the chapter 
AEM Accruals earnings management 
REM Real earnings management 
IG Investment grade rating (BBB- or above) 
SG Speculative grade rating (BB+ or below) 
CR Credit rating 
Actual CR Actual credit rating as of 31st March is an ordinal 
variable taking on values from 1 to 20 representing the 
firm’s S&P long-term credit rating (e.g. D=1, and 
AA=20) 
Expected CR Firms’ expected ratings estimate by using a model 
from the target capital structure literature, following 
Alissa et al. (2013) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) 
diff  Deviations from expected credit rating is a firm's actual 
rating as of 31st March minus its expected rating as 
estimating the ordered probit model in equation (2) 
em dummy Earnings management dummy that takes the value of 
1 if firm’s AEM and REM estimated are higher or equal 
to industry average for a given year and 0, otherwise 
treatedT Treatment firms in tsunami sample is dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 in the countries which were hit 
by tsunami in 2005-2006 and 0, otherwise 
treatedF Treatment firms in flooding sample is dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 in the countries which were hit 
by flooding in 2012-2013 and 0, otherwise 
treatedT/treatedF*em Use to assess the consequences of earnings 
management during natural disasters (tsunami/ 
flooding) on deviations from expected credit rating 
Modified DD The residual from modified Dechow and Dichev model 
following McNichols (2002) 
Performance Match The residual from performance-matched Jones model 
following Kothari et al. (2005) 
CFO The residual from cash flow from operations model 
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following Roychowdhury (2006)  
Disc The residual from discretionary expenses model 
following Roychowdhury (2006) 
Modified DD dummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if Modified DD variable 
is higher or equal to the industry average for a given 
year, otherwise is zero 
Performance Match 
dummy 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if Performance Match 
variable is higher or equal to the industry average for a 
given year, otherwise is zero 
CFO dummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if CFO variable is 
higher or equal to the industry average for a given 
year, otherwise is zero 
Disc dummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if Disc variable is 
higher or equal to the industry average for a given 
year, otherwise is zero 
mb Firm’s market value of assets scaled by total assets 
tang Asset tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment, 
scaled by total assets 
rd Research and development (R&D) expenses scaled by 
sales 
rdind A binary variable set equal to 1 if R&D expenses is not 
missing and 0, otherwise 
sga Selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses 
scaled by sales 
profit Operating income scaled by lagged total assets. 
size The natural logarithm of sales 
operrisk The standard deviation of operating income scaled by 
lagged total assets 
growth The percentage change in sales 
roa A firm’s return on assets 
lev Ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets 
intcov Interest coverage ratio 
plusminus A binary variable set equals to 1 if firms are near a 
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broad rating boundary (plus and minus) and 0 if firms 
are in the middle of ratings 
y0 Year (0) is defined as the fiscal year during which 
disaster occurred 
+1y Year (+1) is defined as the first year after the disaster 
occurred 
+2y Year (+2) is defined as the second year after the 
disaster occurred 
treatedTy1/treatedFy1 Treatment group in year (+1) is dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 in the countries which were hit by 
tsunami in 2005 or flooding in 2012 and 0, otherwise 
treatedTy2/treatedFy2 Treatment group in year (+2) is dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 in the countries which were hit by 
tsunami in 2006 or flooding in 2013 and 0, otherwise 
treatedTy1/treatedFy1*em Use to assess the consequences of earnings 
management in the first year after tsunami occurred in 
2005 and flooding occurred in 2012 on deviations from 
expected credit rating 
treatedTy2/treatedFy2*em Use to assess the consequences of earnings 
management in the second year after the tsunami 
occurred in 2006 and flooding occurred in 2013 on 
deviations from expected credit rating 
treatedT/treatedF*AEM Use to assess the consequences of accruals earnings 
management on deviations from expected credit rating 
during natural disaster 
treatedT/treatedF*REM Use to assess the consequences of real earnings 
management on deviations from expected credit rating 
during natural disaster 
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Appendix 4.2: Summary the level of credit ratings 
S&P 
credit 
ratings Description 
Score 
(Main 
analysis) Score (Robust 1) 
Score 
(Robust 2) 
 
  
Both 
disasters 
Tsunami 
2004 
Flooding 
2011 
Both 
disasters  
D In default 1 1 1 - 
 
 
 
C Default imminent 
with little prospect 
for recovery 
2 1 1 2 
 CC 3 1 1 3 
 CCC- 4 1 1 4 
 
CCC 
Extremely 
speculative 5 2 1 5 
 
CCC+ Substantial risks 6 3 2 6 
Speculative-
grade 
B- 
Highly 
speculative 
7 4 3 7 
 B 8 5 4 8 
 B+ 9 6 5 9 
 BB- 
Non-investment 
grade speculative 
10 7 6 10 
 BB 11 8 7 11 
 BB+ 12 9 8 12   
BBB- 
Lower medium 
grade 
13 10 9 13 
 BBB 14 11 10 14 
 BBB+ 15 12 11 15 
 A- 
Upper medium 
grade 
16 13 12 16 
 
A 17 14 13 17 
Investment-
grade 
A+ 18 15 14 18 
 AA- 
High grade 
19 16 15 - 
 AA 20 17 - - 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 
1 The motivation of the research 
There are at least two main reasons why it is interesting to study the effect of 
natural disaster on earnings management. Firstly, natural disasters can cause 
significant negative impacts on human lives, businesses, and the economy. 
Firms cannot fully avoid natural disasters risk. In other words, even if many 
firms have set plans to reduce the adverse impact of natural disasters, their 
ability to remain in business in the aftermath of the disaster may still be 
uncertain. Secondly, natural disasters are becoming more frequent and severe 
(World economic Forum, 2015; World Economic Forum, 2016; and World 
Economic Forum, 2018b). Hence shedding light on how firms manage earnings 
during natural disasters and the implications of such earnings management on 
credit ratings appears to be important.  
We focus on two different disasters that hit the Asian continent: the 2004 
tsunami and the 2011 flooding. We Choose Asia because it has faced more 
natural disasters than any other continent. The tsunami in 2004 is one of the 
deadliest natural disasters in recorded history and the flooding in 2011 caused 
disruptions to manufacturing supply chains affecting the regional automobile 
production, and also causing a global shortage of hard disk drives which last 
throughout 2012 (Sms Tsunami Warning, 2012; and Centre for research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters, 2012). Moreover, two different disasters, and 
261 
 
samples of analysis, are useful to address concerns over the generalizability of 
the evidence obtained. 
2 The objectives of the research 
The thesis begins with a review of the literatures on earnings quality and 
earnings management to understand the conceptual underpinnings of earnings 
management research. This literature review serves as the basis to conduct the 
empirical studies. One focuses on natural disasters as the determinant of 
earnings management. The other focuses on the relationship between earnings 
management and credit ratings in the occurrence of a natural disaster. 
The main objective of the first empirical study is to examine whether firms in 
countries that are hit by natural disaster are engaging more in earnings 
management. We expect companies to manage earnings during a disaster 
because of a significant loss of investor confidence in the survival of the firm or 
a significant decrease in the performance of firms or because they want to 
attract government help. Whether managers are managing earnings upwards or 
downwards depends on which incentive prevails (i.e. the market hypothesis or 
the political cost hypothesis).  
The market incentive hypothesis for earnings management suggests that when 
a firm experiences poor performance due to exogenous shocks (like a financial 
crisis, or a natural disaster) managers may make adjustments to their policies 
(such as changing estimates of bad debt, reducing employee training expense, 
extending the credit term) to improve the look of financial statements. The 
political cost hypothesis instead suggests that when a firm is suffering from 
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exogenous shocks it manages earnings downwards to benefit from the 
government’s help or lower the political costs to the firm. 
In the second empirical study, the research question focuses on how the 
relation between earnings management and credit rating, established in prior 
literature, is affected by natural disasters. Firms are likely to affect credit rating 
by managing earnings and obtain a more favourable credit rating or avoid a 
downgrade during natural disaster. However, whether credit ratings are affected 
by earnings management practices during the disaster period will depend on 
the trade-off between the reputational and financial incentives of the credit 
rating agencies. 
According to the reputational concerns hypothesis, if credit rating agencies 
recognize that firm manage earnings during the disasters, they should penalize 
those firms by lowering their credit rating. At the same time, however, credit 
rating agencies might be financially motivated not to penalize firms with 
earnings management during the disasters. This contradicting financial motive 
may arise because of a conflict of interest, i.e. credit rating agencies are paid by 
rated firms, so more lenient ratings may ensure client loyalty. 
3 The main finding of the research 
3.1 The first empirical study 
With respect to the question whether natural disasters affect earnings 
management, we find during a natural disaster firms are more likely to use both 
accrual and real earnings management, although our results are sensitive to the 
measure of earnings management. All in all, we interpret our evidence as 
aligned with the idea that managers manage earnings upwards to boost market 
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confident in the firm’s survival in the aftermath the disasters (i.e. support for the 
market incentive hypothesis). We also consider whether the increase in the 
level of earnings management depends on the intensity of the disaster. We find 
that the coefficient of interest in the flooding setting shows greater magnitude 
than in the tsunami group, suggesting that the more intense the disaster, the 
higher the level of earnings management. 
3.2 The second empirical study 
In the second empirical study, we hypothesize that the association between 
earnings management and deviations from expected credit rating is moderated 
by the occurrence of a natural disaster. Overall, our results suggest that 
earnings management negatively affects deviations of actual credit ratings from 
expected credit ratings during a natural disaster. This indicates that credit rating 
agencies can detect earnings management activities and penalize firms 
engaging in earnings management by lowering their credit rating as predicted 
by the reputation incentives hypothesis. 
Next, we expand the results in the first empirical study (Chapter 3) and examine 
whether the effect of earnings management on the deviations from expected 
credit rating is conditional to the intensity of the disaster. The evidence shows 
that the moderation effect of natural disasters is statistically greater in the 
flooding group than in the tsunami group. Thus, we conclude that the higher the 
intensity of disaster, the more the credit rating agencies will adjust their credit 
rating for earnings management.  
The third hypothesis focuses on whether credit rating agencies’ response to 
earnings management of speculative grade firms differs from that of investment 
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grade firms during natural disaster. We test this by running two separate 
regressions, for the speculative and the investment grade groups. Consistent 
with the main analysis reported (non-separate between SG and IG groups), our 
results suggest that credit rating agencies penalize SG firms with earnings 
management by lowering their credit rating. Because of several constraints in 
earnings management for SG firms, it is not surprising that credit rating 
agencies are likely to detect earnings management in SG firms easily. However, 
in the IG group, there is no evidence that firms engaging in accruals and real 
earnings management during the tsunami and flooding periods are penalized by 
credit rating agencies. Hence, consistent with H3, the moderating role of a 
natural disaster in the relation between earnings management and deviations 
from expected credit rating is different between SG and IG. 
4 The limitations of the research 
This study is subject to certain limitations. Firstly, the exclusion of some specific 
firms (i.e. financial firms, and utility firms) and non-listed firms previously 
mentioned might reduce the generalizability of the study.  
Secondly, the empirical test results based on secondary analysis of data using 
discretionary accrual models should be treated with caution, since discretionary 
accrual models are only a statistical proxy of earnings management at the firm 
level. Moreover, our measures of accruals earnings management may not 
adequately capture the underlying construct. While we do find generally 
consistent results for only aggregated accruals or total accruals for accruals 
earnings management measurement, future studies may wish to examine other 
research designs for accruals earnings management such as the distribution of 
earnings after management, and specific accruals. To measure real earnings 
265 
 
management, we use cash flow from operations and discretionary expenses 
models following Roychowdhury (2006); whereas, future studies may replicate 
the results with performance-matching technique advocated by Kothari et al. 
(2005). All these may be an avenue to measure accruals and real earnings 
management in the future. 
Thirdly, due to limitations on data availability from Bloomberg, our sample is 
relatively small compared to many archival studies examining abnormal 
accruals and real activities. Future studies could use larger sample sizes when 
and if more data becomes available. As mentioned above in Chapter 3, 
Philippines has a small sample size compared with other countries (Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Korea). We note that the small samples size in Philippines may 
cause problems for the associated econometrics (i.e. increases the likelihood of 
a Type II error skewing the results), which lead to decrease statistical power 
and increase the margin of error (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). However, including 
Philippines still ensures that the sample is large enough for conducting analyses 
on subsamples of interest by splitting the data into the separate categories and 
fitting separate models (i.e. high leverage and low leverage groups, high impact 
and low impact industries groups, and speculative grade and investment grade 
groups) (Lin et al., 2013). 
Next, this research is limited to ratings that were issued only by Standard and 
Poor's and does not contain ratings from the other two large credit rating 
agencies, which are Moody's and Fitch. As a result, the findings may not be 
generalizable to the overall credit rating environment. Moreover, the sample is 
constrained to firms that have ratings available in Capital IQ, further reducing 
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the sample. Overcoming these limitations may be an avenue for future 
research. 
Fifth, real earnings management tests should be interpreted with caution in light 
of the fact that they may actually be capturing actual disaster effects on the 
production and investment processes of firms rather than real activities 
manipulation. It is likely that the occurrence of a natural disaster impairs a firm’s 
ability to invest in the near future. This can be due to a lack of funding that must 
be diverted to repair the damages of the natural disaster or to the fact that some 
investments must be postponed because after the disaster the firm can no 
longer operate at full capacity. For example, if the disaster destroyed part of a 
firm’s plant and the production stopped for a period, it may be that the firm will 
not invest in advertising during that period. Alternatively, if a costly machinery 
has been destroyed during the disaster, it is likely that the management will 
have to divert funding from some discretionary expenditures to the investment 
in a new machinery. All these decisions clearly affect the real earnings 
management metrics used in the paper as they do not represent earnings 
management and would be against our arguments. However, firms may still 
have incentives to spend money to invest in discretionary expense after the 
disasters. For example, firms may still want to invest in advertising after the 
disaster to communicate with customers, encourage sales, and avoid a loss in 
the value of the brand. Further, if firms faced damages in equipment, they might 
spend money for maintenance or training of employees on how to use the new 
machineries and equipment. In this case, the abnormal discretionary expenses 
are capturing earnings management activities.  
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Finally, we note that the interpretation of results presented in Chapter 4 seems 
partially to contrast with Chapter 3. The interpretation of the negative relation 
between earnings management and credit rating provided in this study is that 
credit rating agencies recognize that the accounting process has been 
tempered after a natural disaster and thus they penalize firms that managed 
earnings. Accordingly, if external stakeholders can see through earnings 
management practices (as shown in Chapter 4) why should companies engage 
in earnings management after the disaster as documented in Chapter 3? This is 
interesting question to be addressed in the future. However, credit ratings 
agencies are only one stakeholder. In our view, in the presence of such 
disasters, the benefits from communicating to the market (i.e. shareholders) that 
the firm is confident about future prospects through the use of upward earnings 
management may have greater benefits than the costs that arise from a 
potential credit downgrading. However, the study has not tested this issue and 
may be an avenue to provide the supporting evidence in the future. 
5 The implications for future research 
This study gives new insights into the earnings management literature by 
viewing natural disasters as determinants of earnings management and as 
factors affecting the consequences of earnings management. The findings not 
only yield a more reliable picture of how natural disasters affect both accrual-
based and real earnings management, but also, provide a better understanding 
on how credit ratings agencies rate firms engaging in earnings management in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster. Moreover, the study also supports the earlier 
findings on similar exogenous shocks, such as the financial crisis in Trombetta 
and Imperatore (2014), that the higher the impact from the natural disaster on 
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the firm, the more engagement in earnings management and the greater the 
effects from earnings management on the credit rating of the firm. The better 
understanding of how managers react to natural disasters and of credit rating 
agencies’ response to earning management of firms during natural disaster may 
help investors in making investment decisions, practitioners in assessing risk, 
and regulators in formulating appropriate policies to protect investors.  
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